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Tac Error

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About Tac Error

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  • Birthday 06/29/1992

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  1. Version 1.0


    A collection of British Army manuals published between 1995 and 1997 for trainers to craft a generic enemy similar to U.S. Army's OPFOR. They describe three types of forces: - Basic Forces: a carbon-copy of a late 1980s Soviet Army-style force oriented towards Gorbachev's defensive doctrine - Mobile Forces: based off of early 1990s Russian plans for an elite "Mobile Forces" - ROWEN: Generic third-world enemy While these manuals were published in the 1990s and after the Soviet Union fell, the first two forces described are useful references for Cold War-era scenarios, as they contain a more sophisticated understanding of Soviet/Russian-style tactics and techniques than early-mid-1980s publications. The Mobile Forces publications will be useful for depicting Soviet OMG or forward detachment formations.
  2. I'm not an expert, but if you have access to the "Journal of Slavic Military Studies" (formerly the "Journal of Soviet Military Studies"), there is an article by Fritz Stoeckli (one of the West's best specialists in Soviet correlation of forces and means calculations in the late 1980s) titled "The Correlation of Forces and Success in Overcoming Anti-Tank Defenses" which analyses Kardashevskii's data and calculations.
  3. The original source is an article published in the Soviet tactical journal "Voyenniy Vestnik/Military Herald" by Yu. Kardashevskiy in July 1979.
  4. By the end of the Cold War, the main military threat to the Soviet Union was from Western microchips, not Western tanks or jets. The USSR's conventional military forces were all well and good for fighting the sort of mechanized industrial wars that would have happened if the Cold War went hot in Europe, '45-'89, but as figures like Ogarkov foretold in the mid-'80s, the Soviet military and economic-technical base was ill-prepared to compete in the next round of the military arms race. That next round was a shift from large-scale mechanized forces to automated command & control systems and what Soviet theorists termed "reconnaissance-strike complexes". (Something like a closed-loop link between a dedicated reconnaissance asset and a firing unit, or example JSTARS) On that new technology though, I do recall the posts of a retired officer over at Armchair General forums, who said that the numbers and depth of those new technologies was too thin even in 1991.
  5. Version 1.0


    A 1990 Soviet Army Studies Office study on the usage of Soviet artillery on the defense.
  6. Version 1.0


    A guide to the Soviet forward detachment by James F. Holcomb of the Soviet Army Studies Office.
  7. Tour of the Chieftain in 1991: gWY2eLzVrU8
  8. Version 1.0


    A 1990 Soviet Army Studies Office study on a Soviet battalion on the defense.
  9. Version 1.0


    This is a full extract of the artillery chapter from the unpublished Field Manual 100-62, Armor- and Mechanized-Based Opposing Force: Tactics. It goes into much more detail of Soviet-style artillery than the TRADOC Heavy OPFOR Tactical Handbook.
  10. Generally, Soviet artillery operates differently, (For example, the commanders of artillery units are forward in mobile command observation posts *directing* the fires instead of "calls for fire" from FOs) but I don't know if SB can model such a system.
  11. A total rewrite. It's not widely available being a draft, but you might be able to find it in various U.S. Army schools, training centers or university libraries. (Such as Stanford or the Fort Leavenworth Combined Arms Research Library)
  12. Adding another reference to AKM's suggestions, I can suggest James Holcomb's study on Soviet artillery if you are like me and have trouble finding a copy of Bellamy's book not being sold at ludicrous prices. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a216371.pdf
  13. An issue of Red Thrust Star had an article on meeting engagements you guys might find interesting, linked below: http://nara-wayback-001.us.archive.org/peth04/20041020015617/http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/red-star/issues/JUL94/JUL94.HTML#Military%20sciences I would note, reading the article that references to precision-guided weapons and "future/modern battle" was part of Ogarkov's legacy to the Soviet Army when they tried to deal with the theater war in the information age, and so that stuff might not apply for 1980s scenarios. The 1984 edition of FM 100-2-1 has been widely referred to, but one author of the 1990 revision on another forum called it a "stereotyped, misleading, and woefully incomplete view of the subject", so I wouldn't rely on it that much.
  14. Here in the West at least, there's a lot of uncertainty on exactly what is "operational art". Is it grand tactics, minor strategy, or perhaps something else? The 1986 edition of FM 100-5 calls operational art as "the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations". Soviet specialist Charles Dick put it as "the business of successfully combining the combat activities of a large number of forces over a significant area of space and time in order to accomplish all or part of a strategic goal." It's interesting to see how operational art is interpreted in the West, but IMO it can get a little convoluted.
  15. What to a NATO officer is just a dirt path through a forest is to a Soviet, almost as much of a "road" is as a highway, and therefore just as much as a candidate for a regimental strike sector. If a NATO officer in planning his defense believes that a Soviet unit will be channeled along open valleys because the flanking wooded hills constitute an obstacle "on account of´╗┐ their lack of roads", then he might be in for an unpleasant surprise... :wink: