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Homer

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Everything posted by Homer

  1. Problem to change amunition in BETA

    It's top fed but its mounted upside down in the CV90
  2. common spelling mistake game

    occuring - occurring labratory - laboratory
  3. Responsible Behavior

    Got some funny stuff in there
  4. really cool little program

    http://sodaplay.com/
  5. Paper Topic

    I found this on my HD.... U.S. ARMY TACTICAL DOCTRINE FM 100-5 has been the bible of the Army’s war-fighting doctrine since it was first distributed in the early 1970s. This document has undergone a number of revisions over several administrations, and it’s more of a work in progress than canonized dogma. Troops in the field are expected to live and die by the concepts of the current edition. Before delving into those concepts, we must give some attention to the tactical thought that preceded them. Only then can you fully appreciate how the current doctrine has evolved and why it represents the most effective use of available resources on a battlefield that has become increasingly deadly. General Depuy When the first edition of FM 100-5 was published, General Depuy was the Commander of TRADOC, the Army training command headquarters. The doctrine promulgated in this volume was that of 'Active Defense.' Faced with overwhelming Soviet numerical superiority in the European theater of operations and the never-far-from-immediate threat of a Soviet attack through the Fulda Gap, Depuy endorsed a doctrine which drew heavily on Carl Von Clausewitz's principles of war, as well as the German experience during World War II. Active defense relied on firepower attrition and using the minimum force structure necessary to stall the threat until reinforcements could be brought to bear. To achieve this economy of force, defending forces would have to achieve the element of surprise, inflict maximum damage on the enemy, and also carefully husband their very limited combat power. Since Western forces were so grossly outnumbered on the border, the principal of economy of force was at least partly motivated by political factors. Additional divisions were unavailable for deployment to Europe, first due to U.S. commitments in Vietnam, and subsequently because of the extensive reduction in forces that occurred immediately after that conflict. Any other approach would have been nothing more than a paper tiger, without teeth. Even so, as you might have guessed, the teeth in Active Defense weren't particularly long or sharp. Lt. General Don Starry was in command of the forces at the line in the Fulda Gap during Depuy's tenure at TRADOC, and he was an avid and active opponent of FM 100-5's doctrine statement. Starry believed it to be more hype than help in the accomplishment of his very difficult mission. In 1977, he was given the opportunity to 'put up or shut up,' when he succeeded Depuy as the Commanding Officer of TRADOC. General Starry At the head of a good staff of professional junior officers, Starry developed the first draft of the Air-Land Battle Doctrine (ALBD). The success or failure of this edition of the ALBD hinged on four key principles: depth, agility, initiative, and synchronization. Depth is achieved via accurate and timely intelligence collection and dissemination to combat forces which, in turn, could interdict enemy reserves and second and third echelon troops before they could reach the front. In a perfect world, these interdiction operations would also strip first echelon enemy formations of the logistic and combat service support they need to maintain the tempo of offensive operations. Mobility is a contributing factor to agility, as defined in this version of the ALBD, but 'flexibility' is a more precise word for the concept Starry was trying to convey. Individual unit commanders must not only be able to react more quickly than their counterparts on the other side, but also do so in a coherent fashion that fits the tactical situation. All of the contingency plans, Battle Drills, Formation Drills, and Actions on Contact that remain in use today evolved from the principle of agility. Further, the fact that we have developed and trained with these tactical drills and systems to the point that they have become almost reflexive supports the third principle of ALBD as well. Initiative at the lowest possible level of the chain of command has remained the greatest difference between the American serviceman and his counterparts abroad. At the time Starry and his staff authored the ALBD, they also realized quite well that the Soviet soldier took almost no initiative without guidance from fairly high up in the chain of command. This was a weakness that ALBD was designed to exploit. ALBD elaborated beyond the obvious, however. In its context, initiative also meant 'offensive spirit, boldness, audacity and the propensity to take risks in the heat of battle.' There certainly weren't many risk takers on the other side, so why not foster a little 'he who does not risk will not win' mentality among our troops? The tactical philosophy of initiative was to gain contact with the enemy and relentlessly maintain that contact. The idea was to never allow him the opportunity to regroup and regain a clear picture of the battlefield. This not only allows small, determined forces to appear stronger than they really are, but it also has a tremendously negative psychological affect on the enemy, who is pounded day and night. The final principle, that of synchronization, is really an evolution of the combined-arms concept. When most people think of combined arms, they don't go beyond the common and very basic understanding of it. Artillery and air bombardment softens up the battlefield prior to a ground assault with tanks and infantry. Synchronization is a much more sophisticated concept than that, involving all of the combat and non-combat force multipliers at a commander's disposal. Non-combat force multipliers include electronic warfare, psychological operations, combat engineering, operational deception, and the element of surprise, among others. Each of these multipliers has its proper place in the sequence of engagement, from the planning phase through movement, combat, and consolidation after the mission is over. All of the combat arms and support services have their individual roles to fill in the sequence of engagement, and these differ from one type of unit to the next. Synchronization is the commander's ability to blend all of these diverse elements into a cohesive whole, such that they support the battle plan in the proper time and sequence to achieve a decisive affect. Perhaps the best analogy is to think of the battlefield commander as an orchestra leader, building woodwinds, brass, string, and percussion sections to a rousing crescendo that the audience cannot resist. All of these individual assets are used to maximum effect when synchronization is achieved, and therefore, friendly casualties are minimized and economy of force is achieved. The following brief excerpt about Major General Griffith's 1st Armored Division, a quote from Brig. Gen. Robert H. Scales, Jr., taken from Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War, illustrates the principle of synchronization, as well as that of depth, extremely well. 'The fight around Al-Busayyah was little more than a skirmish, but it was first blood for the Division. First, the fight confirmed, if only on a small scale, the superiority of Griffith's tactic of simultaneous attack in depth. To his front, Griffith created a carpet of combat power that stretched twentyfour hours and nearly a hundred kilometers ahead of his lead maneuver elements. At the greatest distance, Apache aircraft struck with Company sized attacks as far as fifty to sixty kilometers forward of the advancing tanks. At thirty kilometers, MLRS's began to inundate targets uncovered but as yet undestroyed by air attack. Once within direct observation of scout helicopters and forward observers, cannon artillery joined in the crescendo of firepower. Only after these four successive waves washed over the Iraqi defenses did Griffith carefully maneuver to achieve overwhelming tactical superiority and finish the fight with direct fire.' General Otis General Starry may have developed the original ALBD concept, but it had undergone additional revisions before being implemented in the preceding example from the Gulf War. General Otis, Starry's successor at TRADOC, was the guiding force behind a 1982 revision that developed the concept of 'Operational Level Warfare.' Traditionally, military thought resided in one of two camps, strategic or tactical. The former can be further divided into 'Grand Strategic,' which involves the movement of entire armies in support of political policy, and 'Strategic,' which focuses on the movement and employment of corps and divisions within those armies. Tactical thought lies at the other end of the spectrum, dealing with company, platoon, and squad fire and movement plans in response to specific battlefield situations. In other words, grand strategy conceived the Normandy invasion during World War II, strategy was used to assign beaches and landing zones to the various units which participated in that operation, and tactics were employed by those units to overcome the obstacles they encountered once they arrived onshore. General Otis recognized that this traditional division left a very broad area of military operations undefined, specifically the planning and coordination of regimental and battalion staffs, which is the natural interface between strategy and tactics. Some of the functions these staffs performed fell neatly into strategy, others cleanly into tactics, but far more of them involved blending both schools of thought. As such, Otis rightfully believed that a new level of military philosophy needed to be defined and studied. Under his guidance, the 1982 revision of FM 100-5 established the concept of Operational Level Warfare. Unlike Depuy's original approach of 'Active Defense,' the Operational Level Warfare concept was immediately embraced as doctrine by subordinate units, because, in essence, it simply canonized what they were already doing. The battle was far from over, however, and one of the most sacred cows of the military bureaucracy still had to be slain before ALBD would mature to its current stage of development. The Importance of Being Purple For Operational Level Warfare to succeed, virtually all of the well constructed, carefully nurtured barriers that existed between the various components of the armed forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) had to be torn down brick by brick. This was not an insignificant task. Anyone who thinks that inter-service rivalries are embodied only in sporting events like the Army-Navy football game has been living under a rock. In peacetime, the various services duke it out for the limited funding that each considers essential to equip, train, and maintain their ability to accomplish their mission in peace and war. In wartime, the stakes go even higher, and when things go wrong, fingers tend to get pointed across service boundaries far too frequently. That was the norm in the early 1980s, and it was built on at least 40 years of institutional momentum. Nevertheless, proper implementation of the revised ALBD meant that the Army had to count on the Air Force to conduct deep interdiction, for example, and both had to be able to coordinate their efforts at the operational level to achieve the aforementioned concept of synchronization. In other words, generals and admirals would no longer have the sole privilege of carving up battlefield responsibilities (after which each service would handle their share of the load relatively autonomously). The Joint Operations concept begins with just such a meeting, but it doesn't end there. Once the concept of an operation has been approved at the higher level, operational level commanders and their staffs, many of which now contain representatives from the other branches of service, must coordinate the execution of that plan at all levels as if inter-service boundaries do not exist. 'Purple Ops' became the slang for Joint Operations between the various armed forces, after some wiseacre determined that blending all of the various uniform colors together would produce the color purple. Initial resistance to Joint Operations was squashed after the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt illustrated that interoperability issues between the services needed to be resolved. Decades of independent research and development programs, service-specific doctrine statements, segregated support functions that wasted funding, and provincial attitudes had created a balanced force of four elements, each of which was fairly good at performing its assigned mission, but-with the possible exception of the Navy-Marine Corps team-was lousy at supporting the missions of the others. Communications frequencies and protocol varied from one service to the next, logistical planning and support functions weren't standardized, intelligence gathering assets weren't shared, and the list goes on and on. Many of these issues are still being refined, but the important thing to understand is that had this renaissance in military thought not begun between 1982 and 1986, the conduct of the Gulf War would have been entirely different. Granted, the outcome would have probably been the same, but both the duration and the cost of that conflict would likely have been much higher. Today’s Air-Land Battle Doctrine The current iteration of the ALBD relies on Joint Operations as an integral component and has incorporated a number of other lessons learned from recent operations. For example, when friendly casualties must be kept to a minimum, as is almost always the political reality of modern warfare, operations must be conducted swiftly and with overwhelming force. Night operations, though difficult to coordinate and execute, also contribute to this secondary goal. When collateral damage and civilian casualties are potential pitfalls to the conceived operations, precision-guided munitions can simplify the commander's task. Each of these lessons refine our ability to conduct ALBD, but their impact is more evolutionary than revolutionary. The heart of the concept remains the same. ALBD stresses becoming 'proactive,' rather than reactive, as soon as the opportunity permits. Do not allow the enemy to dictate the tempo of operations. Use the concepts of depth, agility, initiative, and synchronization to break up the first wave of any enemy attack, then move from a defensive to an offensive posture. Use air strikes, artillery, special operations units, cruise missiles, and other non-combat force multipliers to confuse, delay, and even break succeeding waves of enemy troops moving into the theater of operations. While this state of disorganization exists, exploit it with the synchronized application of joint firepower assets. These include rotary and fixed-wing attack aircraft, MLRS, naval gunfire and artillery (indirect fire), and optimal employment of fast, mechanized forces to achieve decisive effect on the ground to seize and hold territory which supports the objective of the operation.
  6. New Stealth plane.?

    Yes, it was just a design study. I mentioned it in reference to the movie "Stealth" whose plane is based on the Switchblade. This site has some info about it: http://www.area51zone.com/aircraft/switchblade.shtml As for your flying triangle, it might be a X-plane... a couple of the recent ones are triangle in shape (X-33?)
  7. New Stealth plane.?

    It's based on a real stealth design proposal called the "switchblade". I think it came from Lockheed.
  8. Is my scenario uploaded?

    Normally the file manager does respond with message when the file has been successfully received... time outs are usually caused by a connection issue.
  9. common spelling mistake game

    proceedure - procedure
  10. Vista Help

    ....and here is some other stuff you can check out: http://www.nvidia.com/object/windows_vista_hotfixes.html
  11. Vista Help

    Once into SB, use ALT-W to switch to windowed mode.
  12. common spelling mistake game

    forteen - fourteen fourty - forty forth - fourth
  13. Problems with new computer

    Is there a specific reason why you are running Vista 64?
  14. This is what....

    Are you sure about that?
  15. common spelling mistake game

    It's not necessarily bad spelling, more like bad typing.
  16. SB pro makes "Canadian Army Journal"

    Here is the site link : The Canadian Army Journal Here is the link to the article (pdf) : NOTE TO FILE—CONSTRUCTIVE SIMULATION VERSUS SERIOUS GAMES FOR THE ARMY: A CANADIAN CASE STUDY
  17. http://youtube.com/watch?v=FjhOBiSk8Gg The not so funny part is that he is talking about half the people on the internet.
  18. Downloading Scenarios

    Take it apart and clean it. Use alcohol on the plastic sheets and soak the button assembly in warm water then use a blow dryer on it (assuming you have a normal keyboard). Take your time during reassembly, making sure all the parts are sitting properly in place before screwing the cover back on.
  19. Downloading Scenarios

    Glued firm eh? Visiting pron sites again? ;-)
  20. Questions over nature of military restructuring

    The Power Point Creed This is my PowerPoint. There are many like it but mine is 4.0. My PowerPoint is my best friend. It is my life. I must master it as I master my life. My PowerPoint without me is useless. Without my PowerPoint, I am useless. I must format my slides true. I must brief them better than the other staff section who are trying to out-brief me. I must brief the impact on the Commander before he asks me. I will. My PowerPoint and myself know that what counts in this war is not the number of slides, the colors of the highlights, nor the format of the bullets. We know that it is the new information that counts. We will brief only new information. My PowerPoint is human, even as I, because it is my life. Thus I will learn it as a brother. I will learn its weaknesses, its strengths, its fonts, its accessories, its formats, and its colors. I will keep my PowerPoint slides current and ready to brief. We will become part of each other. We will… Before God I swear this creed. My PowerPoint and myself are defenders of my country. We are the masters of our subject. We are the saviors of my career. So be it, until victory is America's and there is no enemy, but peace (and the next exercise)! Author Unknown
  21. Modern Insurgencies: Ideas and Stratagems

    There are two items that weren't addressed: Sponsorship and Urbanization. Insurgencies invariably have external sponsors in one form or another. Arms, supplies, training, recruiting, etc. requires money, space and the freedom to carry out such tasks. If any long solution is to be had, you need to deal with the puppet master too. On that note, you have to remember that not only nations such as the US have to combat insurgencies, we also sponsor them too. More significantly, the world is urbanizing. Traditionally, insurgencies have been rural endeavours and urban operations were used to distract attention away from what was happening in the rural area. I dont have the numbers but the world population is again moving back into cities because of factors such as globalization. Three excellent examples of modern urban insurgencies are The Troubles in Ireland, Soviet-Afghan war, and Chechen war. It's easy to discuss and dissect what to do and why to do it... but I never see the most important part: HOW to do it?
  22. Video Thread

    Motherlode of videos http://www.strategypage.com/gallery/video_2007.asp
  23. Synchronization against a high tempo enemy offensive

    I'll post more material for you in the download area. It will be named OPFOR quickguides.
  24. Route March Timer

    Version 1.0

    588 downloads

    A guy named Richie created this simple little utility. Might be useful for mission designing or during the planning phase when timing is a critical issue.
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