Andrimner

No, I'm fine with some of the users not getting the point. But as witnessed on this page (edit: the previous page), much of that is because they fail to read the thread properly. And I'll do my best to clear up any challenges based on miscomprehensions of my position. As there seems to be a lot of them. If an 8-page long thread with "text walls" is too text-filled for some to keep up, then I hope for their sake that their armies publish their field manuals in cartoon form.

I get that feeling as well, but I think I'll stay in a little while longer.

Well, as I've stated previously, the option "hit the dirt" isn't really available if there aren't any horizontal LoEs. Again using Froggys plan as an example, the duel between the bounding element and the enemy is going to be over long before the supporting element is able to do anything. The techniques you are describing are basic techniques that can apply to both armour and infantry, but in this case, they fit infantry well and armour....not so well. Tanks can't go prone to exploit the smallest features in the terrain as cover, which means that engagements in relatively flat terrain over medium distance is likely to be of a more decisive nature, and decided in a relatively short amount of time. Rendering a supporting element that can't support immideately almost completely irrelevant. (Firing into a "general area" that you can't see isn't going to have any practical effect against enemy armour.) And I'll restate this, to be sure: This isn't about the supporting element "not doing their job". It's about them not being ABLE to do their job. The nature of a vertical LoE means that passing such lines in bounding WILL expose your bounders to areas the overwatchers can't cover. Again, look at Froggys movement plan - I made the (general) prediction that bounding elements will expose themselves alone, and lo and behold: That was precisely what happened. Try playing out that scenario, and see how long it takes the supporting element to do anything useful AFTER the time of contact. How many rounds do you think will be exchanged between red and blue tanks during that time? That has been my point since page 1 of this thread. My entire case is against the users claiming that bounding overwatch should ALWAYS be used. I'm not saying it should NEVER be used. If you had read my posts, you would know that a) I have never asked such a question (There aren't any questions from me here for anyone to answer, but there are statements that can be challenged by anyone), and b) my point has never been that bounding overwatch isn't a useful method. I've repeated this on so many occasions that at this point, it's fair to say that your failure to get that comes from not reading the thread, not from me formulating the point poorly. This is my point, as I stated on page 3 of this thread: For your benefit, I'll restate my point: Bounding overwatch is not a useless technique. It can be used to good effect on many occasions. However, it comes with some weaknesses, and because of these, the plt leader should know when to use different techniques instead Again, more suited to infantry than armour in the environment I'm describing. When the bounding element reaches that area, chances are they'll be exposed and engaged (again, since they can't go prone, and assuming they cross the LoE). In that case, they'll fight it out alone until the supporting element gets there. They can't exploit cover that isn't there, so chances are the engagement will be decided before the other element can do anything. Remember, a vertical LoE is no bigger in the terrain than a few metres across, if that. This is the line that, if crossed, will expose you to the enemy. As I said numerous time, I'm not. I'm basing this on the ease with which bounding elements can be isolated and destroyed by improper use of this tactic in practice. And improper use of this tactic is the most frequent among officers who seem to believe that bounding is always better since that's "what the book says". I'm not the one lost in books here. The users with the seemingly religious and completely unreasoned and uncritical relation to their manuals (Eisenschwein being the case in point) are. That's predictability that can easily be exploited by an enemy using a crossing FoF-defence in the proper terrain. Ehm, I HAVE proposed an alternative tactic, on plenty of different occasions. Again, your failure to find them is a failure on your part to read the thread. The post "showing how to use the tactic" you're talking about is already in the wiki, which has been linked to in this thread. So there isn't any need for that sort of post here. This is a thread about the "why", not the "how". I would have thought the title of the thread gave that away... In your scenario (Nor really sure what you mean when you "split into smaller elements" as you've already described the sections as "E1 and "E2", it seems to me you're actually splitting the unit into individual tanks?): E2 moves to the woodland in the east, and faces any enemy to the east of this position alone. No mutual support against potential enemies in that area. Same goes for the recon action, chances are that section will face the enemy alone (although any enemy on the hill will be detected by E1) And so on. Almost every one of your maneuvers means exposing the bounding element to areas the supporters can't cover, which means there won't be any mutual support at the time of contact. And if you really did split E1 and E2 into "smaller elements" (this means individual tanks), then that would at some point mean that a single one of your tanks is facing the enemy by itself. As described above, this tank can't necessarily "go firm" in the sense that infantry can - finding cover in this sort of terrain is much harder for a tank than for an infantry squad. The upside is that the tank can fire on the move, which means it isn't as dependent on a stationary element to provide fire for it.

It really isn't that hard, although I agree the point seem to be lost on some. In vertical-LoS environments there are plenty of areas where it is physically impossible to establish supporting positions that can cover every area the bounding element exposes itself to. Enemy units positioned in those areas will be able to engage your bounding elements, while your overwatching element can't fire back. Razor mentioned infantry tactics that exploit this phenomenon, the same can be done by armoured units. This exploits bounding movement, so by bounding you're doing just what the enemy wants you to do. If you need a concrete example, look at Froggys movement plan on a previous page in this thread. One platoon, advancing by bounding overwatch through a wooded area. The bounding section was engaged by an enemy tank that the supporting element couldn't see or fire upon. It could point weapons "in that direction". But since it couldn't see the enemy, much less fire on him, the pointing of barrels wouldn't do much good. In that duel, the "supporting" element is completely irrelevant, and the platoon would've been much better off by advancing as a unit in fluid formations. Note that there is no way to simultaneously bring all four barrels to bear on that tank if you advance by bounding, which is just the effect that enemy tank wants to achieve. He'll much rather face two tanks alone than four. As stated above, the only upside is limiting the maximum number of tanks you lose. However, the engaged section will face the enemy on poorer odds by itself than alongside the rest of its unit. And since you seem to be bent on always bounding, he'll know what's coming. The idea that it's better than just "charging forward" just doesn't hold up, because that's just a matter of levels. Why not split the section into individual tanks, and send one and one tank forward at a time? All the more support, right? Must be better than just send both tanks forward at the same time, "hoping for the best"? Why is it merely "hoping for the best" when 1 platoon advances as a unit while 2 platoons supports? Isn't that exactly the same principle applied on another level as when you send ahead one section, with the other in support? There's nothing magical about sections that makes section-wise bounding a sane choice and platoon-wise bounding an insane one, and so on. There is, obviously, no contradiction at all between predicting the enemy course of action and advancing continuously. It is in fact perfectly possible to advance cautiously and in a tactically sound manner without resorting to bounds within the platoon. My guess is that at least some of the opposing views in this thread are based on a knee-jerk "this is what the manual tells us to do, so this must be best"-instinct. "Bounding or hoping for the best" is a typical false dichotomy, I simply refuse to believe that professional armoured units of other armies are unable to advance continuously in a more thought-out manner than rolling forwards apathetically, "hoping for the best".

The assumption being that as long as it is within LoS of the supporting element, the supporting element can cover? As we know, that just isn't the case. Move one element forward 50 metres in a vertical LoE-environment, and that element will expose itself to new areas the supporting element can't cover even if there is an LoS between those elements. If your enemy doesn't know how to exploit that, you'll be fine. If he can, you are very likely to be screwed. Infantry tend to be very adept at exploiting the gaps between the elements - in vertical LoE-environments, exploiting the inherent weakness of bounding can be done with amazing ease by an enemy that knows what it's doing. Razors post made that point very well, and the principles of those tactics can be applied by armoured units on the defence as well. I've done so in training sessions myself - is usually works as advertised: The bounding element is isolated and destroyed before the supporting element is able to do anything sensible. Even if that is the main reasoning, it can be employed on different levels. Companies can bound with platoons as well, and so on. If every organisational level choose to take out that sort of policy, your brigade attack will end up with two attacking tanks, and a whole lot of supporting ones. Yes, a bit over the top there, but still... And remember there are other insurance policy providers out there, firepower being one. Problem is that suppressing fire from the overwatchers against positions of that kind is very likely to be abysmally ineffective, since the supporting element isn't likely to see the enemy, and since the enemy has in fact got frontal cover (assuming that he knows what he's doing). Chances are, there isn't going to be anything for the overwatchers to shoot at. The tactics are designed to isolate and destroy the element that strays into the defenders field of fire, while keeping the supporting elements irrelevant. Counter-attacks shouldn't be necessary in order for the basic tactics to work - especially if they are employed as an element in delaying operations. Ideally, the bounding section should be engaged and destroyed without exposing any defending units to any attacking units outside of the kill area (in principle not esp hard to do in the right terrain). When this is employed succesfully, the overwatchers will, as advertised, find themselves almost completely irrelevant, unless the battle is prolonged enough for them to maneuver effectively. (Which, in the case of delaying ops, is rather unlikely) Bounding is just what the designer of these tactics wants the attacker to do, because it feeds him enemy units piecemeal. Keep in mind that these sorts of defensive tactics are of the sorts that are heavily favoured in vertical LoE-environments, esp restricted ones, which in itself is likely to reduce options of maneuver. Experience from environments where horizontal LoEs dominate doesn't really come close to revealing how effective the crossing FoF-defence can be in other sorts of terrain. Overwatch might prevent the defenders from pursuing (infantry in an ambush aren't necessarily likely do do that), but that doesn't really help the element that is isolated and destroyed in the "kill sack". And it doesn't help the rest of the platoon either - there is a limit to what the platoon can accomplish with a knocked-out section. The only consolement of the attackers is likely to be that he "only" lost two tanks, not four. If that's the main ground for choosing bounding even in vertical LoE-environments, I say maybe a good idea would be for the company to probe more carefully with one platoon moving as a fluent unit instead. Unless you're dealing with an incompetent enemy, he is extremely likely to exploit the weaknesses of bounding in those environments - ESPECIALLY if your army bound as a "matter of course" without critical consideration in each instance. That's called predictability, and brings me back to the point of this entire topic. Bringing up officers to believe that bounding overwatch ALWAYS provides more security is an extremely poor idea.

By submarine. Homemade, of course.

The abbreviation "jk" seems to be lost on a couple of the members of this forum.

GP, Razor. That's my understanding of those tactics as well, as they were explained to me by my infantry colleagues. (basically what I described as crossing FOF-tactics) Applied against a bounding enemy in the proper terrain, they will be deadly - whether the defenders are infantry or armour. And you managed to state the point more concisely than I did. IMO, the proper counter on a plt-level, for the sake of this thought experiment disregarding arty and combined arms, is a close echelon-formation to the opposite side of the defenders you want to engage. Thus focusing every one of your gun on one half of the enemy, while remaining concealed from the other half.

I'll hit this thread with yet another reply, since I just now stumbled on something on the internet that made me think of this controversy and chuckle: http://www.creative-problem-solving.org/but-we’ve-always-done-it-this-way-top-ten-list/ Anyway, glad Tjay seemed to enjoy this discussion at least (note how the above piece corresponds to your own point) - I did as well. We might be the two only ones to have done so, but so be it

Well said, Tjay.

As I said, Froggy, I base my views on reason, not authority. IF you want to convince me, point out the advantages of your solution instead of appealing to authority. I won't be convinced by a tinkling contest in the form of who's accumulated the most years in the service anyway. As I said: Professionals are familiar enough with their techniques to explain the reasons behind them. If they can't, maybe it's time to start questioning them. Since you asked, however, I spent 10 years on Leo1A5s and Leo2A4s in the norwegian army (hence the "broken terrain"), 5+ of those years as platoon 2iC, 2 as platoon leader, and the last 6 months of my service as company instructor (Gunnery and platoon-level TTPs). And as I also repeatedly pointed out, I'm not saying continuous movement is "always" best. I'm saying NONE of the solutions can be counted on as the universally ideal solution, which seems to be the controversy. The different approaches each come with their own pros and cons, and the platoon leader needs to consider how the pros will stack up against the cons in each individual instance.This will cause him to opt for bounding overwatch in some instances, continuous movement in others. If we can agree on this basic principle, I'm fine with agreeing to disagree on the detailed application of it. I don't think we'll agree on everything here anyway.

I'll respond to you when you provide me with a reasoned response instead of juvenile nonsense.

My idea, Eisenschwein, is to provide a reasoned response. As I've said, I base my views on reason and experience, not tradition and unquestioning faith in others. And, yes, I've driven tanks around the fields outside Munster (see original post).

Froggy: Well, I see a couple of contradictions in your analysis. The factor that allows me to employ my unit in the way that I do is the fact that the tanks are equipped with stabilised turrets with fire-on-the-move capabilities. I think we can all agree that these tanks are better suited to Target Acquisition and firing on the move than tanks with unstabilised turrets. That was also the reasoning behind our old technique: If your tanks can't fire on the move, make sure you always have some stationary, so at least some of your vehicles are able to return fire. Because of this, moving the platoon as a single unit is less of an issue in modern tanks than in older ones. Secondly, the assumption that the second section can move to support doesn't make much sense to me, for the following reasons: - Comparing the time that T-80 needs to fire off 2-3 or 4 rounds, the time the other section will need to move forward is just too long. Given the reload time on those tanks, how many rounds do you suspect will have left barrels before the supporting section has realised what is happening, figured out where the threat is, accelerated and advanced towards the LoE and exposed itself to the enemy? (Keeping in mind that they need to be careful not to barge into the first sections field of fire, a problem much more accentuated in real life than in SB) - Having your other section move forward to support negates the entire point of leaving it behind to support. It means that the supporting section is on the move when it confronts the enemy, because it needs to cross the LoE. Thus, there is absolutely no advantage to the stationary positions that section occupied when the first section made contact. In my plan, 4 moving tanks encounter the enemy at once. In your plan, 2 moving tanks make contact - then the two supporting tanks advances, and encounters the enemy as moving tanks. Where's the upside here - how does your platoon derive any sort of advantage against this enemy from the fact that the supporting unit was stationary? - Having your second section out of the first ones sight also complicates the communication in the plt. If they all move together, a simple "tank, x o'clock" will provide plenty of info to the other tanks (possibly combined with what we in my country call "Battle Drill Right!"). When the sections can't see eachother, more info may be required. And in this instance, there might be an additional need for coordination to make sure that the second section doesn't run into the first sections field of fire (a very real danger if they just steam ahead) The fact that your two sections advance along two different paths will OTOH provide no particular challenge towards the enemy, since they'll appear in the same general sector anyway, as long as the supporting section goes by the direct route (for the possibility of a supporting flank maneuver: see below). Which is the reason why he chose that particular BP. And he will definitely prefer having to deal with two tanks at once, rather than four. I do realise there are different versions of support. And yes, I run the risk of exposing my entire platoon to the enemy at once, and thus pinning it down (which is why I'm making small bounds, although I could easily make the case that supporting maneuvers can be made by platoons as well). But that also means maximizing the amount of guns I can bring to bear on the enemy - increasing the exposed units chances of survival. It increases the amount of vehicles exposed to danger, but also increases the likelihood of winning the duel. Your solution does the opposite. You might find a flanking route for your supporting section - but since there is no proper BP your (original) bounding section can occupy, the duel will most likely be over long before your supporting unit can bring guns to bear on the enemy by an even longer route than the obvious direct one. The tanks in the bounding section are completely exposed to an enemy tank at relatively short range. That duel won't be a question of tanks being pinned down, it will be much more decisive than that. Maximum available firepower NOW will do that section a lot more good than a clever flanking maneuver completed minutes after your bounding section is knocked out. And even the clever flanking plan might prove irrelevant, if the enemy manages to disable your bounding section and then finds another BP - not necessarily an unrealistic situation. Thirdly, the idea of always having proper flank security simply isn't always a reality in the type of real-life terrain I usually operated in, because that terrain is broken, with plenty of vertical LoEs, and more often than not limited possibility for maneuver. You could bring a mechanised brigade with you, it still wouldn't do because the positions they would need to occupy to properly cover your flanks just aren't available. And by "properly" I do not even mean 100%, perfect coverage - I'm more in the range of 50-70%, if breaking it down to a pecentage is even possible. "I'll just count on flank support from Co B" is the trademark response from our fresh platoon leaders when they're faced with this problem as a theoretical one. The instance it turns into a practical one, it very often turns out that that just isn't possible. And this isn't just an issue with your flanks: It will often be quite possible to find BPs within your platoons own sector that can ambush the bounding section while remaining untouched by the supporting one. A skilled opponent that actively searches for this (infantry will, at least ours) should be able to find plenty of such positions. In these instances, even 100% flank security from your neighbour won't help you, because even he won't be covering your own sector. An enemy unit, properly deployed with crossing fields of fire can be a formidable opponent if the terrain supports that system - something vertical LoE-terrain often does. Those units WILL be deployed to deliberately take advantage of the problem I'm describing. I've done so myself on several occasions. An enemy unit deliberately seeking to take advantage of your limited possibilities to provide mutual flank support can certainly ruin the day of the plt ldr relying on his neighbours support. I've been driving enough tanks on the fields outside Munster, Germany to know that these situations can occur there as well. And the problem isn't exactly unheard of in SB either. It's illustrated any time some of your vehicles spots a target that some of your other ones can't. I simply refuse to believe that this never happens to anyone else but me. Imagine advancing down a wide road through a forest too dense to maneuver in. Unless you send infantry through to the other side every single time you encounter roadbends or hog aerial resources for detail recon every time, your platoon WILL face a vertical LoE. If you leapfrog through it (as was the routine with our older tanks), then you'll end up piecemealing your tanks to the enemy. It isn't exactly what I'm describing, but it illustrates the problem. Separating vehicles in areas with plenty of vertical LoEs will very often expose them to flanks supporting units can't cover, because in those areas, flank security will be spotty anyway.

I'm sure you could spot weaknesses in my plan, and as I promised, I will face them with all the humility I can muster. Feel free to point them out if you will, just be specific enough so I know what you mean. I'm quite certain there are better ways to navigate that corridor than the basic route I drew up, and I believe I was quite clear when I said that the point of the scenario was to compare movement plans - not to "win" against the red side. A general "that is stupid"-remark is too vague for me to work on, though...a movement plan of your own would help As I stated before, give me your reasoned opinion, and I will respond to the best of my ability. But don't expect any notion of "authority" by terms of age or service history (or forum history for that matter) - you won't get any from me. You're not the only real-life tanker around, and there's nothing special about you, your nationality or your army that justifies replacing reason with unfounded statements. I'll consider your posts by the measure of reason contained within them, nothing else. I also don't care what you think of my abilities as a plt ldr, a question you know nothing about - I've heard what my own CO, NCOs and soldiers thought about that. That's my scale. It isn't shifted by ramblings on an internet forum. As regards the red tank: Please note that it is located exactly in the spot one would expect if one had looked at the map I uploaded on page 2 on this thread. I'll also take this opportunity to state the following: I've encouraged you to correct me if I misrepresented your position. Since you didn't do that in either of the posts, I'm assuming your position really is that leapfrogging will always be safer than continuous movement.