Tactics; past, present, and future

[ShotMagnet]

It occurs to me that while we talk a lot about our favorite tanks, we say comparatively little about how tanks are used, how an enemy tries to defeat them, and the synergy driving tactical evolution.
Here is a thread for us to do just that.
Rat, you were telling me about something you had, how about throwing it in here?

Shot

[Hector]

This is the kind of discussion this forum is lacking, a bit. Very good idea Shot.
I will be following this thread with high interest. I guess that is the kind of discussion available over at tanknet, but is very wellcome here, at home, hehe.
Good call Shot


Regards

Héctor

[ShermansWar]

I had asked sean awhile back, if he could start a board on strategy and tactics, he said he'd ask Ssnake, but that he thought Ssnake would say no. it's true, for all the bullshitting going on around here we dont talk about how we fight, and how we actually play the game.

[ShotMagnet]

I guess that is the kind of discussion available over at tanknet...

I haven't seen this over at tanknet. I haven't been through all the threads, though. Still, for a set of fora dedicated to all things armored, one imagines that there would be a forum dedicated to tank and anti-tank tactics.
Credit for this idea goes to Ratseal. He and I were talking, he mentioned an article he'd seen, and it got me thinking.

Shot

[Hector]

I thought Shot was referring to real world tactics. I misunderstood, sorry. I think is understandable when players are not willing to unveil their tactics or playing skills.

Hector

[Hector]

I guess that is the kind of discussion available over at tanknet...

I haven't seen this over at tanknet. I haven't been through all the threads, though. Still, for a set of fora dedicated to all things armored, one imagines that there would be a forum dedicated to tank and anti-tank tactics.
Credit for this idea goes to Ratseal. He and I were talking, he mentioned an article he'd seen, and it got me thinking.

Shot

ah yes shot, then i am game, hehe. you are right over tanknet, discussion is either too technical, lav/stryker polemics or Panther bashing lol

[Grenny]

Well, from the German p.o.v.:Here the armord troops will be scaled down massively.
PzBtl will decomissioned, PzGren Units scaled down in favor of light inf(paratroopers(Fallschirmjäger) and mountain-rangers(Gebirgsjäger)...makes you wonder why they scraped the Jäger units in the first place)

A whole bunch of new armored "cars" are developed ("Mungo" "Dingo" "Fennek"...to name a few) to underline our "new tasks"(peace keeping, development aid etc...) as "massive war for defense" becomes just a sencondary task for the Bundeswehr.

That makes you wonder what the future place of tanks will be!?

my 2cents, the entering of the kosovo has shown that nothing says "Get out of our way" better then 56tons of german steel rolling on top of your convoy.

[NEpi]

there's a huge paradigm shift in the armored combat tactics around the world (mainly, around western world).
it happens because today, it's much easier and cheaper to hunt down big weapons platforms than individual persons, and technologies for doing that are just getting better and better (as shown in GW2).
on the other hand, full scale wars are more rare, and many western armies wish to lower down the cost of maintaining military force by using smaller, more nimble, forces supported by better state-of-the-art weapons platforms. such highly advanced platforms, be it airplanes or tanks, are very pricy and very lethal, meaning noone needs too many of them to have the same power as they once had or want to expend that much for that purpose. the problems of maintaining a large fleet of highly advanced tanks only gets worse when recent developments in accurate armament makes densely deployed troops extremely vulnerable.

also, don't forget that western armies don't have a massive producing opponent, to have to be in line with. most dangers are from less effective armored forces.

add to that the disarmament of europe (first time in 2000 years that european powers don't fight against each other)...

this is all true for north american and european armies. Israel is different.
we still have major military threats from our neighbours (mainly Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia), so we can't let go our heavier platforms. still, the paradigm shift i mentioned earlier touched IDF. in the last year or so, a conscript armor brigade was scraped in favor of another infantry brigade. this has major implications on the size of reserve armored brigades in the next 20-30 years. this change is stemmed in both israel suffering from economical problems, the need of the army of infantry in current afairs, and the ability to give up some tanks because of technological superiority over possible threats.

although major cutbacks in armor units were made, tanks are still implemented in urban operations. for that use, a new SOP was written, and shown to be highly effective in the last 2 years. tanks are working in very close relationship with infantry as heavy and highly protective mobile bases of fire, while moving in and out in a pattern that makes the enemy hard to follow. tanks and very heavily armored APCs are used in fast movement, and so are not so vulnerable to infantry as they might be if moving slower.
even with this tactics, it is still very hard to take cities. it does make it easier, while minimizing casualties even further by making preparations of a good anti-armor defense very hard.

for these reasons, i think that using tanks in a low density as presented in SB is more current than the game itself :-D
i think armor combat will become more sniper-oriented and less massive mess, because that way it will end quite quickly from the air. on the other hand, i don't think tanks will disappear that fast. they are still very useful machines, although very expensive ones. tanks still enjoy their basic benefits, that even improved with time: mobility, survivability, firepower.

[Ssnake]

for these reasons, i think that using tanks in a low density as presented in SB is more current than the game itself :-D
Actually, that is a deliberate design decision, stemming from the late 90s where the trend for downscaling forces was already quite obvious, as was the downshifting of operational responsibilities to company and platoon level. I wanted SB to be the "electronic sandbox" that I so sorely missed as a platoon leader and company XO, and the Bundeswehr focused on either conventional platoon training or battalion scale tactical training. That has its merits, but still I felt the need to fill the "company gap" in training.

It's just that a mix of noncombattants, irregular fighters/terrorists, and a setting of urban terrain is taxing in its technological challenges, in the associated mission design, and for a single player game as well. The conventional force setup is much easier to handle and therefore better suited to enter the market. From here, we can then improve step by step.

It is not unlikely that future versions of SB Pro will attempt to close this current gap in force compositions and terrain types, but given the numerous challenges associated with it it's bound to be a gradual and rather slow process.

[ShotMagnet]

I thought Shot was referring to real world tactics... I think is understandable when players are not willing to unveil their tactics...

I was indeed referring to real-world tactics. To wit:

there's a huge paradigm shift in the armored combat tactics around the world (mainly, around western world).
it happens because today, it's much easier and cheaper to hunt down big weapons platforms than individual persons, and technologies for doing that are just getting better and better (as shown in GW2).

I don't think there is a major shift, so much as one or more people in authority are remembering a lesson already taught. As an answer to what NEpi wrote, tanks have always been vulnerable to infantry. This has been forgotten or ignored until now, probably because, despite the fact that the Cold War has been over for some time, we still have a lot of Cold War-era armor. They're great for fighting other tanks, but like all AFVs they're vulnerable to infantry. We haven't been practicing MOUT, either. I bet things have changed in the last year, though.

Shot

[Trekker]

I'll go on Nepi's line here. There is no "large-army" threat to our world today. All armies in the western world are concentrating on peacesupport or peaceenforcement, not one division against division.
The role of the tank is changing, from being a armys main assort, to something in reserv, to call on when you'r in big shit.
The days of the heavy 70ton monsters is over, the era of light, rapid, well-equipt infantry is here. And noone is more sad that me..
IMO this gulfwar might be the last war where heavy large scale armorformations thunder across the land. We'r looking at a new world and the armies around the world are trying to catch up.

[Gunfighter]

there's a huge paradigm shift in the armored combat tactics around the world (mainly, around western world).
it happens because today, it's much easier and cheaper to hunt down big weapons platforms than individual persons, and technologies for doing that are just getting better and better (as shown in GW2).

That’s Western Technology. Show me a Sub Saharan Country (Except the South African Army) that could counter Massed Armoured Formations in the Open? Besides, we all know the Cyclical Tendencies of Armour and Firepower. If technology will Doom a Tank, then it is Technology that will make It rise like a Phoenix again. There is nothing better in a Chemically/Biologically contaminated Area than an AFV. And when all is Nuclear Blue, a Tank can still roll in and do its job.


on the other hand, full scale wars are more rare, and many western armies wish to lower down the cost of maintaining military force by using smaller, more nimble, forces supported by better state-of-the-art weapons platforms. such highly advanced platforms, be it airplanes or tanks, are very pricy and very lethal, meaning noone needs too many of them to have the same power as they once had or want to expend that much for that purpose. the problems of maintaining a large fleet of highly advanced tanks only gets worse when recent developments in accurate armament makes densely deployed troops extremely vulnerable.

The Last Big Ones (were Armour was used in Mass) were GW2 (2002), Chechnya (1999 and 1994), GW1 1991, Tiananmen Square (1989), IDF in Lebanon 1982…..
The Last Century was the Bloodiest in Human History, this Century is proving to be bloodier still with China’s Tank Armies still leashed, India vs. Pakistan Round 4 or 5, Israel vs. all its Neighbors (Again)……..
The fact that there are “too many Tanks Out There”, means that Tank vs. Tank vs. Man is going to be a reality.


also, don't forget that western armies don't have a massive producing opponent, to have to be in line with. most dangers are from less effective armored forces. add to that the disarmament of europe (first time in 2000 years that european powers don't fight against each other)...

Western Armies have fought each other in the Past, Recent and Distant. History is a great guide. It repeats the same tragedy when most people think it will never happen again. Besides, there is Still Russian Inventories full of War Machines and Chinese Tank Armies.


this is all true for north american and european armies. Israel is different.
we still have major military threats from our neighbours (mainly Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia), so we can't let go our heavier platforms. still, the paradigm shift i mentioned earlier touched IDF. in the last year or so, a conscript armor brigade was scraped in favor of another infantry brigade. this has major implications on the size of reserve armored brigades in the next 20-30 years. this change is stemmed in both israel suffering from economical problems, the need of the army of infantry in current afairs, and the ability to give up some tanks because of technological superiority over possible threats.

For an Island of Democracy surrounded by a sea of Despots, please do not ever lay down your arms.


although major cutbacks in armor units were made, tanks are still implemented in urban operations. for that use, a new SOP was written, and shown to be highly effective in the last 2 years. tanks are working in very close relationship with infantry as heavy and highly protective mobile bases of fire, while moving in and out in a pattern that makes the enemy hard to follow. tanks and very heavily armored APCs are used in fast movement, and so are not so vulnerable to infantry as they might be if moving slower.
even with this tactics, it is still very hard to take cities. it does make it easier, while minimizing casualties even further by making preparations of a good anti-armor defense very hard.

Can you write about those tactics? I read in “that Israeli” Newspaper, that Merkavas may soon have a rear firing MG or such to cover a Tank’s Rear. If it is declassified, I would very much like to hear what you can say.


for these reasons, i think that using tanks in a low density as presented in SB is more current than the game itself
i think armor combat will become more sniper-oriented and less massive mess, because that way it will end quite quickly from the air. on the other hand, i don't think tanks will disappear that fast. they are still very useful machines, although very expensive ones. tanks still enjoy their basic benefits, that even improved with time: mobility, survivability, firepower

Roger on that. As you can remember, Infantry used to fight Shoulder to Shoulder, then weapons changed to make them fight in a spread out fashion. With the introduction of “Soldier Systems”, the Infantry frontage is increasing more and more. With tanks, the frontage was increase due to the Technology change as well. I have books from 1980s that said a 4 Tank Platoon’s Frontage was 2K. Now, I believe that 1K between tanks in the open may be too close…… (in the Cities its gonna be different).

[mitcha901]

Not going too far either way is the key. The British thought aircraft especially aircraft carriers were obsolete in the 60s and found out in the Falklands how wrong they were.

The Israels need tanks. The US still needs to worry about Korea and the US is learning they might have gotten too small in the 90's.

China and it growing need for oil ?

Free peaceful Europe disarming and putting its head in the sand like USA after WW1 ?

Things can get ugly very fast after all it all seemed OK on 10 Sept 2001.

[Ratseal]

So, returning to the thread topic at hand...

The idea that I wanted to kick around was to try to build AARs for OIF/OEF in advance of the official AAR/LL from the USA/USMC. There are some interesting articles on the Armor Officer site which address evolving Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) for Armor.

I posted a news article on the front page news section - I am selecting NON opinion or editorial pieces, and focusing instead on tactics and battle reporting.

I think that it would be interesting to compare our observations and efforts to what the professionals have to say.

[ShermansWar]

GF makes a great point. I think the tactics are more obsolete than the tank itself.Right now the tank is vulnerable. When armor technology again rises to the level where only tanks can destroy tanks you will see massed armor again.

[Ratseal]

This is an example of an article from which we could begin to glean some data points and correlate them to a (hopefully growing) accumulation of similar data points. Please do not leap on this article with indignance of the Pole versus Nazi comments - keep it tactical.

New York Daily News
April 16, 2004

Fallujah Streetfight Looms

By Corky Siemaszko, Daily News Staff Writer

The Marines have the latest in weaponry, superior firepower, unlimited ammunition and complete domination of the Iraqi skies.

But none of this matters in Fallujah, where U.S. forces are in a gutter fight with an enemy that doesn't wear uniforms, uses the densely packed city as cover - and is operating from a playbook that urban guerrillas have been perfecting since World War II.

"We knew where to hide and escaped into the sewers, we stripped guns off of dead Germans and used them against them," said Boleslaw Stanczyk, who was a Polish underground fighter 60 years ago when the citizens of Warsaw rose up against the Nazis. "The Iraqis are not Poles and the Americans are not Germans, but many of the tactics are the same."

Tony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington agreed.

"Street fighting is a dirty, dangerous business," he said. "The enemy knows the grounds and the streets. And all the high-tech equipment won't tell you who is going to suddenly burst out of a house."

So most of the time the Americans don't know who the enemy is until they're fired upon.

"This is fighting at close quarters," said John Pike, director of Globalsecurity.org, a Washington research group. "High-tech weapons are irrelevant in counterinsurgency."

Instead, said Pike, "one of the most useful weapons becomes the bolt-action sniper rifle because it enables you to pick people off, one at a time, without killing bystanders."

The Marines also have been using sledgehammers on Iraqi homes, creating holes big enough to poke a gun through without exposing the soldier.

"Otherwise, buildings are sealed boxes and potential traps," said Cordesman.

Reporters embedded with the Marines said soldiers also have been strewing about broken glass as a low-tech early warning system so they can hear the crunch of insurgents' steps and prevent a surprise attack.

Stanczyk said American soldiers in Fallujah also have to leash their inner beast if they want to keep the rebellion from spreading.

"They are in a very difficult situation," said Stanczyk, 85, who now lives in Chicago. "The Germans would order everybody out of a building and massacre men, women and children. The Americans can't do that because then all of Iraq would be against them."

But the Marines cannot ease up their offensive because the Iraqi insurgents will come at them with the same ferocity that the Poles went after the Nazis.

"When we had the chance, we fought hand to hand and we wanted to kill the Germans," he said.

[Ratseal]

Counter sniper operations using tanks

Washington Times
April 12, 2004
Pg. 1

Iraqi Snipers Work In Teams To Hit Marines

Cease-fire curbs obstruct troops as insurgents adopt new strategy

By Willis Witter, The Washington Times

FALLUJAH, Iraq — The Marine regiment that fought its way from Kuwait to Baghdad a year ago finds itself facing a new kind of enemy — Iraqi snipers working in teams and taking up posts in places such as mosque minarets.

Insurgents yesterday wounded two Marines in sniper attacks, even as Fallujah's clerics and officials from the U.S.-appointed Iraqi Governing Council kept talking to try to arrange a permanent cease-fire.

Just hours after the cease-fire was announced Friday, Cpl. Jason Lee, 26, of Syracuse, N.Y., opened a Red Crescent ambulance full of rocket-propelled grenades that the 1st Battalion's 5th Regiment had confiscated from one of the city's many mosques.

"I did a quick count of what was inside, and within minutes they started shooting. There were two of us. We were pinned down and had to call in a tank," Cpl. Lee said.

Cpl. Lee and many of the regiment's Marines were the first to cross the Kuwaiti border just over a year ago. They pushed straight to Baghdad, where for 12 hours they battled through volley after volley of bullets before the guns fell silent and Saddam Hussein's statue tumbled.

"This is far worse," the corporal said. "This is the result of 13 gangs living in one area, and they've got the mosques. They come on the walkie-talkie all the time and say prayers. These people will not let go."

It's different from the last time, said Pfc. Jermaine Vincente, 21, of Toledo, Ohio.

"Back then we knew who we were fighting," he recalled. "Now you talk to some guy, and the next minute he's your enemy."

In what is being called a cease-fire, the Marines are not allowed to conduct "offensive operations." They can fight back only if fired on.

The grumbling can be heard everywhere. "Let us finish the job," said one.

Many U.S. troops complained of politicians getting in the way. The most common question for a visiting reporter, however, was whether the American people still supported them.

The subject came up repeatedly, as if it had been embedded in military culture as a shadow of the Vietnam era that few of the men here are even old enough to remember.

For the first three or four days, insurgents sprayed mortars, rockets and bullets indiscriminantly wherever there were Marines. Before Fallujah, it is doubtful where any Marine here had seen an Iraqi raise an AK-47 rifle to the shoulder and aim. The preferred local way was to spray bursts from the hip.

Later in the week, snipers began to turn up, with optical sights on rifles. Some would work in pairs.

One would shoot and the other would wait for the Marines to move forward in response and try to shoot them in the back.

The regiment holds about one-fourth of the city, mainly an industrial zone of abandoned warehouses, listless stray dogs, and lots of places for the enemy to hide and shoot.

The Marines either patrol on foot or in open-bed Humvees, some not yet fitted with steel plates to stop bullets. The only defense is the seven or eight Marines with black M-16 rifles aimed in a pattern that covers all 360 degrees of the horizon.

Outside the headquarters of Alpha Company, a half-dozen Marines lined up for their turn to patrol the nearby streets. One crossed himself and said a silent prayer. Others closed their eyes, too, having gone three or four days without sleep. Still others simply gazed ahead, lost in thought.

Capt. Phil from Ohio won't let reporters use his last name because of an unpleasant experience being quoted during the 1991 Persian Gulf war.

Capt. Phil had been busy blasting a building full of snipers with an M1A1 tank when a mortar shell hit his company's headquarters about a block away.

Four Marines were slightly wounded, one of whom picked a piece of shrapnel from his knee and returned to battle, his right boot stained with blood.

[Ratseal]

Experimenting on how to ambush armored vehicles.

Washington Post
April 14, 2004
Pg. 1

Insurgents Display New Sophistication

Campaign Leaves Bridges Heavily Damaged, Hampering Military's Push South

By Thomas E. Ricks, Washington Post Staff Writer

FORWARD OPERATING BASE DUKE, Iraq, April 13 -- Insurgents fighting the U.S.-led occupation force have sharply increased the sophistication, coordination and aggressiveness of their tactics over the past week, Army officers and soldiers involved in combat here said.

Most dramatically, as several thousand U.S. troops pushed south this week from the Baghdad area to this new base in central Iraq, one highway bridge on their planned route was destroyed and two others were so heavily damaged that they could not be used by heavy Army trucks and armored vehicles.

Those attacks on convoy routes, which U.S. forces were using for the first time, revealed a previously unseen degree of coordination among insurgent groups, said Army Col. Dana J.H. Pittard, the commander of a brigade-size task force now assembling for possible combat operations against the forces of radical Shiite Muslim cleric Moqtada Sadr in or near the holy city of Najaf.

"The dropping of the bridges was very interesting, because it showed a regional or even a national level of organization," Pittard said in an interview. He said insurgents appeared to be sending information southward, communicating about routes being taken by U.S. forces and then getting sufficient amounts of explosives to key bridges ahead of the convoys.

With occupation forces battling Sadr's Shiite militiamen south and east of Baghdad and Sunni Muslim insurgents to the north and west, the timing of the Iraqis' tactical development is nearly as troubling for U.S. forces as its effect. But the explanation for the change is not yet clear, military commanders said.

Here in southern Iraq, which is overwhelmingly Shiite, U.S. officers say the best guess is that former soldiers who served under President Saddam Hussein have decided to lend their expertise and coordinating abilities to the untrained Shiite militiamen.

"It's a combination of Saddam loyalists and Shiite militias," Maj. Gen. John R. Batiste, commander of the 1st Infantry Division, said in a brief interview here at FOB Duke, where he was reviewing combat preparations.

Batiste said the influence of former Iraqi Republican Guard officers was especially apparent in the fighting in the Sunni town of Fallujah, where, he said, many veteran officers made their homes. "You could staff a division with the Iraqi officers living there," he said.

Maj. Kreg Schnell, Pittard's intelligence chief, agreed with Batiste's assessment. "There's been a marriage of convenience between Sadr's militia and Saddam loyalists," he said.

What officers here say they are not seeing is a sharp increase in the number of foreign guerrillas involved in the fighting. That element, said Pittard, is tiny -- perhaps "about 2 percent."

One of Pittard's combat engineers noted that several hundred pounds of explosive material and a fair degree of expertise were required to destroy a span on a major highway bridge. Several Army convoys moving south to this base -- the task force commanded by Pittard includes elements of the 1st Infantry Division, 2nd Infantry Division and 25th Infantry Division -- were delayed by more than 12 hours by the operations against the bridges, which Pittard called "irritating" but not a major problem.

The bridge demolitions are not the only evidence of the insurgents' increasing sophistication.

"When we first got here, it was just IEDs," the roadside bombs known as improvised explosive devices, "and mortars," said Sgt. James Amyett, a scout with the 1st Infantry Division who arrived in Iraq just over a month ago. "Then all of a sudden, it's full-scale ambushes."

He was speaking in the predawn hours Tuesday while his convoy recovered from a roadside attack just west of the Euphrates River that began with a bomb and was followed by bursts of red tracer fire from a machine gun and several volleys of rocket-propelled grenades. One U.S. soldier was mortally wounded in the attack; another soldier and a civilian contractor were less seriously injured.

In a separate ambush east of Najaf, a group of fighters suspected to be part of Sadr's militia let a group of six U.S. armored vehicles pass their position, then placed obstacles across the highway behind them, cutting off their line of retreat. The armored vehicles were forced to move forward across a bridge. While they were on the bridge approaching a police checkpoint, Iraqi fighters, some of them wearing police uniforms, began firing on them. No U.S. troops were hurt in the incident.

In another departure being studied by U.S. military intelligence, groups of fighters launched synchronized attacks Friday on several U.S. and Iraqi installations in Baqubah, a provincial capital north of Baghdad. By simultaneously striking U.S. troops at the police station, the provincial governors' office and a U.S. military office, the insurgents displayed not only a considerable amount of planning and positioning but also a level of aggressiveness far beyond the roadside bombings and firing of rocket-propelled grenades that occur daily in Iraq.

"This ain't just 15-year-old kids with RPGs," said a combat engineer in the 1st Infantry Division.

The new assertiveness of the anti-U.S. fighters was displayed further later that day on the outskirts of Baqubah, where dozens of RPG-toting fighters confronted a platoon of four Bradley Fighting Vehicles, according to a 1st Infantry Division after-action report. "The platoon was literally surrounded by the enemy," the report said. One U.S. soldier and about 20 Iraqis were killed in the encounter, the report said.

"More and more, they're starting to stand and shoot," said Sgt. Maj. John Fourhman, the top enlisted soldier in the 1st Infantry Division's 3rd Brigade. "Before, they just ran."

In addition, Iraqi fighters have begun dynamiting highway overpasses in Baghdad. Though they did not destroy the spans, they succeeded in slowing traffic, depriving U.S. supply convoys of their best defense against ambushes -- speed. It is far easier to use roadside bombs and rocket-propelled grenades against a truck mired in traffic than it is to hit one moving at 60 mph.

The evolution of the insurgents' tactics is particularly surprising, military analysts say, because many such moves had been expected but did not occur during the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq last spring.

Attacks on bridges were widely expected within the Army because it was clear that the U.S. troops heading for Baghdad would have to cross the Euphrates. Also, while much of the Iraqi military, including its armored units and air force, was believed to have deteriorated badly after a decade of crippling economic sanctions, Iraqi military engineers, who would have overseen the destruction of bridges, were judged to be extremely competent. As it happened, not one bridge was detonated to block the path of the invasion force.

[Ratseal]

Here is an article on using armored vehicles as supply trucks during MOUT.

Washington Post
April 15, 2004
Pg. 20

A Wrong Turn, Chaos And A Rescue

Marines Battle for Hours to Save Crew of Personnel Carrier Set Afire in Grenade Attack

By Pamela Constable, Washington Post Foreign Service

FALLUJAH, Iraq, April 14 -- It began as a routine supply mission to the front lines, in a volatile but largely becalmed city.

It ended as a fiery and chaotic rescue mission, with a small force of Marine tanks, Humvees and ground troops surrounded and attacked as they fought their way through a hostile neighborhood to save the crew of a burning armored personnel carrier.

Marine officials said the three-hour battle that erupted at dusk Tuesday on the streets of Fallujah, and was recounted Wednesday by several of the key officers involved, exemplified the bravery and resourcefulness that Marines are known for, even when surprised and surrounded by a host of enemy fighters on alien urban turf. By the end of the tumultuous encounter, the charred personnel carrier had been towed to safety by a tank and most of its 17 crew members -- several of them wounded -- had been rescued from a house where they had taken shelter.

But the incident also revealed some startling facts about the insurgency that the Marines are facing here, officers said. More dramatically than any armed confrontation since U.S. forces surrounded Fallujah nine days ago, it showed the tenacity, coordination, firepower and surprisingly large numbers of anti-American guerrillas who still dominate much of the city.

"We definitely stumbled into a wasps' nest. They were definitely a lot more organized than we thought," said Capt. Jason Smith, 30, commander of the company whose armored supply vehicle made a wrong turn into insurgent territory and was immediately inundated by gunfire and rocket-propelled grenades from all sides.

Marine officials here said offensive operations in Fallujah would remain suspended, extending a pause that was ordered Friday to allow civilians to leave the city and let political leaders in Fallujah and Baghdad attempt to negotiate a solution to the conflict.

Just before dawn Wednesday, however, AC-130 Spectre gunships launched a devastating punitive raid over a six-block area around the spot where the convoy was attacked, firing dozens of artillery shells that shook the city and lit up the sky. Marine officials said the area was virtually destroyed and that no further insurgent activity had been seen there.

According to accounts by Smith and two other officers, a supply convoy of Humvees was heading toward a command post at the edge of a Marine-controlled industrial zone around 4:30 p.m. Tuesday when it came under small-arms fire. The convoy backtracked, and its cargo was shifted to two Marine amphibious assault vehicles, which resumed the mission.

Those carriers were hit by rocket-propelled grenades, known as RPGs. One turned back toward friendly territory, but the other caught fire and the driver lost his way in the unfamiliar neighborhood. Suddenly, the crew encountered a large number of armed men milling in the streets. Within minutes, they were being attacked from all sides.

"They started taking RPG fire and tried to get out of the area, but we lost communication with them," Smith said. "Their engine was on fire and they were heading away from our zone. . . . I saw a huge plume of smoke and I knew something was very wrong."

Officers dispatched a quick-reaction squad whose members had already been in battle earlier Tuesday. While guarding the site of a helicopter crash in a marshy area southeast of the city that morning, the outfit was ambushed by insurgents.

The rescue squad rushed four tanks and six Humvees to the area, where they fought their way through several blocks to reach the burning carrier. Surrounded by 25 Marine riflemen on foot, the armored vehicles advanced, firing machine guns from their turrets. Overhead, Air Force attack planes repeatedly strafed the area. Marine officials here said at least 20 insurgents were shot dead during the fighting.

"Within the first 500 meters, we were shooting 360 degrees," said Lt. Joshua Glover, 25, who commanded the rescue force. "When we finally saw the [armored personnel carrier], it was a piece of burning metal."

The carrier's crew had managed to escape and had taken shelter in the nearest house, where they were pummeled with gunfire from the surrounding houses. Under covering fire from U.S. tanks and planes, Glover's team was able to get the crew into Humvees and race off to safety.

"People were tossing grenades from the houses on either side," Glover said. "I could hear small-arms fire, and I even saw people running across the street to try and enter the house." He and Smith said they saw only armed men in the area.

Senior Marine officials here, who plan to seek commendations for valor for four men involved the rescue mission, said the most important aspect of the incident was the courage that the Marines displayed in battling their way through heavy fire to reach the disabled carrier and rescue its crew.

"This is a story about heroes. It shows the tenacity of the Marines and their fierce loyalty to each other," said Lt. Col. Brennan Byrne, commander of the 1st Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment. "They were absolutely unwilling to leave their brother Marines behind."

At the Marine base in Fallujah and at command posts along the front lines Wednesday, troops recounted the rescue story to one another, relishing every detail and braced by the display of fighting spirit during what, for many Marines, has been a period of frustration and inactivity since Friday, when offensive operations were halted.

But Smith and other officers said the incident also offered sobering insights into the sophistication and size of the insurgent force, which the Marines have characterized as a combination of Iraqis loyal to toppled president Saddam Hussein, foreign Islamic guerrillas and local criminals.

In the past several days, Marines have also recovered hundreds of weapons, including rocket launchers, machine guns, sniper rifles and explosive belts for suicide bombers, while searching the deserted industrial zone. Many of the weapons were wrapped in plastic and buried under sand piles or other debris, suggesting they had been hidden some time ago for use in battle.

Until Tuesday's firefight, moreover, the Marines here had never been attacked by more than five or six insurgents at once, Smith said. This time, when the personnel carrier strayed just a few blocks into enemy territory, "there were 50 to 100 guys. It took a great deal of fire for us to get there, and I saw much more coordination than anything I seen before," he said.

"They've been preparing for this the whole time."

[ShermansWar]

The marines will kick the shit out of them as soon as they get the green light. One thing they do well is adapt to a changing situation and any tactics the iraqis come up with they will counter. But as i said many many times before, this micro management is gonna kill us, interferes with initiative, and you cant get guys jacked up, tell them stand down ,get them jacked up, tell them stand down and jerk them off like that.
these tactics are part of what turned me against bush in the first place, where they kept cornering forces in afghanistan and then calling ceasefires for negotiations while rebels slipped away.its horseshit and they better let them do their job. as i said in the past, war is serious business and they better quit jerking around and going at it half assed.it's not fair to the troops to interfere this way, it's never been done before where troops in the middle of offensive operations are ordered to halt by the pentagon and then left swinging in the breeze.it's a travesty IMO.

[DrDevice]

Agreed 100% Rat:

US FM 3-0 Operations

Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national or multinational objectives.

The operational level of war is the level at which campaigns and major operations are conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations (AOs).

Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain, and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements.




I think we should focus on tactics, not strategy or operations. The more strategic implications of the future of armored warfare are covered elsewhere. Let us focus on the elements we game on a daily basis and the reporting and improvement of performance based on the virtual-world tactics we have developed as both a response to the limits of the simulation at hand and the sheer quantity of man-hours of training to be had compared to real servicemen.

We have the advantage of some serious time "behind the wheel" and could aptly see what we can learn from our real-armor counterparts (like I did while working FMT with Puckstop, a real M1A1 gunner) and what things we've learned that may apply to the real world.

Rat, could you post a link to the articles you mention for review by the forumites?

[ShermansWar]

I also called in right when i said in other thread some marine did something in Fallujah he was gonna get decorated for on that date before the details even came out.
Hehe.

[NEpi]

I don't think there is a major shift, so much as one or more people in authority are remembering a lesson already taught. As an answer to what NEpi wrote, tanks have always been vulnerable to infantry. This has been forgotten or ignored until now, probably because, despite the fact that the Cold War has been over for some time, we still have a lot of Cold War-era armor. They're great for fighting other tanks, but like all AFVs they're vulnerable to infantry. We haven't been practicing MOUT, either. I bet things have changed in the last year, though.

Shot

shot, i disagree about vulnerability of tanks to infantry. tanks can be implemented against infantry at long distance quite effectively. the problem starts when tanks are assaulting, and infantry get too close.
IDF used tanks to ambush hizbulla personel for a long time, and was quite successful in doing that.
the problem is tanks can't evade being too close to enemy infantry when in urban deployment.
somehow, IDF theorists managed to devise an SOP to negate that problem.

[TankHunter]

The Last Century was the Bloodiest in Human History, this Century is proving to be bloodier still with China’s Tank Armies still leashed, India vs. Pakistan Round 4 or 5, Israel vs. all its Neighbors (Again)……..
The fact that there are “too many Tanks Out There”, means that Tank vs. Tank vs. Man is going to be a reality.


And that is why I would like to see Chinese and Indian tanks in SB. A war between the Russians and NATO probably will never come to light (which SB was pretty much made to simulate given the weapons used) but a war between the Indians (and an allied USA) and Chinese (along with Pakistan being an ally of China) is more likely. I don’t like having to simulate Arjuns, T-90s, Chinese tanks and APCs and Paki tanks with what is available in SB. It just doesn’t simulate it too well. Ya know?

[NEpi]

That’s Western Technology. Show me a Sub Saharan Country (Except the South African Army) that could counter Massed Armoured Formations in the Open? Besides, we all know the Cyclical Tendencies of Armour and Firepower. If technology will Doom a Tank, then it is Technology that will make It rise like a Phoenix again. There is nothing better in a Chemically/Biologically contaminated Area than an AFV. And when all is Nuclear Blue, a Tank can still roll in and do its job.

GF, western technology makes if futile to build tanks as protection from other western powers. fighting against technologically inferior countries mean you don't have to have that much force in the first place. each of your tanks is better than each of theirs, and there isn't a competitive mass producer of tanks any longer.

The Last Big Ones (were Armour was used in Mass) were GW2 (2002), Chechnya (1999 and 1994), GW1 1991, Tiananmen Square (1989), IDF in Lebanon 1982…..
The Last Century was the Bloodiest in Human History, this Century is proving to be bloodier still with China’s Tank Armies still leashed, India vs. Pakistan Round 4 or 5, Israel vs. all its Neighbors (Again)……..
The fact that there are “too many Tanks Out There”, means that Tank vs. Tank vs. Man is going to be a reality.

yeah, but it won't matter because of force multipliers. strong western powers can make that calculation, and decide to have fewer tanks than they did 15 years ago.

Western Armies have fought each other in the Past, Recent and Distant. History is a great guide. It repeats the same tragedy when most people think it will never happen again. Besides, there is Still Russian Inventories full of War Machines and Chinese Tank Armies.

true, but the russian inventories are mostly in hands of european allies now. it's the first time that european nations actually work together and not just have a web of pacts to maintain status quo.
the chinese army will have dire consequences for leaving its homeland, even if taking logistics alone into consideration.

For an Island of Democracy surrounded by a sea of Despots, please do not ever lay down your arms.

as much as i know, we're not intending to :-)

Can you write about those tactics? I read in “that Israeli” Newspaper, that Merkavas may soon have a rear firing MG or such to cover a Tank’s Rear. If it is declassified, I would very much like to hear what you can say.

i don't know what i can say more than what i already did. there was a big conference a month ago about this issue and others. if you know the right people in the US military, i'm sure they can tell you more. sorry.
i'll just add that it evolves penetration from many directions at once, and a very high degree of communication between forces. those penetrations are in and out quickly, kind of a dance. you get in, then out, then in from another position. get the RPGists crazy. that way the enemy always facing us while being exposed from behind. also there is a new way of thinking about mutual cover...nuff said. sorry.

[NEpi]

my reaction to the poles against nazis comparison:
the thing that the elder partisan didn't take into consideration is the information technology that makes american forces faster to respond with overwhelming force. UAVs and comms are so much better, the insurgents have to hide very well and move a lot and very quickly. these two goals are counter-productive and very difficult to do. it is true that insurgents can pick off a soldier or two, but they will aventually be killed in much worse ratios. i think the main problem is that too few marines are engaged in this battle, to really ovewhelm the insurgents quickly. i think so, because it is done weekly here.

[Ludwigmeister]

I think morale plays a big role in all this. Troops of higher moral will be better able to concentrate on learned tactics. That's why after every kill the TC should stick his head out and start talkin smack, "yeah thats right fool! You come back up in my crib, and imma waste you with my "STAHLWERK NINE" BABY! you can't touch this, imma give you the BOOM SUCKA BOOM, and send your junk all over this mufu'in field BIATCH!" This will help the crew both laugh and gain courage through their TCs energetic outlook on the battle.

For added crew morale, the TC should then proceed to catch the next sabot round with his teeh, spit it back and yell "OH NO YOU DIDNT! KNOW YOU GONNA GET IT SUCKA! GUNNER... BLAST THIS PUNK ASS MOFO BIOTCH!"

Ludwig.

[ShotMagnet]

"Street fighting is a dirty, dangerous business," he said. "The enemy knows the grounds and the streets. And all the high-tech equipment won't tell you who is going to suddenly burst out of a house."

That says it best. Rat, I found it interesting, the shift in tactical paradigm that's suddenly got the insurgents fighting, as you said the other night, 'a stand-up fight'. I found interesting as well the assertion in one of the articles that the insurgents had gained a 'fair amount' of expertise in usage of explosives regarding demolitions. Dropping bridges is an echelon of expertise greater than using explosives as road mines.
Regarding what we were talking about the other night, tanknet had a link to a coupla good pieces about MOUT, contrasting and comparing how the Russians approached it in Grozny, with how we are approaching it in Iraq. The articles were from Armor magazine, and were done before this spike in insurgent attacks, but the conclusions were still relevant.
Okay, if you're looking for an operational-level AAR here it is, in all its half-baked, conclusion-jumping glory.
The Marines will 'secure' the objectives, to find that the insurgents can ebb and flow as they please. The only real way to seal off an urban area is to remove every living thing from it, in a truck or a body bag. That won't happen. It's neither cost-effective nor politically expedient, and it's probably not possible in any event.
The insurgents will therefore come and go, essentially as they please. What will stop them is the removal from authority of what charismatic icon from which they're taking direction.
A military victory is not probable. The Coalition may 'sterilize' Fallujah, or anywhere else, but the instant they do some martyr with an RPG will materialize out of nowhere, whack a tank, and the op winds back to zero.
A political victory is possible, assuming that an effective synergy of military might and popular sentiment can be forced into a shotgun marriage. It won't be won by force only, but force will seat all the guests at the table.

NEpi, I have to disagree regarding tanks and infantry. See the quote above. In an urban combat situation, the infantry are the undisputed queen of the battlefield. There are too many places for them to hide, and thereby ambush an essentially blind vehicle, like a tank.

Shot

[Trekker]

NEpi, I have to disagree regarding tanks and infantry. See the quote above. In an urban combat situation, the infantry are the undisputed queen of the battlefield. There are too many places for them to hide, and thereby ambush an essentially blind vehicle, like a tank.

Shot

The Swedish army has a system for this situation. One tank, one CV90 and one rifle squad. The rifles are the eyes, they see around corners and can "sense" when things are wrong. The CV90 is there for close protection, getting acouple of 40mm 3P in a window makes the bad guy jumpy. The tank has the supirior firepower. Coz there will be tanks in urban areas, and nothing kills a tank better then another tank. (This is only when we do streetfighting, not housefighting. In that case the tanks and IFV's are supressing/supporting from already cleard ground).

One should not neglect the use of tanks in urbanfighting. A tank in BP firing at a crossing is almost impossible to take out, if that same tank is protected by dismounts it's impossible. We need both IFV's and tanks to follow our dismounts in urban enviroment.

[JAVEHN]

I would say that the days of the tanks , in today type of conflicts are not over yet , they just nead to renew the tactics , and several ellements of tanks , that can be easy replaced .

Here i would bring the pluses and the minuses of tank use in Low intensity conflict , and fighting agsinst Guerilla in Urban place :

Pluses :

1)Tank optics : The high concentration of optics in the tank (Gunner optics , Commander optics , Loader can use Personal googles) , allows for much more presize bandit location . Ussually infantry can not spot the enemy , until it's starting to fire at them . With an X12 optics , gunner can spot a sniper 100 metter away peeping from window , and to take him down before he shoots .

2)Tank firepower - The firepower is not only HUGE , it's also exact and presise , thanks to Fire control Computer , and you can implement them at the same time against the same or several targets . You can also take out enemy in great distance in exact shot . In my personal experience , fire fight between 2 ground forces can last up to half hour without major shift in balance , until one tank comes, and ends the event in 15 seconds .

3)Protection : Offcorse , the armor that tanks offer . In surroundings , when insurgents using small arms , tank would be preferable tool , and it even could act without infantry support . Friendly infantry also can hide behind the tank armor , and the tank can operate as a "fire magnet" , giving for infantry a margin to operate .

Minuses :

1)Atraction : As i said before , tank would be preferable "fire magnet" . It's all good and ok , until the guys with RPG's starting to take it seriously ,and consentrate their main effort on the tank . After that , all that was written in the books , how exactly infantry should support tank in Urban surrounding wouldn't be so important to you , sence the tank would be on some nice fire , along with you and the crue . And the fact , that tank is just asking to be in the centre of the glory, it can't just hide or desapear , and pesky insurgents from the other side of the city would hear the tank comming , grab the RPG's , and join the party . It's just to big and noticable , and it's stealth is not zero , it's getting even bellow .

2)Tactics : The tactics that's used in this days by tank crues , are absolete , and good for old fashion war , against tanks , and intrenched infantry . To give you one example the proccess of C&C inside the tank . The TC is in the head of tank hieratchy , and he is the only one with a right to issue orders . Or the other crue members have only right to issue warnings to TC , that TC later translates into another command . As we all now , insurgents tactic is Hit and Run , so the margin for error here is just a matter of seconds . It would be the guy in civilian clothes , that would pull out AK from his window , fire a birst or 2 and escape , or some combatant with RPG from the corner , that would fire and escape . The reaction must be instant , and that's just impossible in that C&C proccess . I unfortuantly have close relations with that problem , because i had a lot of fights with my superiors about this subject . I asked them to review the tactics , and allow the crue members more freedom in action , and direct interaction between themself , but i was talled repeatadly , that it's just to unsafe issue . I had a luck to witness a young TC on his first mission , that started to act just like it was written in the book , when hi's gunner sighted armed combatant . The commander started to issue a command just like it was written in the books (sort of "Gunner , coax , infantry , range " , "fire" ) , and when the gunner started to fire coax , the combatant eat dinner inside his house allready .

3)Lack of control in close ranges and high ground : In Urban enviroment ,many engagements take place in close up to very close ranges , and from high ground. Tank have problems to control close ground when it's buttoned , and to fire on it while buttoned . Same thing to high ground . Tank have the tools to answer all those , actually . It has an AA gun (in some tanks it's 50 cal , and in some same old 7.62 MG that can be elevated high ) , that can go against targets on high places . Or the loader and commander can answer to a close control problem , if they would stay unbuttoned , and habe they personal weapons in the ready . Unfortunatly , many Commanders preffer their safety over operational matter , and would drive buttoned , "killing " their control over high ground , and close territory . It's all nice and lovely that infantry there to support you , but ussually they will not spot the enemy in time . And if they can go around without any type of protection , so the TC can take his head out from time to time .

4)Collathoral damage : Tank with it's 60 + Ton weight causes a great damage to road, even when it's tracks paved with rubber . In narrow streets tank can accidently take down a part of house , or run over car . I don't even talk about weaponry . 120 mm projectile has huge safety disperce of it's remainings , that can hit someone in a distance of miles away . Tank inside the city , is something like an Elephant inside small shop .

5)Hearts and minds - Tottally wrong tool if you have an area , where the friction between Army and local population is a must . Tanks just brings "bad energy " with it , and it's associated as a tool of occupation , along with other heavy equipment .

So , the pluses and minutes give and take . Think about it :wink:

[OperationIvy]

Yea id agree with Javehn :wink:

[Gunfighter]

Javehn,

Good point on the C&C within a tank crew. I always encouraged my Gunner to "seek" out targets and engage on his own. (except when I think its unsafe or wrong target.) This leaves me free to spot more targets and get some Irish Cream into my Coffee.

Overcontrol (micromanaging) is the opposite of co-operation. And since I value my Crew's Craniums, I train them to think (incase I buy the Farm) and help me get the best fire position.

GF

[Lone*star49]

Javehn,

Good point on the C&C within a tank crew. I always encouraged my Gunner to "seek" out targets and engage on his own. (except when I think its unsafe or wrong target.) This leaves me free to spot more targets and get some Irish Cream into my Coffee.

Overcontrol (micromanaging) is the opposite of co-operation. And since I value my Crew's Craniums, I train them to think (incase I buy the Farm) and help me get the best fire position.

GF
...

Outstanding reading both Javehn and GF.. and FTR, it shows, in my operations as CoA LSR, and that each of my Co's/Xo's once given general overall map orientation of battlefield and BP's both ours and supected enemys, then have those under their command, ask any questions, request, etc. to them directly, freeing me up to observer entire field of battle, ie map, and control artty, as well as FIGHT with my CoA company and indvidual platoon leaders within my company..

Accurate communitcations by all, and trusted individuals, to act immediatley, are key to retaining the flow of victorious battle, along with stemming the tide, as in "stalling" drives of the enemy.. and reversing the flow..

None of which, can happen without complete "team play"


LS

[JAVEHN]

Yea id agree with Javehn :wink:

Hehehe :lol: . Hey, Ivy , welcome to the community . I hope you like it here .
Now get some SB , so we can kick some ass over the net :wink: .

[Ratseal]

I tried to add up the pertinent AAR point from the 4 articles that I threw up. I can't post the link only, bc most of these articles are pulled from a .mil site accessible to US DoD or contractors; its called the Early Bird and it is a collection of relevant articles clipped from all the news that came out that day. However, the articles themselves are from open source pubs.

I can easily do one article a day, and I can look for particular kind of articles too. UNODIR, I will continue to focus on armor in OIF.

1. Concern for collateral damage, and relevant ROE, dramatically inhibits the application of military force. In urban situations, this significantly decreases the technological and firepower overmatch available to US forces in OIF.

2. Improvements in sensors have marginally improved armor's capability to operate in urban environments - but attacking infantry will benefit from night vision too. The statement that high tech doesn't matter in urban fighting is inaccurate and misleading.

3. Correct and aggressive employment of snipers and point fires from larger weapons systems are critical.

4. Armor is remains a potent force in urban fighting. Its protection, speed and firepower are useful for destroying roadblocks, dominating fire lanes and applying psychological pressure. Its optics are useful for long range counter sniper ops.

5. The failure to attach or slave secondary weapons on tanks to night vision significantly degrades force protection capabilities during night ops. Example - the M1 .50cal has no night vision on most tanks.

6. Prelaunch detection of RPG and pre-initiation detection of IEDs is critical to urban operations. No technologies are currently deployed in significant numbers to address this. Other approaches are being used.

7. The prolonged military operations are affording the enemy the opportunity to learn and significantly improve tactics and organization. Therefore, blue force tactics must adapt ahead of the enemy's capabilities.

8. Armored vehicles can be ambushed and destroyed much more easily in urban combat. Channeling vehicle movement by creating obstacles and cutting bridges is effective.

9. Urban navigation is as challenging and potentially treacherous as any other kind. All primary and secondary vehicle operators need to participate in navigation and route planning.

10.

[NEpi]

good points, jav. i'm a little surprised about TCs prefering to button up. i wouldn't if i was them. especially in surroundings that can bullocks the tracks that easily, and the need to use my AR of AAMG to shoot down higher foes.
a point to non-israelis: we're used to keep our ARs ready to fire at all time. we can use them from the hatches quite effectively.

for mentioning gunners firing without being ordered to, it is incredibly dangerous. until you can be in TC station, and see what you DON'T see when looking through the sights, you can't imagine how much. in your example of the green TC you said the C&C was too slow. i don't think you should blame the SOP, but the TC and gunner: the TC was too slow to start issuing the order, and the gunner was too slow to do it all in advance without pulling the trigger. giving freedom to fire to the gunner is very, very different than giving the same freedom to tanks in a platoon or platoons in a company.
also, letting the gunner traverse freely in a street is a guaranteed way to bump the gun in a wall of a house. the gunner might not see it in the first place. gunners should look for prey, but they should be monitored by the TC.

there are ways to negate the problem of elevation, but i don't think i should expand on it here.

you also mentioned how obvious tanks are. true, but that's true for heavy APCs too, so when deploying the APCs, you can add a tank or two and still not suffer from further loss of initiative. trying to sneak in with a large force is useless anyway. as the first bullet screams above your head, the mosques already starting to call to arms anyway. they all know you're coming.

for the size of tanks in urban terrain, it's true that they are really bad for alley fights, but they're priceless for holding key positions and for cleaning routes for the infantry to drive through. they shouldn't get in narrow streets in the first place. such incidents should be prevented by good field intelligence from UAVs and other measures.

collateral damage from firing can be minimized if implemented correctly.for example, you shouldn't snipe into windows when firing the 120mm, but hit the front wall. that way the first room will be hurt bad, but not the inner parts of the house or the street on the other side of the house. (i'm sure you know that, but for the rest of the lot...). it is an immense force, though, and as one it is harder to control. that's why using 120mm in urban operation is very very risky, and should be delt with accordingly.

for #5, hearts and minds, when using heavy mech inf. and armor, this is the least of your worries at the time.

after all that being said, i guess you've seen more urban fighting than i did. i was used to more open terrain at the time. so i'll take your word for it ;-)

rat, your #7 is a double-edged sword. long operations give your side to learn, adapt and implement new tactics too. adapting ahead of the enemy is almost impossible, as we tend to solve our current problems before solving the problems of tommorow.

[Ratseal]

Nepi, you're right. I should have said, Bluefor must change their tactics ahead of the enemy in order to maintain the initiative and keep the enemy reactive.

[ShotMagnet]

I can easily do one article a day, and I can look for particular kind of articles too. UNODIR, I will continue to focus on armor in OIF.

Second. These articles are gold.
If you haven't, go to tank-net and take a look at the article I was talking about. One particular the Armor magazine article talked about was how the Israelis are employing what was originally a training aid (the .50 mounted over the mantlet, can't remember the acronym) as an anti-sniper weapon.
Something similar could do wonders for supporting infantry, if mounted on Brads or Abrams'.

Shot

[Gunfighter]

for mentioning gunners firing without being ordered to, it is incredibly dangerous. until you can be in TC station, and see what you DON'T see when looking through the sights, you can't imagine how much.

I do not mean the Main Gun but the COAX. In my situation, I issue arcs to the Gunner and the fire order "Watch and Shoot" (12A, I know its an Infantry Fire Order but I'll use whatever works).

For Main Gun action, when the Gunner Spots the Target before I do, he initiates the fire order (I just get out of the way from the Breech) which gives me enough time to say "Fire" or "STOP". I have to trust my gunner and driver to get to fire position and hit the target without any detailed control. As for Safety, I have to inform the crew of what happens to their flanks and rear, if they endanger the tank or its crew - Its my head and Job.

good points, jav. i'm a little surprised about TCs prefering to button up. i wouldn't if i was them. especially in surroundings that can bullocks the tracks that easily, and the need to use my AR of AAMG to shoot down higher foes.
a point to non-israelis: we're used to keep our ARs ready to fire at all time. we can use them from the hatches quite effectively.

The only time I button up is when its Raining (steel or water). Seeing the enemy 1st is worth the risk. I wish we were issued BullPup Rifles so that I can 'reach out' and touch someone in a pinch. My C-7 is a meter long and won't fit in the turret for a quick draw. (Grenades, however are always in hands reach).

[NEpi]

GF, when issuing a coax fire order, i expect the gunner to continue until otherwise ordered. this is not the case here, if i got jave correctely. he was talking about the gunner spotting an enemy before the TC. in this case, i prefer the TC issue the fire order to lower the chances of friendly fire that might be caused by the gunner's limited FoV.

and for buttoning up, you get in when it's raining water? damn, what a lady ;-)

we israeli tankers keep our rifles outside the hatch, so we can use them even when they're relatively long. that way we don't need to give up accuracy or sturdiness to be able to use them. the whole idea of keeping the long personal weapon inside seem strange...

[Gunfighter]

GF, when issuing a coax fire order, i expect the gunner to continue until otherwise ordered. this is not the case here, if i got jave correctely. he was talking about the gunner spotting an enemy before the TC. in this case, i prefer the TC issue the fire order to lower the chances of friendly fire that might be caused by the gunner's limited FoV.

The AFVs we use have a direct main gun range of 2k, and I tell my crew what we are facing and who is suppose to be in our arcs. If friendly fire occurs, then they have Me to hang. If the enemy gets a shot off first because the Gunner had to wait 3 seconds for me to say my Fire Order, then the whole crew Hangs. Better me then all of us....

and for buttoning up, you get in when it's raining water? damn, what a lady ;-)

Thank you NEpi. :red: My Parasol looks tacky when I unfurl it - hence the hatch.

we israeli tankers keep our rifles outside the hatch, so we can use them even when they're relatively long. that way we don't need to give up accuracy or sturdiness to be able to use them. the whole idea of keeping the long personal weapon inside seem strange...

We do not have brackets or mounts outside our AFVs within hands reach. And the space in the turret interior is festooned with Odd equipment that makes storing a long rifle in the turret difficult. I agree having a quick draw weapon with range is prefrable to pistols or SMGs. But I cannot risk my C7A1 (all our C-8 Carbines are overseas) getting snagged by a tree or falling off when we hit a ditch at 45kmh.

[NEpi]

GF, when considering urban fighting, 2km range is fantastic. you shouldn't see further than battlesight at best.

being wet to the bone is part of the job. if you can look like one SoB when you're all wet, you are tough!

i'm sure you can figure out brackets that will keep your gun in place, and when the shit hits the cooling fan, you SHOULD be able to afford it. i've read plenty of AARs depicting tank crews trumpling the enemy and firing their personal weapons. i also read one that the TC got off and ran with his rifle and grenades to lob one through an enemy tank's hatch.

[Gunfighter]

NEpi, the "tank" we use is an armoured car - vulnerable to .50, RPGs and Bad Looks. Urban Warfare it is not for.

being wet to the bone is part of the job. if you can look like one SoB when you're all wet, you are tough!

Any fool can be comfortable....

i'm sure you can figure out brackets that will keep your gun in place, and when the shit hits the cooling fan, you SHOULD be able to afford it.

Yes we know exactly what brackets go where. We just cannot mount it. (We are not allowed to modify our AFVs)

[DrDevice]

Good NPR piece of the need for more armor in MOUT and the issues of the current Fallujah. Consistent with our current discussions here.

Best line: "When you get right down to it, the best anit-sniper weapon in the world is 8 inches armor and a 120mm gun."

"NPR : U.S. Casualties Peak 12 Months After War Began"

http://www.npr.org/rundowns/segment.php?wfId=1842834

[JAVEHN]

GF, when considering urban fighting, 2km range is fantastic. you shouldn't see further than battlesight at best.

There is no 2 km at Urban fighting , unless you are been targeted , and you can't see the target on your eyes .Or for other tactics , that it's not the place to mention it .

Funny story : My Co stolled a huge observation binocular (i mean huge one , telescopic sight ) , and mounted it on his tank . He later corrected a fire to his gunner , while his gunner himself had no idea what he is shooting on . It was a range of more then 1400 metters from coax , and pretty accurate shots ...

being wet to the bone is part of the job. if you can look like one SoB when you're all wet, you are tough!

No , man , that's not fun !! It's cold !

The AFVs we use have a direct main gun range of 2k, and I tell my crew what we are facing and who is suppose to be in our arcs. If friendly fire occurs, then they have Me to hang. If the enemy gets a shot off first because the Gunner had to wait 3 seconds for me to say my Fire Order, then the whole crew Hangs. Better me then all of us....

The problem of LIC (low intensity conflict) those days , that you really don't know what you are up against . It's all ok that the gunner covers the arc of possible enemy direction , and when the tanks pull up over the hell , your gunner nails the bastard . I am talking about situation , where you really don't know where from the enemy will go , and this guy that wals on the street and smiles at you , can pool next second RPG and nail your Tank/APC in proximity of 10 metters , and you couldn't even say "Oh my god" . This is a matter of seconds , and a problem is , that your time of responce is very limited , and not suitable to the drills existing today . Now NEPI , i would agree what you say about the gunner , for instance , in some cases , but loader of the tank see the same picture , as the TC see . He can fire without an order , and i don't see many problems with it (i will surtainly update him offcorse , of possible movement of friendly forces in the area , and their location , in order to prevent FF ) . The first thing that must be done quickly , is to supress the shooter with violent fire to his direction , fast as possible .

[NEpi]

jave, first of all we seem to talk on different situations than GF. we all agree here. no point in arguing :-)

rain IS cold, damnit, i know it all too well. on the other hand, buttoning up? i prefer being cold than slipping into a ditch or letting other million accidents happen because of this (ever told you how i almost decapitated an engineer once? i would have if my head was inside).

the loader has a good FoV when unbuttoned. on the other hand, a loader out is moer target for snipers. i always prefered sending that guy inside and keeping him there, unless i saw any reason for specific control over close left side. any other time the loader should be kept completely defended, IMO.

[Ssnake]

A Must Read: "Thunder Run" by David Zucchino. 'nuff said.

[12Alfa]

[quote="Gunfighter"][quote]
I do not mean the Main Gun but the COAX. In my situation, I issue arcs to the Gunner and the fire order "Watch and Shoot" (12A, I know its an Infantry Fire Order but I'll use whatever works).
quote]

Np with that method. In a competition I have used the same drill.

But only with a tight crew is this possible. My driver was with me for 3 years, and them became my gunner. I had him for another 3 and then he left for his leadership course and his own turret. We were tight (no not that kind of tight!), at the end he was thinking the same as I was, both tactialy and for fire commands. In most co-ax shoots I was degraded to his loader, nothing more, he found, and was engaging the targets before i could open my mouth or turn my head to the trg. Maybe I trained him too well, he was at the end and before his next course, asking me if he could pratice some Commander Fire Commands on our gun camps, seeing he was off to his Commander course next I gave him the OK (under supervision) . He was then finding the trg, issusing himself the fire command, firing the gun and then carrying on with the shoot at a alarming speed. He is a fine gunner and now will make a good commander, it's to bad that we are re-rolled back to Recce, all that trg'ing gone to waste, hehehe.

As others have posted in close fighting ,speed of the return fire will be the desiding factor to your AFV surviving the fight, crew co-operation and speed are essential, i would think.

12Alfa
Lost but makin good time.

[ShotMagnet]

Rat, is there any indication from the stuff you've posted that Chechens have made the trip and are now battling with Coalition troops in Iraq?
The stuff I'm doing for the 29th has kept me from reading the articles, but then you maybe knew that.

Shot

[DrDevice]

Another interesting piece on globalsecurity.org

http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2004/040429-armour-casualties.htm

The jargon/nomenclature is poor, and some of the conclusions are suspect IMHO, but it's another interesting bellwether on the daily facts of armor in Iraq.

[Ratseal]

There are no open source articles documenting UNCLAS, confirmed examples of Chechens fighting in Iraq.