Soviet Artillery Doctrine

[ShotMagnet]

Getting my feet wet doing scenario design, starting out small, with say a platoon of M1s and some mech infantry against maybe a Soviet Tank/MR company. As an aid to realistic design, was Cold War-era doctrine for the Soviets the same as in WWII (i.e. massive artillery prep, when available)? What type(s) (HE, Smoke, etc) should I include, and what priority should it be given?

Thanks

[GaryOwen]

FM 17-123 has some good stuff on Soviet-style operations. The chapter on defensive operations describes Soviet offensive doctrine (or at least what TRADOC considered Soviet offensive doctrine to be).

Plus it's got a nifty defensive scenario that takes place somewhere near Haunetal (if my recollection serves correct), between Fulda and Bad Hersfeld. Allons!

http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/71-123/toc.htm

[9erRed]

In ref to your request for active info on Opfor tactics in the offence.
The OPFOR in the Offense
Types of Offensive Action.
The OPFOR will employ three basic types of tactical offensive actions:
1. attack against a defending enemy,
2. meeting battle,
3. And pursuit.
a. Attack Against a Defending Enemy. The basic form of offensive combat and the preferred OPFOR method of attacking a defending BLUFOR:
Occurs when the BLUFOR is occupying known defensive positions.
Can occur in a variety of situations: envelopment’s, supporting attacks, penetrations of the BLUFOR defense, and exploitation.
An attack from a position in direct contact is most often used when transitioning over to the offense from the defense.
(1) Assembly Areas.
When attacking from the march, a division would normally occupy an assembly area of between 300 to 600 sq. km located 60 to 75 km from the BLUFOR’s forward positions.
Brigades could occupy assembly areas as close as 20 to 30 km.
Forces depart assembly areas in march formation and deploy into prebattle and, if necessary, battle formation at designated lines.
(2) Operations against a BLUFOR Covering Force Area.
Goal: to prevent having the OPFOR main body deploy from march formation prior to reaching the designated deployment lines.
Against a weak covering force:
Forward detachments of 1st echelon divisions, with strong artillery and air support, responsible for destroying BLUFOR covering force.
Main bodies of divisions follow in tactical march column, ready to exploit the forward detachment success.
Deployment of lead divisions depends on degree of BLUFOR resistance.
Against a strong covering force:
OPFOR would deploy main bodies of 1st echelon divisions from the outset.
Use forward detachments and air landings to cut off BLUFOR withdrawals and seize entries into the tactical zone.
Divisions may send forward detachments to seize key terrain in the covering force area.
(3) Attack zones and strike sectors. Figure 5-5 lists average widths of attack zones (frontages) and strike sectors (penetration sectors/sectors of main effort) at the tactical level. The OPFOR's goal is to achieve overwhelming superiority in the strike sector. A minimum of 5:1 is desired but more is better.
Div Bde Bn Co Plt
Zone of Attack (km) 5-25 3-8 2-3 .5-.8 .1-.2
Main Attack Axis (km) 6-10 2-4 1-2 NA NA
Distance Between Echelons (km) 15-30 5-15 1-3 NA NA
Figure 5-5. Typical Attack Zones and Strike Sector Widths.

NOTE: These distances are doctrinal and may vary significantly depending upon the situation.
(4) Force Disposition.
(a) MID and TD.
In attacking a well-prepared defense, a division will normally attack on a narrower frontage (as narrow as 10 km) with a stronger second echelon (two brigades rather than one).
A division attacking on an army's supporting axis will normally have a wider frontage than one attacking on the main attack axis.
Division elements will normally deploy as listed in Figure 5-6.
Division 1st Echelon Concentrated to attack on main and supporting axes.
Div. 2nd Echelon or Combined Arms Reserve Moves by bounds 15-30 km behind the first echelon until committed.
Brigade Artillery Groups 1-4 km from the forward edge.
Divisional Artillery Groups 3-6 km from the forward edge.
Army Artillery Groups 3-8 km from the forward edge.
Army Rocket Artillery Group 4-8 km from the forward edge.
Divisional Antitank Reserves Between the 1st & 2nd echelons on the main attack axis or on a threatened flank.
Division Main CP Up to 15 km from the forward edge.
Division Forward CP Up to 5 km from the forward edge.
Division Rear Area Control Post Up to 30 km from the forward edge and located near the rear services elements.
Brigade Main CPs Up to 5 km from the forward edge.
Logistics Units The divisional medical post, together with repair and evacuation elements, moves behind the first echelon. The rest of the divisional logistical units will be some 5-10 km behind the 2nd echelon.
Figure 5-6.Deployment Depths.

MIBN and TBN
Battalion may attack using either one or two echelons.
When attacking in one echelon, it will normally have a small combined arms reserve (platoon sized).
A tank company attached to a MIBN normally operates intact.
Does not have the organic combat support or combat service support required for independent action, except when deployed as a security or enveloping detachment, an advance guard, a raiding detachment, a forward detachment, or a heliborne or amphibious landing force.
b. Meeting Battle.
The basic form of offense used to meet and destroy BLUFOR tactical reserves.
Goals: to destroy the BLUFOR and to continue developing the offensive.
The side that seizes the initiative first through rapid deployment into battle or prebattle formations and through delivery of indirect and direct fires is most likely to win, even in the face of a superior BLUFOR.

1. OPFOR battalion in the meeting battle. A mechanized infantry or tank battalion is most likely to become involved in a meeting battle when acting as the advance guard of a brigade. This is also true of a battalion acting independently as a forward detachment of a division or brigade. When performing such a role, a mechanized infantry battalion is normally reinforced with tank, artillery, and engineer troops and possibly with antitank, air defense or chemical protection elements. A tank battalion would be similarly reinforced, but with mechanized infantry rather than tank or antitank elements.

2. OPFOR Company in the meeting battle. OPFOR maneuver companies fight meeting battles and defending enemies in the same manner. A mechanized infantry or tank company normally fights as part of a battalion. However, it can also act independently as a forward security element of an advance guard or a forward detachment. A Company in such a role can receive reinforcements from NBC reconnaissance, artillery, and a unit of the other maneuver arm (tank or mechanized infantry).

Phase Element in March Basic Task Actions on Contact
Initial Phase Reconnaissance Patrols and Groups Obtain data on BLUFOR disposition and terrain along main routes of advance Disengage when possible.
Report and/or continuously monitor the situation.
Bypass BLUFOR, continue to penetrate BLUFOR positions, particularly nuclear-capable and high-precision weapon systems.
In favorable conditions (or out of necessity), may attack advancing units, take prisoners, disorganize/disrupt BLUFOR, and destroy BLUFOR NBC and high-precision weapons and C3I systems.
Forward Detachment Seize key terrain to facilitate the advance of the main body.
May conduct raids en route to objective against key targets (NBC and high-precision weapon systems, C3I centers) Avoids contact as much as possible, moving rapidly to its objective.
If necessary, conducts meeting battles like a battalion acting as an advance guard
Advance Guard Move along route of main body to ensure uninterrupted advance of main body, overcoming BLUFOR security/reconnaissance forces and obstacles. Reports BLUFOR contact/disruption.
FSE deploys and attempts to overcome BLUFOR based on information from CRP(s).
If the FSE is not able to overcome the BLUFOR, it assumes a defensive overwatch position to support maneuver of main body of advance guard.
Main body of advance guard attempts a close envelopment or double envelopment to defeat the BLUFOR unless his force is overwhelming in size.
If successful, units reform and resume march or initiate pursuit.
If unsuccessful, units hold positions/block BLUFOR/continue attacking to support the subsequent maneuver and attack of the main body of the parent unit.

Actions of Main Body
Main Body Deploy rapidly for the attack and defeat of the BLUFOR, generally from the flanks. Based on information from forward elements, commander maneuvers his forces and attempts to envelop.
Units march rapidly to assigned sectors and deploy in prebattle/battle formations as needed to assault BLUFOR.
Conclusion
Main Body Develop the attack into the depths of the BLUFOR rear. If BLUFOR withdraws, it initiates pursuit.
If it decisively defeats the BLUFOR, it resumes direction of march and overall mission.
If it does not defeat the BLUFOR, it continues to develop the attack and holds positions aggressively until higher headquarters can conduct its maneuver.
If it is unsuccessful, it may go over to the defense in the course of the offense.

Phases of meeting battle.
COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE PATROL (CRP) / FORWARD PATROL

Upon contact, actions of the CRP/Forward patrol are:
Report contact to the advanced guard commander.
Attempt to penetrate to the BLUFOR main force, bypassing his advance elements.
Perform chemical and engineer reconnaissance.
Collect all information on the BLUFOR that will expedite the commander’s decision.
Build-up of Firepower (CRP/Forward Patrol)
Time: 0 minutes
Forces Committed: 3 BTRs

FORWARD SECURITY ELEMENT (FSE)

Actions of the FSE, moving in column behind the CRP(s) by up to 10 kilometers, are:
Advance at maximum speed.
Engage the BLUFOR with all weapons.
Develop the fight.
Seize and hold a position until arrival of the advanced guard main body.
Build-up of Firepower (FSE)
Time: +20 minutes
Forces now committed:
11 BTRs
3 Tanks
6 Mortars
6 Howitzers, 122mm

ADVANCE GUARD MAIN BODY (AGMB)
At the time of initial contact, the advance guard main body is moving in March column 5 to 10 kilometers behind the FSE. The commander:
Defines the plan for the engagement.
Issues orders to the commanders of the CRP and FSE.
Moves forward, with the artillery commander, at maximum speed to an observation point.
Issues orders for the deployment of the advance guard main body.
Launches the attack
Build-up of Firepower (Advance Guard)
Time: +60 minutes
Forces now committed:
50 BTRs 2 Antiaircraft Guns
10 Tanks 6 AT-4s and 9 AT-7s
6 Mortars 3 recoilless guns, 73mm
18 Howitzers, 122mm 6 Automatic Grenade Launchers

c. Pursuit. The OPFOR defines pursuit as a type of offensive conducted against a withdrawing BLUFOR. The goal of a pursuit is to complete the destruction of, or capture the BLUFOR.
(1) The three forms of pursuit are
Frontal pursuit,
Parallel Pursuit, and the
Combination Frontal and Parallel Pursuit.
(2) Characteristics of the Pursuit:
Centralized planning.
Decentralized execution.
Artillery allocated to maneuver battalions.
Extensive use of forward detachments (both heliborne and ground) to seize key terrain to block the BLUFOR's withdrawal routes.
Heavy emphasis on reconnaissance.

Advise if this meet's scene perameter's

9erRed..... Sorry for the lengthy reply will send a link next or e-mail.

[ShotMagnet]

Thanks for the help, guys. 9er, there is no such thing as too much information, when designing a scenario. Feel free to e-mail me, add me to your buddy list, etc, with anything you think is relevant.
Am I correct in assuming, per my original question, that NATO forces in general can expect to see lots and lots of artillery prep? The buildup of OPFOR forces you described would seem to make the answer to that question an obvious 'Yes'. If so, may I assume that priority for contact elements as regards fire support will be at least 'medium', bordering on 'high'?
Also, taking note of the vertical envelopment idea, is it possible for units to spontaneously appear, after the start of a scenario? I'm thinking paradrop, right behind the FEBA, although typically paradrops don't occur at the point of contact. Could OPFOR units be made to enter the map from the NATO side of things after a suitable delay to simulate the paras marching to contact, behind NATO lines.
Thanks again for your help.

[9erRed]

Ref.to the Arty.
The Opfor will have there arty on high priority during the initial advance to contact. Mostly HE strikes as there was not a docturne set for using ICM or fastcam... and there wasn't a lot of that ammo avail. anyways. Smoke was also used as assult assistance but not as high a proirity. And keeping in mind that not all assulting units had the ability to "see" through smoke. Even though the engine smoke was used at the assult for cover of move, that tactic proved only usefull against BlueFor inf. as most [not all] other defensive vehicles had the abitily to "see". As a note here the Opfor will have at least 7 batteries of Guns at immediate disposal to the maneuver commander. And another 18 - 25 batteries avail. on call....So YES there arty would be on HIGH.
The initial line of Artillery fire concentration would normally be on the BlueFor forward positions. Subsequent lines were nornmally 300mtrs to 1000mtrs apart through the depth of the BlueFor positions. This "initial" fire would have been proceeded by a "Fire Assult" directed at point and area targets, this "Fire Assult" normally involves all or most of the artillery allocated to a division.
Now ref. your wanting to "spring" some flank Opfor units on the defensive BlueFor lines or deeper. There is no option to "generate" new units during the game, BUT if you can find a hiding place that blue cannot see at the start of the mission (little valley, or behind a hill)...and the "enemy info" setting for blue is not set all that high, then they may just surprise the BlueFor.[now keep in mind that all defensive positions adopted by Nato had or has "Flank Security"] So you'll have to move the Red "Sprung" units slowly [to reduce veh. noise and early dection]

All for now ...hope that helps in your mission... 9erRed..out

[ShotMagnet]

9er, thanks again for the info, it helps a lot. I'll start ginning up OB's, put them on the map, see how they work. At the point where it looks like it might be doable, do you want to playtest it?

[0802]

You have to remember when US doctrine for artillery talks destruction we talk 30 percent, at the point the Russians would still only being in the suppression phase. When the Russians developed norms of fire for destruction they are talking 80 percent of the force is eliminated.

[Ssnake]

Hm - this may be a question of artillery specific terms and expressions:

- "Destruction" in the German Bundeswehr is never used since it designates the employment of "special weapons" or "nuclear devices" (use your favorite euphemism here).

- To "break up & destroy" would mean a 70%+ attrition rate at which point the targeted force would be considered combat ineffective.

- "Suppression" would result in maybe 20-30% casualties, mostly because the main purpose is not attrition but putting the enemy out of action for a limited time window. The longer this suppression is being applied, the higher the final attrition rate.

- "Harrassing fire" finally has just one purpose - to slow down enemy activities with minimal ammunition usage. I question whether this would actually be used today. If you look at the mission profiles and doctrine of self propelled howitzers, they rely on short and intense missions. This type of mission is probably suited for small caliber mortars only.

[ShotMagnet]

Ssnake, I agree about harassing fire. Avalon Hill's (now MMP's) game Advanced Squad Leader (ASL) lets you do harassing fires. They don't seem to do much more than screen your units, keep the other guys at arms length. Whether game experience translates well into historical experience is a good question, although ASL is, like SB as much sim as game.
My feeling is that anyone on the Soviet side of the table is going to want destruction, be forced to accept disruption, and will pile as many barrels as are deemed useful on the target to assure the one and maybe get the other. Like you said, short and intense mission, displacing quickly to avoid counterbattery fires. Would Soviet ammo stocks of the period ('85-'89) have carried anything fancier than HE and Smoke?

[Ssnake]

Basic bomblets are no rocket science - and the Soviets knew rocket science very well. I am at a loss whether they actually had shaped charge bomblets, or just fragmentation submunitions.

Viewing some recent videos of the 2S19 I am not sure whether they really follow the doctrine of short high intensity barrage. They invested quite some time to show the impressive dozer blade to let the vehicle dig itself into the ground. Why would you want to waste your time with something like this if you weren't determined to stay for longer? And the 2S19 is one of the rather modern concepts, unlike the 2S1 or 2S3.

[Pakenko]

I got one good idea for the dozer blade and the entrenchment practice: Chechen snipers :)

[I2R06]

Just my opinion. I would NOT give the Soviet side High priority. High Priority tends to simulate a rapid response to a call for fire. In other words, if in the middle of the game I see a previously unknown enemy I can rapidly get indirect fire on him. Soviet Artillery doesn't work like that. There is lots and lots of it, but it is not very responsive. It tends to get preplanned at higher echelons. Remember that the Soviet system is top down control. (I'm thinking 80's. Things may have changed since then.) I would plan for massive artillery prep by the Soviets as I created the scenario. I like to do this first, before I set up the Blue Forces so I don't know where the Blue Forces are. I generally use a lot of HE and Smoke. That's all. Then I give the Soviets Low Priority. If you survive the prep, you won't be bothered by more artillery unless you sit in one place too long.

[ShotMagnet]

12R06, I agree about some of the responsiveness issues, regarding mid-'80's Soviet artillery. On the other hand, they had, certainly still have, dedicated OP vehicles for artillery observation. That concept isn't new, either. Since at least WWII the major combatants have used AFVs for artillery spotting, even if the Soviets didn't have them for WWII they surely learned about them and adapted AFVs accordingly. A mobile observation post is immensely useful, both because it's mobile and because it can offer at least a little protection, and allow for some increased responsiveness as regards battery access.
Not forgetting also that communications between lower and higher echelon units have improved universally, if not at the same rate. I'm thnking doctrine would take such improvements into account.
Taking out the OP vehicle during the scenario might best simulate a reduction, perhaps to nothing in artillery request priority. All of an M-1 platoon can call down fire, the same might not be true for Soviet artillery, and bagging the OP track might rob the Soviets of their big guns, for that scenario. Not that OPFOR would advertise which track is the OP track, but then no one on the NATO side of things would be too fussy about servicing targets, or whatever the current euphemism is, past maybe prioritizing tank targets before they get around to BMDs and BTRs and BRDMs, etc.
Good ideas, though. Thanks for the input.

[Ssnake]

Let's not forget the organic artillery support of each regiment (a company (or "battery")) of 2S1 or 2S3 each, and pretty close to the advancing tanks and IFVs. It makes sense to assume that the responsiveness of the artillery is low after the initial preparation, since they would be empty and have to redeploy.
Nevertheless, after a relocation and reloading the howitzers, every regiment will have its own battery for immediate artillery support, and with observers and guns being in the same unit one can reasonably expect rather short communications, hence reduced reaction times.

Needless to say that the artillery model in SB2 will receive some refinement.

[ShotMagnet]

Ssnake,

Do the SPA rolling with the tanks have ammo vehicles nearby? I would guess not, but you never know. If not, is there some form of handoff between the SPA and the towed/divisional assets, so as to provide continuity between fire missions?
Might make things interesting, if they're not. OPFOR has to hope that it guesses right where the NATO assets will be, otherwise the first echelon folks are in for a hard time, maybe the scenario length can be defined as that interval while the guns are displacing/ammo-ing up. NATO forces know they have that long to do something about attacking units before they need to be elsewhere.

[0802]

The COPs for Soviet artillery really didn't work for the local maneuver commanders but the artillery commander, who worked for the overall commander. This caused Soviet Artillery to be very non-responsive. Also the Soviet method of both the COP and the Platoon Commander/XO with the guns computing data, and than the deciding which set of data to use has never been as efficient as the US use of a FDC.

The Russians had ICM starting in the 80s, however they suffered from a systemic problem within their industry, they had a hard time miniaturizing things, so a 152mm ICM round had about half as many, much larger bomblets as a M483A1 DPICM..

[Ssnake]

As far as I remember, Soviet artillery doctrine considered on-board munitions of the SPGs as "emergency stock". All regular fire missions were supposed to be fired straight from the truck.

[I2R06]

"Quantity had a Quality all it own"

It sounds like we are moving in the direction of the Korean Nightmare scenarios. Shot Magnet, if you haven't played one of these scenarios, I highly recommend it. A massive artillery prep at the beginning of the game that seems to hit everybody. Soviet prep takes out whole grid squares at a time (1000m x 1000m). Lots of little infantry squads that come out of the woods to further ruin your day. I don't know if the author password protected it or not. If not you can look at what he did to simulate massive prep at the beginning and infiltration of the rear. Ssnake, I forgot about the Artillery Battery in the Regiment. But its only one Battery and could only handle one fire mission at a time. Other than that it could be pretty responsive because if the regiment is in the attack it often fires in a direct fire mode. Something SB1 doesn't handle because these vehicles are not in the game. (This is NOT meant as a complaint. I love this game.) I think this will come down to play testing. Play the scenario specifically to see how the Soviet Arty goes. Deliberately fiddle with it at all three settings. Pick the one You like. After all, its your scenario.

[ShotMagnet]

12R06
The Stalin quote says it all. Not that I think that Soviet fires will necessarily be as responsive as NATO fires, but they'll have the advantage of knowing when they want to strike, where, how hard, etc, and will have allocated accordingly. If I read my history correctly, that would fit right in with Russian-Soviet doctrine. Hit them hard, deluge them with lots of pre-planned fires, then charge forward and take the dazed survivors by storm.
On the other hand, it wouldn't be much of a scenario if all OPFOR had to do was pound the snot out of the other guy. And if I recall NATO doctrine correctly, always a big if, there wasn't supposed to be a lot of force up front, waiting to get smacked. There was supposed to be a tripwire force to raise the alarm, allowing for a reactive response to where the Soviets looked most threatening. For the scenario, maybe a tank or two, some screening infantry and/or Brads, at start. After the artillery has come and gone, for the moment, here come some more NATO tanks. The result should be an interesting meeting-engagement fight with neither side completely aware of where the other is, beyond generalities.
Ssnake, does the 6-10 minute window between massive fires sound reasonable? I'm assuming that other strikes can happen in the meantime, responsiveness to such requests simulated by a 'low' priority for arty.
Thanks everyone

[Ssnake]

The screenign force idea is a response to the artillery preparation doctrine. The trick is - and this actually requires a great deal of skill and training - to deceive the advancing enemy about the fact that he is meeting the screening line that he is expecting, and that it actually is the main defense line. Once that Red is forced to commit a large share of his artillery resources, get the hell out, pull back, and assume the role of battalion reserve.

[ShotMagnet]

Everybody,

Thanks for your help, it's certainly influenced how the scenario will look. Anyone interested in playtesting?