The Initiative

[TankHunter]

The Initiative, It’s Importance in Warfare and Historical Examples of Initiative Being Used in Warfare


When it comes to warfare, the concept of “initiative” is of great importance. It can be used by a lowly sergeant, or by a theater level commander to help win a battle or a war. The best definition of the concept that I know of is from the Marine Corp War Fighting Manual. “All actions in war, regardless of the level, are based upon either taking the initiative or reacting in response to the opponent. By taking the initiative, we dictate the terms of the conflict and force the enemy to meet us on our terms. The initiative allows us to pursue some positive aim even if only to preempt an enemy initiative. It is through the initiative that we seek to impose our will on the enemy.” In other words the initiative allows an inferior force to be able to defeat a more powerful force. The gaining of the initiative allows one to out maneuver and then break the will of your opponent. One can gain the initiative in warfare by reacting faster than an enemy commander and by being more aggressive than the enemy (for one still needs to take the initiative). If a commander seeks to gain the initiative, he would first have to have more information on where his opponent is, and at the same time keep his opponent from knowing where your own forces are; a concept called “friction.” A good commander tries to reduce his own friction while he increases that of the enemy. Keeping the opponent from knowing where you are weakest and where you are strongest is the key for if he does know he can gain the initiative by attacking at your weak points. In other words surprise is essential. One would also need to react faster than the enemy commander a concept called the “Boyd Cycle.” It revolves around the theory that before a commander can react he needs to observe, orient, decide then act (also known as the OODA Loop). If one can get into an opponent’s “decision cycle” one is then at a great advantage in gaining the initiative. Put simply, you must know more about where the opponent is than he does about you, and react faster then he can. If you can do that, you are in a much better position than the opponent is in.

Let me point to something that we all know and understand; chess. In it both sides can move one piece at a time, and then after you move one of your pieces you must allow the other side to move their piece. How do you win? This can be done by making it so that each move accomplishes the following goals. Developing your pieces (put them forward in areas where they can be used effectively), taking the center of the board, and gain the initiative. If you can think of the next few moves, and the opponent is still thinking of his current move, you can easily gain the initiative. Once he is reacting to you, he has lost. For he is in effect a few moves behind you. That is what one hopes to archive when one tries to gain the initiative. By forcing the opponent to react to you, then you have a great advantage over the opponent because if done correctly he will not be able to succeed in the fight.

One historical example of one commander gaining the initiative and his opposition failing to do so is the battle of Khalkhin Gol. This is a little known battle between the Japanese and Soviets in 1939. Both the Japanese and Russians laid claim to the region just east of the river Halha. In May the Mongolians had some cavalrymen who were in the disputed territory. The Japanese pushed them out. In response the Mongolians sent more troops in to push the Japanese out. This escalated when a Japanese divisional commander sent large elements of his force to kick the Mongolians out. The Japanese were able to do that, but a week later part of the Japanese force, which contained the force’s reconnaissance element, was surrounded and destroyed. The Japanese commander in the area then moved his entire division into the area to push the Soviets and Mongolians out. The Japanese were able to gain the initiative for a period of time, but a very competent Russian commander by the name of Zhukov was able to blunt the Japanese offensive by sending in a mechanized force to stop the Japanese advances. The conflict then degenerated into a battle of attrition. The Japanese were unable to advance, and the Russians were building up their forces. Zhukov ordered an attack into Japanese held territory. The Japanese were not prepared for the attack. Zhukov was able to keep the Japanese from knowing that he was preparing for an offensive. The Russian forces made little headway initially in the northern part of the front, but in the south the Russians were able to break through and were pushing north. Whereas the Japanese, not knowing which attack was the main thrust sent reinforcements to the north, to block an already bogged down attack. After four days the Russian forces in the northern part of the front were able to break through, and encircle what was left of the Japanese. The Japanese were then defeated completely.

The Japanese lost because they failed to reduce their friction (increasing what they know of where the enemy is, what their objectives are, etc), which allowed the Russians to gain and keep the initiative. That caused the Japanese forces to be surrounded. Had the Japanese reduced their own friction, they could have sent their reinforcements to block the Russian breakthrough in the south.

The next example is Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union. The Russians even though they had the largest military in the world at that time were at a disadvantage. They had for the most part inferior equipment and were still suffering the after effects of Stalin’s purges.

The initial attack was a surprise for the Russians. The Russian intelligence service STAVKA did give a warning to all Russian troops on the frontier about an imminent attack, but the warning did not get to any of the Russian formations. The Germans were able to gain the initiative right off the bat, just because of the mass of forces involved in the attack. The Russian commanders were overwhelmed. The Russians also were not willing to react to the initial German attacks. They didn’t react to a very fluid situation, reactions such as falling back. This resulted in entire Russian Army’s being cut off and destroyed.

The Nazi leadership believed that they would be able to reach Moscow by the time winter set in, which did not happen. The winter did two things. It caused serious problems for the Germans equipment wise (equipment would literally freeze solid) and because the Germans were unprepared for the winter, they suffered heavy loses from attrition. The Russians took advantage of this by engaging in attacks against the German forces. Even though the Russians took extraordinarily high losses, the attacks took the initiative away from the Germans. This resulted in the Germans being stalled just outside of Moscow. After the Russians stopped the Germans outside of Moscow, the Russians were able to push the Germans back away from the Soviet capital.
The Germans were able to gain the initiative by overwhelming, and then out maneuvering the Russian forces. Because of the lack of Soviet strategic depth, the Germans had little to worry about after they broke through Russian lines. Thus even if the Russians didn’t have orders from Stalin to hold where they were; the Germans still would have had the initiative. The Russians would have been reacting to the Germans behind the Russian lines. The Russians were able to keep complete disaster from happening when they took advantage of what the weather gave them and attacking the Germans. This made it so the initiative was up for grabs and the Russians were able to retake the initiative long enough to give Moscow some breathing room.

The following example is not necessarily an example of what happens when one side gains the initiative, but more of an example when neither side does. The example is of the opening offensive of the Iran-Iraq War. A war that had the objective of gaining land from Iran in a quick conflict, but it only ended up becoming a war of attrition which lasted for 8 long years spanning from 1980 to 1988.

The Iraqi objective was simple, go into Iranian territory and take land that Iraq wanted; after that go on the defensive and work out a truce. This involved taking the towns of Abaden, Khorramshahr, Susangerd, Musian, and Mehran.
All of these towns were well within 100 kilometers from Iraq. Saddam Hussain wanted to reduce the casualties that Iraq would suffer so he only wanted to make limited gains; instead of trying to destroy the Iranian military and toppling the nation’s government. The Iraqis had few problems in obtaining these limited objectives.
In fact the objectives were obtained within a week of hostilities starting. The bulk of the Iranian forces were by the nation’s northern border. All that was able to combat the Iraqis initially were light infantry which gave the Iraqis few problems except when it came to urban combat; besides that the Iraqis rolled right through Iranian defenses. Because the Iraqis were able to obtain their limited objectives they didn’t push any further. Even though they had the initiative they didn’t take advantage of it and they did not utilize it, thus giving the Iranians time to react and build up their forces along the front. This resulted in attrition warfare. The Iraqis were never able to gain the initiative again in the strategic sense. They also lost all of the gains in the Iranian territories that were made at the start of the war due to the launch of a series of Iranian offensives in 1982.

Normally a nation or military fails to gain the initiative due to poor equipment, bad communications, or bad intelligence, but the case of the Iran-Iraq war is of pure incompetence. Iraqi leadership was so casualty adverse that they allowed themselves to lose the initiative and let the Iranians react. This proved to be a disaster for the Iraqis.

In conclusion, the initiative is one of the most important things in warfare. It can at times be even more important than the forces involved in the fighting. Even if a superior force fails to gain and hold the initiative, they will at least have a very difficult time to win or they will find themselves in a battle of attrition. At worst they will lose decisively.

[ShermansWar]

Very nice TH. I am very pleased to see you apparently have read" Warfighting".
It is basically what we try to do in 2D.

I would make the points that, as far as initiative and decision cycles goes, we seek to maintain the initiative, to an extent we get "Inside" the enemies decision cycle, and react/act swiftly enough so as to render his decisions obsolete by the time they can be effected on the battlefield.
By maintaining the initiative,and thus staying inside the enemies decision cycle, each decision he makes is more and more obsolete, making each choice he makes more and more irrelevant, till, in the end, he is overcome by events.

I love the chess analogy also.

I would like to point out a few things about friction, however. Friction is that which, in war, makes the simple difficult, and the difficult seemingly impossible. it is not necessarily due to any action of the enemy. The example you gave of the weather around Moscow during Germany's offensive is an example of friction they had to deal with.

Weather, supplies, ammunition shortages, communication difficulties, lack of support, lack of coordination, unclear orders, conflicting orders, unclear goals, and a myriad of other things all combine to create friction, and this is before we even take into account the enemies attempts to create friction for us.

We seek to create friction for the enemy so that we can get and then stay inside his decision cycle so that his decisions are increasinlgy obsolete and irrelavent until he is overcome by events. One of the simplest and most effective ways to do this in an SB game is to seize and maintain the initiative.

Nice post, and nice topic, TH.

[TankHunter]

Very nice TH. I am very pleased to see you apparently have read" Warfighting".
It is basically what we try to do in 2D.

I would make the points that, as far as initiative and decision cycles goes, we seek to maintain the initiative, to an extent we get "Inside" the enemies decision cycle, and react/act swiftly enough so as to render his decisions obsolete by the time they can be effected on the battlefield.
By maintaining the initiative,and thus staying inside the enemies decision cycle, each decision he makes is more and more obsolete, making each choice he makes more and more irrelevant, till, in the end, he is overcome by events.

I love the chess analogy also.

I would like to point out a few things about friction, however. Friction is that which, in war, makes the simple difficult, and the difficult seemingly impossible. it is not necessarily due to any action of the enemy. The example you gave of the weather around Moscow during Germany's offensive is an example of friction they had to deal with.

Weather, supplies, ammunition shortages, communication difficulties, lack of support, lack of coordination, unclear orders, conflicting orders, unclear goals, and a myriad of other things all combine to create friction, and this is before we even take into account the enemies attempts to create friction for us.

We seek to create friction for the enemy so that we can get and then stay inside his decision cycle so that his decisions are increasinlgy obsolete and irrelavent until he is overcome by events. One of the simplest and most effective ways to do this in an SB game is to seize and maintain the initiative.

Nice post, and nice topic, TH.

I thought that you might like that post Sherm. That was a report that I did for college in which I had to define something. So I picked initiative. I am happy that you enjoyed it. :)

[Cobra2]

here we go again into Thought Loop , or what ever you call it. im ready to blow a fuse! take the damn gun and shoot!

the perfect strategy by Cobra2.

[ShermansWar]

Well, Cobra, that depends on whether or not you are Playing sniper tank, and trying to use the program as a game, a first person shooter, trying to play a new version of nintendo, or whether or not you are trying to use the program to simulate the type of considerations involved in command and control. I am not going to get into the old debate as to whether or not the game can be used to model operational level thinking( to be clear, when I use the term I am referring to the command of multiple companies, smaller scale actions I refer to as "tactical" level scenarios)command and control.

Even in the type of sniper tank lone gunman type style of play you utilize, initiative is the key and primary element. Speed above all other things seems to be the hallmark of your gameplay. Again, initiative. You seek to keep the other guy responding to you, reacting, and preventing him from having time to plan and/or respond. You utilize the same principles and don't realize it. The program was designed as a simulator. As such, actual tactics and doctrines are an apropriate topic for discussion, what works, what doesnt, what might be tried, etc. If you don't like or appreciate the discussion, then why bother commenting on it,is it simply to discourage others? Makes no sense.

The concepts discussed in and covered by warfighting, such as initative, friction, suprise, incertainty, utilizing the chaos and uncertaity of battle to your own advantage as an opportunity to exploit are typical of the western mindset and aproach to warmaking. There is a reason that we are fighting for several years in Iraq and have about 2,300 dead, after 3 years, as compared to the over 1,000,000 that died during the Iran Iraq war. A lot of it has to do with weaponry, but the Russians had advanced weaponry in Afghanistan, and sustained much higher casualties while maintaining a similar degree of control over the country. When Ivan went in, they faced a largely unarmed civilian populace, whereas we faced a much more highly armed enemy , with over a decade of experience fighting a modern army( that they drove out) .

It may be a blast a go charging into battle screaming " Allah Akhbar" but it doesn't win wars in this day and age. All it gets you is dead.

[Lone*star49]

here we go again into Thought Loop , or what ever you call it. im ready to blow a fuse! take the damn gun and shoot!

the perfect strategy by Cobra2.
...

First, I'd invest some of that oil money into a fiber optic connection, so you can join MP and last, instead of your limited MP connection you've had.


LS

[-=UK=-Tanker]

Weapons of war are worth nothing without worth while wizdom.
Thanks for taking the time to post this as is was an interesting read, i think if you have not already then take the time to read through :)

[nimo]

great post TH!

i have a question - do you think that attacks on the command unit (battalion command et's) will change the curse of the battle?

for example: constant ABC attack on the command unit that makes the commander "self survivability" a factor in his battle management, sending more forces to destroyed the treat, and not to accomplish his goals.

or as in your chess analog: the queen (not the king) is under threat and you use your moves to protect it even if it's not your main game goal.

[TankHunter]

great post TH!

i have a question - do you think that attacks on the command unit (battalion command et's) will change the curse of the battle?

for example: constant ABC attack on the command unit that makes the commander "self survivability" a factor in his battle management, sending more forces to destroyed the treat, and not to accomplish his goals.

or as in your chess analog: the queen (not the king) is under threat and you use your moves to protect it even if it's not your main game goal.

Well, if one goes after your opponent's leaders, or at least their ability to send orders and receive information, then the opponent will have difficulty in effectively conducting a battle. Command and control is one of the major factors in a battle. Take for example the air offensive in the first gulf war, the primary target of it was command and control, along with logistics, etc. Front line formations weren’t the primary target IIRC. This would make things more difficult for the commanders to do their jobs, and should reduce the organization and effectiveness of front line units. With whether or not attacking command and control of a battalion level force would create a situation in which it can lose, yes, it could.

I am sure that Sherman can provide more information on this than I can.

Also, I am happy that the post was enjoyed.

[ShermansWar]

Attacking command and control centers are what we as a nation typically do at the outset of a war,at the same time that we target his forward AA assets.We hit the AA assets SO that we can strike at the command and control centers.The early operational goal is to make the enemy unable to deploy assets effectively to where we intend to focus our "Schwerpunkt",our main thrust. Once we supress the enemy AA defenses, incapacitate his command and control ability, we then take out any air assets he has, thus gaining air superiority. Once we do that, we use it to completely immoblize the enmy armor, and then to reduce the positions where they are deployed.We permanantly take away his ability to hold or gain the initiative. We then commit out ground assets and bypass the strongest enemy positions leaving them to wither on the vine, and attack where we have to to secure our avenues of approach to our ultimate objectives, whatever they be.This is the style of warfare the Germans called the blitzkreig, and utilized combined arms and a highly developed command and control system that relied also on the principles the Germans outline in their doctrine of Auftraugtaktik, wherein common training and common doctrine allows lower level commanders to do what they have to to make independent decisions that allow the force to maintain the initiative in the absence of clear direction from above.Sherman in his writings envisaged that modern weapons would require this type of indepndent decision maing couple with more dispersed formations.

In mobile warfare, the force cannot be micromanaged if you want the Tank as a weapon to fully potentialize it's effects on the battlefield. As part of the effort to remain inside the enemies decision cycle, lower echelon commanders must be given the ability to make independent decisions, whilst assuring they stay within the mission tactics( that is to say, the mission goals).

We can see how this can apply to an SB game, and how drill and common training and tactics are important, because even though sub commanders will make there own decisions as to how and exactly where they will deploy their forces, it must be based on a joint understanding of all members playing on that side, be it blue or red team.

One of the things that made the GuNn the success it was, was the fact that the players knew each other well enough to know how each other would react in a given situation, and were able to plan their own actions accordingly to anticipate and exploit potential situations they percieved might arise during the course of any given battle.Their ability to so stay inside the decision cycle of the enemy was often their key to victory, not simply gunnery skill and speed alone. They had a common set of tactics( or at the least a commoin understanding) they utilized and they took advantage of the fact they knew their team members would react in a given way in a given situation.This is where training comes in. Training with team members WILL help you gain and maintain the initiative.

But how do we acheive the first half of these goals? In the absence of air assets( the inclusion of the Hind D not withstanding), how can we utilize what we are given in a particular cenario to acheive the same ends, to limit the enemy's mobility at the outset, to put him in a position whereby he must respond to our actions? How do we dictate Tempo?This is the challenge that confronts the scenario planner.

In my own thinking, I draw upon what I know of war, what I have learned and what I think I understand.To my mind, war doesnt change. The weapons and the tactics do, the underlying principles do not. Speed ,suprise, shock, initiative, maximizing your assets, communications, efforts to reduce your own friction and create friction for the enemy are all principles that can be found in the writings and tactics of Tsun Tzu, Scipio Africanus, Napoleon,Clausewitz, Sherman, Guderian,and they are all aimed at acheving what Clausewitz said was the goal of war which is the imposition of your will upon your enemy by an act of violence, and acheiving this goal by destroying your enemies will to fight.

USMC Doctrinal Paper 1 , titled "Warfighting"says that the Marine Corps fights a "Battle of Maneuver" to destroy the enemies will to fight, as opposed to a battle of attrition( as the Marine Corps does not percieve that they will regularly have the assets available to fight a battle of attrition, also, that battles of attrition encumber the commanders ability to take action and make decisions, as political considerations often restrict the ability of commanders to make plans that include the possibility of high casualties, as stated by Clausewitz in, "On War").

The USMC says it will destroy the enemies by destroying his fighting force. the cheif weapons they perceive they have at their disposal are the 2 main elements of armored warfare, fire and maneuver. for these reasons I think the understandings outlined in "Warfighting" are worth reading, because the principles can be applied directly to what we do here with SB.

Taking Warfighting to a higher understanding, and realizing ( as does the USMC) that current tactics change not so much to encompass new ideas as much as to adapt tactics for new weapons systems to incorporate doctrines in warmaking that have been proven tried and true since ancient times.

I return again to the teaching of Steinitz, the Chess Grandmaster who said the chess game is broken down into 3 parts, the opening, the middle game , and the endgame. He further stipulated that most chess games are won or lost in the opening. Steinitz said there are 3 key principles that one must adhere to in the opening
1) Maintain the initiative
2) Develop
3) Seize the center
If you do thes things you will win, if you do not, you will lose. I see SB in much the same light, and I see the utilization of these ideas to overcome the absence of air assets to do the things we would like to to help shape the battlefield before we coommit our main effort, our "Schwerpunkt" to assaulting what we have identified as the enemies center of gravity, it's overthrow being central to our plans for victory in any particular engagement.

In a game of SB, try and pick apart the map with the LOS tool before a scenario, trying to identify the main avenues of aproach that both our side and the enemy will use. Then select BPs with LOS that cover the enemies avenues of aproach, as well as BPs that will support and overwatch my own forces as they advance. Try and find strong BPs, even if they are obvious, and know they will get artied. By picking positions that we know will get artied, we establish an early challenge to the enemies will, and provide him with a focus for attack.We can then use the knowledge that his force will strike a particular point on the map to our advantage if we are imaginative and can exploit that knowledge somehow, either by tying up his forces thus making his effort known to us, if even for a short while( although often I will continually reinforce and reassault a position even if I lose it ,just to keep the enemy occuppied and focus his attentions away from the main effort).

I seek to cause him to assault my BPs by picking ones that, if my opponent ignores them, my units posted their with their LOS will severely restrict the eneimes ability to maneuver. In so doing, I try and create friction for my enemy by channelizing his units through other avenues that are covered by fire, and by making him respond to me, thus giving me the intiative.He either assaults my BPs, or surrenders a degree of his mobility. Once the enemy does either, we have gained an advantage. We then must exploit it,and create another advantageous situation for ourselves. We try and take a series of small advantages, and exploit them, getting inside the enemies decision cycle , increasing his friction until he realizes that his decisions are becoming increasinly irrelevant, at which point, more often than not, his will to fight breaks as he is overcome by events and frustration.In many a game of SB you will hear players afterward crying about lag, or ammo, or uneven forces, or unrealistic scenario design or bad map or poor breifings or what have you, as a reason why they lost. all they are really doing is explaining what element of friction it was that caused their will to fight to break, which, in an SB game is manifested by that point in the game where the player realizes he is losing, his options are becoming increasingly limited and eventually his decision making process comes to a halt. Often in game in TS you cant get a guy to respond to comms in the last 10 minutes of a game because he has either gotten up and walked away from his PC in disgust, or he is so pissed he knows he cant speak and stay civil. This is effectively the same result as is acheived be causing panic on an actual battlefield. At that point players get sloppy, dont give a shit, lose focus, give up, or turn to humor and jokemaking to deal with the situation, but at that point, they are no longer giving it their all., which players need to even if they have lost theior individual battles, because they can at least serve as a source of support for teamates who, though losing may still be able to create and exploit a situation that may lead to an advantage that may yet lead to victory.Maintaining the will to fight is not an abstract concept that doesnt enter into this PC game we play, it is in fact central to winning.

Someone once said, the situation on the battlefield isnt nearly as important as what the opposing commanders THINK it is. A C&C center under constant assault, a commander who is to busy keeping the units under his personal command alive will absolutley have an effect as he will be too preoccuppied with saving his own ass to really effectively be on top of his units.this reduces his ability to react and also to take the initiative. This is difficult to acheive in and SB game in asmuch as a CP is an abstract concept when talking about opposing players behind a keyboard.True, you may have a unit that is labeled the PC unit, but the fact is, unless the guy drops from game or runs out of tanks, the enemy CO will remain in the game, fighting and issuing orders until scenarios end.

So, again, how can we, in a game of SB, acheive the effect of destroying an enemy CP?we have discussed how we can restrict his mobility in the early part of the game by taking up BPs in good hull down positions with good LOS over the main avenues of approach. we then get our PCs up to the FEBA, disembark the troops and begin recon with the grunts, andvancing them, getting sound and visual contacts until we have a fix on the enemy, and only then exposing our tanks and revealing our firing positions as we engage, hopefully after we have already engaged the enemy with less valuable assets then our MBTs, so that, for instance he engages our grunts or PCs or is dislocaed and exposed( pushed forward into our LOS from a position on a reverse slope by a well placed and timed arty strike directly behind his BP)just moments before we engage with our main gun.

We Identify enemy BPs by recce, and then reduce them one at a time, constanly maneuvering assets forward, our PCs into the places the grunts found safe, the MBTs into the Bps the Pcs found safe, seeking the gaps and surfaces in the enemies defences, trying to identify his "Center of Gravity" (that position which, when overturned, overturns the core of his defense). This then, is the middlegame. We have now switched from an early defense( whereby we sought an initial advantage in atrition by trying to engineer early engagements where our platforms were in stable hull down positions with clear LOS against enemy tanks advancing against us) to a process whereby we disperse, recconoiter,aquire the enemy, then mass to engage, seeking gaps,avoiding surfaces( his strongpoints) trying to use indirect approaches to advance on the objective until we find that we have shaped the battlefield to our advantage, and have worked our way forward to the point where we can prepare for our final assaults against his center of gravity and/or the objective.

At this point we enter the endgame,the final assault against the objective, an assault that takes place on our terms, after we have shaped the battlefield and reduced the BPs that support his center of gravity,remassing our assets for a coordinated assault and hopefully attacking from multiple axis of advance along indirect avenues of approach that will limit our own casualties and enable us to advance directly upon him where we will engage in manned tanks in a battlesight engagement against his final position, executing with extreme violence.

This is how I try and adapt to the principle of maintaining initiative, and how I try and dictate the tempo to the opponent, to keep him responding to constant threats( not large massed assaults), to create friction, to reduce his capacity for command and control,to stop him from excercising his ability in the art of war, the ability to create and exploit.

During key moments, as we try and shape the game, we try and engage with multiple human gunners at once, and we try to deny the enemy his command and control by " trapping him in gun" that is to say, that, while he is in gun, he cannot be in map. We make an attack, one that we may not intend to succeeed, simply so that the enemy will engage and respond. While a subcommander does this, the CO may be rerouting his units or ordering an advance elswhere, where out true effort is. Feints, deceptions, demonstrations may all be used to either trap the enemy in gun while we execute large scale movements, or, better yet, to cause him to redeploy his assets away from our intended main thrust to where we have manifested a false or minor threat.

Ithe end, winning in SB is about outworking your opponent, being able to spend time in map moving assets forward while you cause they enemy to waste time in the gun instead of staying on top of his force. If you can do this, your opponent will find that his assets are out of place in the later stages of the scenario, and often you can take the objective , even against a team of better gunners, because they cant collapse on the objective in time, cause their assets are scatterred as a result of having spent their time playing sniper tank.

[Lone*star49]

In the end, winning in SB is about outworking your opponent, being able to spend time in map moving assets forward while you cause they enemy to waste time in the gun instead of staying on top of his force. If you can do this, your opponent will find that his assets are out of place in the later stages of the scenario, and often you can take the objective , even against a team of better gunners, because they cant collapse on the objective in time, cause their assets are scatterred as a result of having spent their time playing sniper tank.
...

In a nutshell SW, in a nutshell.. :thumbup:

Oh!, the good/great memories of the IVU TGIF series battles 7-7 and the following 3-4, just as you said.. timing and movement, and final collaspe on the obj/s..

Communications, teamwork, movements, all in check, especially when faced with greater odds, to stay focused, and make the push with far less forces (remaining) than your opponent/s into the obj.


LS :wink:

[ShermansWar]

Rereading it, it's interesting how some of it is rooted in real tactical thinking, and how some of it doesn't have anything to do with real tactics, yet, is a tactic anyway. I mean, in real life, are you ever going to win a battle because you kept your enemy too busy shooting at shit and this prevented him from handling his force in a cohesive fashion? No. But you'll do SOMETHING to keep your enemy too busy to handle his force in a cohesive manner, like, say, for instance, bombing the shit out of his CP and keeping it under arty fire :wink:

[Lone*star49]

...

And IIRC, this very "tactic" was used with success, that actually wreaked havoc on an entire field of operations.. (wiped out everyone's efforts).

Kinda like saying, War has rules (that work) except when one side is losing, and resorts to whatever it takes, in an effort, to turn the tide, however the method.

*if I understand your statement correctly ie constant artty on ones' CP..


LS

[ShermansWar]

Bombing the CP is what you would do IRL. there are no CPs in SB, not functionally, anyway. the question i posed was, what can you do during a game of SB to acheive the same effect? The SB program has limitations. That doesnt mean that we have to as far as our methods for creating the same effects as we would want to IRL, even if by different means.

For example, IRL you attack the enemy CP to disrupt his communications his decision making process and his ability to control and coordinate his units in his efforts to respond to our actions.
we dont have airstrikes in SB, so we cant. we can arty a position, but, so what? even if the unit gets killed, he replaces it. the guy still doesnt lose his TS link, and even if he gets all his tanks killed, chances are a teamate will just hand him off another one.
so how do you take a guy out of the game? in short, you cant really.

There are 3 things you can do. the first is destroy his units by fire and maneuver, but thats obvious and kind of implicit anyway. secondly you can try and break the guys will to fight through any of a number of means. you know what i mean. anyone who has played SB for any length of time knows what it is to break the enemies will, and knows what it's like to have your own will broken, even if you dont recognize it as such at the time.

the 3rd method is to "trap him in gun". in other words, you acheive the effect of having the enemy not in control of his overall force when he is busy playing sniper tank. it then becomes a question of math. can you figure out how to trade a few units for the time it takes you to work in map and gain the initiative while the other guy is busy trying to track down a few of your units? there is an entire set of tactics that goes along with this, for instance, the refusal to Laager your own units, so as to deny an enemy tank that has broken through any real chance of killing significant numbers of your vehicles before you neuutralize him, because, after you route yoiur units forward that you wanted to while he was busy killing your shit, you gonna have to track him down and kill him anyway. that's another reason for the dispersed deployment, because even if he kills a few units, with your stuff spread around in a defense in depth with interlocking fields of fire, he'll usually give you a shot at him after he kills some of your shit. the trick is to not let him run amok like you or Nik or scud used to do, but rather, to use the time that you spend doing your thing playing sniper tank against you. Tank Judo. the guy thinks he has you by the balls, he slipped a tank through your lines and he knows any second he's gonna have your AFVs filling his gunsight. Let him. imstead, route a whole bunch of your stuff forward while you KNOW he is in gun. you know he's in gun cause his name is in green on your screen, lol.But your in map. you stiole the initiative. maybe you presented some targets to him, some bullshit like a couple of hummers and a PC or 2 with a tank thrown in to make it look like a real attack for long enough to buy you time to steal a tempo on him. Yes, boys and girls, we playthe game that tight.
Are you dictating the tempo of the action to the enemy, or is he dictating it to you. when he wants to go fast, slow it down, when he wants to go slow, speed it up. anything to keep him responding, anything to gain an advantage, anything to try and steal the initiative. but remember, once you do you MUST capitalize and exploit or it's for Naught.

[ShermansWar]

Let me give you 2 examples. once awhile back, i think it wa me and fred(bluewings) playing againstHellHound and stumpy. Now either of them is better than either of us, as far as gunnery or handling a tank, and neither is a slouch as a tactician either.
we were playing a scenario by I think it was radio station, or something like that.we moved slowly down the center, took up good defensive BPs, got our scouts out and probed for gaps. meanwhile, in the east, I sent a force of 2 tanks, 2 humvees, 2 PCs and a jag on an end around as a feint.Not really a significant force, a reconnasaince in strength, as it were. I engaged the units singly, yet kept them all advancing, all moving, creating the impression it was a larger force than it was.i got wiped out after a series of engagements were i advanced, withdrew, sought cover, was sought out and destrpyed. but this was my intent, and i was able to use up a lot of time doing it. in the end, i lost the entire force, but, in the interim, i was able to move the main force up while i was in map and the enemy was killing my units.as the scenario wound down, we had our units massed in a coherent fashion to assault the objective from several directions, and the enemy was scattered from hunting down our units. we collapsed on the objective and took it and the enemy ran out of time, and the units they did engage were outgunned due to our ability to mass and throw all out remaining assets into the assault at the moment of crisis. we had, in effect, "trapped the enemy in the gun".

Another time, i was playing with fred, and trying to explain the value of teamplay, and how having a disciplined unit can give the CO opportunities to exploit he might not otherwise have.typically, in a game of SB, the map gets divided into 3 parts, and orders go something like "OK, you take the east, joe will take the west, and I'll take the center."Everyone in effect is fighting his own area battle. we had a map with a central valley that ran from north to south, a series of rugged ridges with lots of spurs that ran NS in the west, and a series of hills in the east. i told fred( to his protestations) that i intended to sacrifice his force to shape the battlefield, to draw the enemy east while he conducted a company strenght assault, totally committed on the east side. i told him if he executed with violence it would draw in forces from the west side, as they would think it was the main assault, as i had no intention of either supporting him or committing the other 2 companies in the west until the enemy had redeployed his assets and vacated some of the BPs that he had covering our only feasable avenues of aproach in the west. it was a bitter pill for fred, but he did it. he got wiped out in 15 minutes. in 20 miutes we had overrun the objective and acheived a victory in the west and took up positions around thew objective so striong that the enemy called the game 2/3s of the way in, as they couldn't budge us.

A feint, a sacrifice,a deception, as an attempt to shape the battlefield in your favor before you commit your Schwerpunkt can be a great equalizer against a highly skilled enemy whose team is full of good gunners.when you have gained an advantage, when you have determined the extent of the enemies defenses, when you have ascertained his center of gravity, then, and only then, do you fully commit yourself, and when you do you hold no reserve back and seek his overthrow in as violent and sudden a manner as possible after you have done all you can to assure the fight will go in your favor.it is then, when the enemy perceives he cannot withstand your assault, that his will break, and the difficult suddenly becomes easy, and your friction level decreases as your opponent finds he is overwhelmed.

[Bluewings]

[off topic]
It 's not easy to play with Sherman commanding , but it can be very fruitfull ...

Dennis 's last exemple is very much a "A la Patton" thing : "hold them by the nose and kick 'em in the ass"

Cheers . :3starSK:

[OilBucket]

Well no offense to anyone, but these tactics explained have been around for ages. Nothing new but nonetheless effective but definitely nothing ground-breaking. The only nation I ever considered with ground-breaking tactics were the Germans. In both WW1 & 2. The Americans were pretty much methodical ( but good at it ) but at times totally unpredictable which kept the enemy on their toes in all wars that I can recall. The British/Aussies being staunch defenders. The French always had esprit de corps, but mauled with out-dated tactics.. never had the fore-sight to stay ahead of the times. But all this was back then and not referring to now.

[ShermansWar]

I dont invent tactics, none of us do really.i'm not even an original thinker. but i do use what is more or less a system that is more or less succesful in any given scenario.I dont think I claimed to have come up with anything other than an understanding of what it is I want to do , how I want to go about it, and have a way to go about it that works on both an individual basis and a team basis. beyond that, it's rooted inwhat i beleive is sound military thinking.you say none of it is new. well, some of it is new, even if not by me. Warfighting is a way to approach war that is only about 20 or so years old, but many nations already refer to it and the ideas in it when teaching their own troops.

Saying you read about it and know about it, and using it ingame are 2 entirely different things. When you play, do you make sure everything you do adheres to certain ideas and principles you dont deviate from? Methods and tactics change from game to game, but an underlying understanding of war and how Iconduct myself and how I play the game does not for me.When I'm not playing like that, thats how I know I'm losing.

You say you know all this, maybe.Do you run battallion sized actions and take and maintain the initiative? Seems to me when you CO, it's a case of everyone playing their own area game.I dont recall you keeping a tight grip on things and making sure your subordinate units react swiftly, in accordance with any overiding idea you have to win the game. You make a plan, you go, you fight.Not the same thing, IMO.

[OilBucket]

Getting em in a wad I see. Since when have you seen me CO?

[ShermansWar]

Exactly. So you see my point. :3starsk2:

You should really try doing a thing before you tell someone else what there doing is old hat, as if you've been there, done that, when you haven't. :roll:

[Lone*star49]

...

:arrow: And then there is the latest tactic:

~ Stealth ~ not be seen nor heard..


LS :wink:

[OilBucket]

Exactly. So you see my point

Yea, I bet thats what you meant :wink:

I was referring to tactics going back through history and to present, not your beloved MP tactics.


You should really try doing a thing before you tell someone else what there doing is old hat, as if you've been there, done that, when you haven't.


For me to discuss to others my MP tactics would make me 1 of 2 things ... 1: a Liar 2: take a guess

[Lone*star49]

Exactly. So you see my point

Yea, I bet thats what you meant :wink:

I was referring to tactics going back through history and to present, not your beloved MP tactics.


You should really try doing a thing before you tell someone else what there doing is old hat, as if you've been there, done that, when you haven't.


:arrow: For me to discuss to others my MP tactics would make me 1 of 2 things ... 1: a Liar 2: take a guess
...

:arrow: 2: a rebel ?



LS :lol:

[OilBucket]

lol LS... but no, thats not the answer :) ... I'll give a hint though... remember when Patton beat Rommel in Tunisia ( or so he thought it was Rommel, when in fact it was Kesselring ), what did Patton say in the movie after the battle? When you find the answer to that question, think about it!

[Lone*star49]

lol LS... but no, thats not the answer :) ... I'll give a hint though... remember when Patton beat Rommel in Tunisia ( or so he thought it was Rommel, when in fact it was Kesselring ), what did Patton say in the movie after the battle? When you find the answer to that question, think about it!
...

George C. Scott's voice:

:3starsk2: Rommel, you magnificent bastard!, I read your book!!


LS :3starSK:

PS.. or what Gen Pattons Aid said to him after he learned Rommel was not there.

:thelmuts: "General, if you beat Rommel's plans, then you beat Rommel"

[Trekker]

"Im my favorit general, and i don't like to be told some second stringer is up against me, then i loose face"

Brilliant.

[OilBucket]

And the winner is? LS!! good try though Trek :lol: ... And would anyone dare to answer the 2nd part? .. In other words, what is the moral behind all this ? lol

[Lone*star49]

...

~ Loose lips, sink ships ~


LS :wink:

[OilBucket]

~ Loose lips, sink ships ~


Ok, thats close enough :thumbup:

[Trekker]

And the winner is? LS!! good try though Trek :lol: ... And would anyone dare to answer the 2nd part? .. In other words, what is the moral behind all this ? lol

My quote was better :x


:lol:

[Lone*star49]

And the winner is? LS!! good try though Trek :lol: ... And would anyone dare to answer the 2nd part? .. In other words, what is the moral behind all this ? lol

My quote was better :x


:lol:
...

Actually my favorite quote was the General's Aid who first said something to the effect: "all over a little bitch-slap" to which Patton said:

"I wish I'd kissed the son-of-a-bitch"


LS :wink:

[Ratseal]

Wasn't there a thread a long ways back when some SBers convincingly demonstrated that Patton wasn't the 'be-all, end-all' of WW2 armor commanders? I can't recall their names, but there was a list of Russian generals as long as your arm that commanded larger forces against worse odds over a longer period. Zhukov is perhaps the most famous - but there were more.

Mind you, I enjoyed George C. Scott's potrayal - nothing like a little Hollywood to polish an image.

[Cobra2]

it is common that the guy made idol/hero, is the one who had the most contacts in the media world or otherwise some guy who is accessable in case the pond is really dry.

i would like to ellaborate, but i see this going polotical. do miss FFZ.

[ShermansWar]

eems to me Patton was singularly unpopular with the media, and he no fan of them, either. I didnt profer Patton as a good tank commander, but it begged the question,Who, as a tank commander at that level was more succesful?i dont know of any who have as many vicrories and as few losses, from that era, anyway. and he certainly was a general who understood how to seize and maintain the initiative.Zhukov, Koniev, timoshenko, budenny., all had more than their fair share of losses, and most of their victories came when they had a vast Materiel' superiority.

[ShermansWar]

Your point about the media is well taken, cobra. For instance, in the Muslim world, Bin Laden is a hero and a great leader. How's that for media spin. :roll:

[ShermansWar]

And the winner is? LS!! good try though Trek :lol: ... And would anyone dare to answer the 2nd part? .. In other words, what is the moral behind all this ? lol

Been thinking about what the hell your getting at for over a week. not quite sure. I'm wondering if it is along the lines of one of my favorite quotes by Napoleon.

"Be careful you do not fight the same enemy too many times, lest you teach him all your art of war."

Unless you were getting at something more smarmy.

i am kind of suprised that what was an attempted discussion on tactics( again, nice work there TH) didn't draw more response.if you cant get a discussion going on something as basic as initiative, how it's done in real life at platoon and company level, how we do it in game, and where the twain meet, or differ, i'm discouraged as to the possibilities of having discussions on more advanced topics.

we have a lot of real world tankers around, especially with the influx of the australians, and i would love to hear some feedback from real TCs as to how the seek and maintain the initiative on the tactical level, aaand? or what role that type of thinking plays in their decision maing processes.

Archangel talked to me several times about the Boyd cycle, others players have, and while i have no formal military training in it, it seems that in a game of SB thats what it all comes down too, a lot of older vets talked to me about it when i first joined. i dont hear about it anymore.

a lot of discussion goes on about what real tactics are, VS what "game" tactics are. I tried to take an example of real world tactics(i.e., using airstrikes to attack CPs so asd to disrupt command and control) and compared it to what adatation i used to acheive the same effect in an SB game.( trapping the enemy in gun so as to keep him out of map while you work to gain a tempo, an advantage, so that it might acheive a similar effect to taking out an enemy CP, even if the effect is short lived) and how you have to capitalize on the advantage and exploit it rapidly for it to bear any fruit.

i'd like to get some feedback from other players as to how they seek to gain the initiative and keep the enemy responding, and I'd like to hear from ral tankers as to how this is aproached in real life on the scale that we model in the game.

OB seems to imply tactics should be kept to oneself, if i understand him. but thats not how or why i play. i try and learn from others, and i try and share what i learn that i think is worthwhile.

a real tanker may think the idea of "trapping the enemy in the gun" is simply a gameplay tactic that has no relevance to real life. but what it does do is stress the importance of initiative and tempo and decision cycles, which are real tactics. so, while the form may change, the ideas and principles are worth exploring.

[Cobra2]

for some odd reason, ever since i discussed this topic with Sherman on TS i had this nasty reaction to it. i dont know why, the topic strikes a nerv or something. my best guess is that it trys to deal with SB gameplay as a study topic. Sherman, are you gonna finish that thesis yet???

okay, back to topic. are we talking about RL initiative? you really dont need speed for that. preventing an enemy from doin anything would be enough even if the military action goes for years at a time. this is clear in the Iraq campaign post 1991. what happened is they got bombed for a long time and couldnt fight back. this is an acute case of taking the initiative.

a more common case would be the insugency post April 2003. what you get is 2 sides that pass the initiative between each other. you get tham and they get you. in this case the 2 sides use very different tactics to achive the same goal, to waer the other side down. this creates a more dynamic battle situation.

Dynamic War is a bad word for military guys. its a war of attrition. its also more difficult to tell which side is winning. being dynamic, the final outcome could be determined by a single event of profound impact on the battle scape. this event may not even be the working of the 2 waring sides. this is the uncertainty that makes war such a gamble.

[taskforce-panther]

eems to me Patton was singularly unpopular with the media, and he no fan of them, either


Thats a good thing......................

the media isnt a friend of the soldier either