Jump to content

Paper Topic


bmzsscully

Recommended Posts

All,

I have to write a 10 page paper for school on any one US security decision that was made or was decided against (except for Iraq and Afghanistan) and would like some recommendations on potential topics. I'm trying to do a military specific issue dealing more with doctrine than weapons programs. Right now, I'm leaning toward the implementation of AirLand Battle doctrine, though I have to do some research to see if it's even an appropriate topic.

Basically, I need something that was somewhat controversial as I have to talk about the role of different power centers in the US (eg: Congress and media)and how they impacted or were affected by the decision.

I'd appreciate any thoughts you might have.

Thanks,

Brian

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Going on with Tank Hunter, if you want a book that kinda goes into the AirLand Battle and 1980's reform, "Into the Storm" by Tom Clancy and Gen. Fred Franks Jr. is a good one. Though the main story line is Gen. Franks experience as the VII Corps commander, he does spend time on the development of the combined arms and the changes that were made from the time he was a Cav commander in Vietnam to his Corps command in Desert Storm.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Going on with Tank Hunter, if you want a book that kinda goes into the AirLand Battle and 1980's reform, "Into the Storm" by Tom Clancy and Gen. Fred Franks Jr. is a good one. Though the main story line is Gen. Franks experience as the VII Corps commander, he does spend time on the development of the combined arms and the changes that were made from the time he was a Cav commander in Vietnam to his Corps command in Desert Storm.

Hmmm...thanks for the reminder on that. I have that book on my bookshelf.

Brian

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The US military reform movement back in the 80s could be an interesting topic. I am not sure if there is much info about it though and it may be too general of a topic too.

Hey TankHunter,

Thanks for the post.

I've found quite a bit on the development of AirLand doctrine, I just have to see if there is much on the decision making process leading to its introduction which is ultimately what the paper is about. I've thought about the development of the Bradley, which I recall had some controversy. There's always Boyd and the development of the F-16 along with the whole Goldwater-Nichols Act from the 80's as well. Someone on another forum I posted the question mentioned the Stryker and FCS, both of which I think would be interesting as well.

Thanks again,

Brian

Link to comment
Share on other sites

It would seem that there a several interesting aspects through which you could analyze the adoption of the Airland doctrine.

First off, there should be plenty of stuff available on the post-Vietnam era versions of FM100-5 and related TRADOC documents.

There's the aspect of the development of the concept of operational art in general and then specifically the development of Airland as a response to threat capabilites. And there's also how that development reflects strategic and political concerns; for instance, how Dupuy's active defense doctrine was constrained by concerns imposed due to the nature of the NATO alliance, and how those concerns were handled by Starry's Airland doctrine. There's the strategic concerns such as the extent to which reinforcement ala Reforger would have been successful.

There's a grand strategic aspect as well. You can contextualize the Airland doctrine in the overall Cold War experiment with limited war in the shadow of the nuclear brinksmanship. That will allow you to consider Krushchev's reforms of the Soviet military and how their eventual nuclear parity changed the strategic landscape.

There's the historical aspect of operational art and combined arms warfare itself, Airland as an expression of and response to Tukhachevsky's deep battle.

And then the institutional aspect of how the US Army, in the context of the Cold War, concentrated on fighting an unthinkable European war as a way to rebuild itself after Vietnam.

And there's the military-industrial complex aspect with the weapon systems necessitated by the Airland doctrine, MLRS, AH-64, M1 & M2/3, etc. And how the military-industrial concerns drive the development of doctrine.

It's certainly a deep topic.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

bmzscully:

If you were to do AirLand Battle, and if you haven't already checked these out, try:

Leavenworth Papers No. 16 Deciding what has to be done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations by Major Paul Hebert

-this is about Active Defense, the immediate predecessor of AirLand Battle, and the Doctrinal concept that spurred the creation of the latter by GEN DePuy's protege, GEN Don Starry

AirLand Battle Doctrine by Douglas W. Skinner

-this covers not only the development of AirLand Battle from Active Defense, but it also deals with the controversies surrounding the 1982 edition of FM 100-5, and how the 1986 edition attempted to deal with them (AirLand Battle gave way to Follow-On Forces Attack [FOFA])

The Evolution of the AirLand Battle Concept by John L. Romjue

-this is a brief but useful overview of AirLand Battle's development

AirLand Battle Doctrine: The Wrong Doctrine for the Wrong Reason by Major Ron S. Powell

-this is a counterpoint to AirLand Battle, and a good one; basically arguing for Active Defense

FM 100-5 Operations

-this will take you to a page ("Obsolete Publications") where you can get the 1976, 1982, and 1993 editions of FM 100-5 Operations (each in four parts)

Selected Papers of General William E. DePuy

-some of these papers deal with Active Defense, AirLand Battle, The Big Five, and the politics surrounding them

Landpower Essay No. 06-2 Lessons From the Past: Making the Army's Doctrine "Right Enough" Today by Brigadier-General Huba Wass de Czege

-this is a good article on the development of AirLand Battle by one of the co-authors of both the 1982 and the 1986 editions of FM 100-5

Green and Blue in the Wild Blue: An Examination of the Evolution of Army and Air Force Airpower Thinking and Doctrine Since the Vietnam War by Major Robert J. Hamilton

-an Air Force take on AirLand Battle, etc.

As for Congress, NATO, the Media, and the political controversies swirling around AirLand Battle, I'm not much help there; sorry about that.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I found this on my HD....

U.S. ARMY TACTICAL DOCTRINE

FM 100-5 has been the bible of the Army’s war-fighting doctrine since it was first distributed in the early 1970s. This document has undergone a number of revisions over several administrations, and it’s more of a work in progress than canonized dogma. Troops in the field are expected to live and die by the concepts of the current edition. Before delving into those concepts, we must give some attention to the tactical thought that preceded them. Only then can you fully appreciate how the current doctrine has evolved and why it represents the most effective use of available resources on a battlefield that has become increasingly deadly.

General Depuy

When the first edition of FM 100-5 was published, General Depuy was the Commander of TRADOC, the Army training command headquarters. The doctrine promulgated in this volume was that of 'Active Defense.' Faced with overwhelming Soviet numerical superiority in the European theater of operations and the never-far-from-immediate threat of a Soviet attack through the Fulda Gap, Depuy endorsed a doctrine which drew heavily on Carl Von Clausewitz's principles of war, as well as the German experience during World War II.

Active defense relied on firepower attrition and using the minimum force structure necessary to stall the threat until reinforcements could be brought to bear. To achieve this economy of force, defending forces would have to achieve the element of surprise, inflict maximum damage on the enemy, and also carefully husband their very limited combat power.

Since Western forces were so grossly outnumbered on the border, the principal of economy of force was at least partly motivated by political factors. Additional divisions were unavailable for deployment to Europe, first due to U.S. commitments in Vietnam, and subsequently because of the extensive reduction in forces that occurred immediately after that conflict. Any other approach would have been nothing more than a paper tiger, without teeth. Even so, as you might have guessed, the teeth in Active Defense weren't particularly long or sharp.

Lt. General Don Starry was in command of the forces at the line in the Fulda Gap during Depuy's tenure at TRADOC, and he was an avid and active opponent of FM 100-5's doctrine statement. Starry believed it to be more hype than help in the accomplishment of his very difficult mission. In 1977, he was given the opportunity to 'put up or shut up,' when he succeeded Depuy as the Commanding Officer of TRADOC.

General Starry

At the head of a good staff of professional junior officers, Starry developed the first draft of the Air-Land Battle Doctrine (ALBD). The success or failure of this edition of the ALBD hinged on four key principles: depth, agility, initiative, and synchronization.

Depth is achieved via accurate and timely intelligence collection and dissemination to combat forces which, in turn, could interdict enemy reserves and second and third echelon troops before they could reach the front. In a perfect world, these interdiction operations would also strip first echelon enemy formations of the logistic and combat service support they need to maintain the tempo of offensive operations.

Mobility is a contributing factor to agility, as defined in this version of the ALBD, but 'flexibility' is a more precise word for the concept Starry was trying to convey. Individual unit commanders must not only be able to react more quickly than their counterparts on the other side, but also do so in a coherent fashion that fits the tactical situation. All of the contingency plans, Battle Drills, Formation Drills, and Actions on Contact that remain in use today evolved from the principle of agility. Further, the fact that we have developed and trained with these tactical drills and systems to the point that they have become almost reflexive supports the third principle of ALBD as well. Initiative at the lowest possible level of the chain of command has remained the greatest difference between the American serviceman and his counterparts abroad. At the time Starry and his staff authored the ALBD, they also realized quite well that the Soviet soldier took almost no initiative without guidance from fairly high up in the chain of command. This was a weakness that ALBD was designed to exploit. ALBD elaborated beyond the obvious, however. In its context, initiative also meant 'offensive spirit, boldness, audacity and the propensity to take risks in the heat of battle.' There certainly weren't many risk takers on the other side, so why not foster a little 'he who does not risk will not win' mentality among our troops? The tactical philosophy of initiative was to gain contact with the enemy and relentlessly maintain that contact. The idea was to never allow him the opportunity to regroup and regain a clear picture of the battlefield. This not only allows small, determined forces to appear stronger than they really are, but it also has a tremendously negative psychological affect on the enemy, who is pounded day and night.

The final principle, that of synchronization, is really an evolution of the combined-arms concept. When most people think of combined arms, they don't go beyond the common and very basic understanding of it. Artillery and air bombardment softens up the battlefield prior to a ground assault with tanks and infantry. Synchronization is a much more sophisticated concept than that, involving all of the combat and non-combat force multipliers at a commander's disposal.

Non-combat force multipliers include electronic warfare, psychological operations, combat engineering, operational deception, and the element of surprise, among others. Each of these multipliers has its proper place in the sequence of engagement, from the planning phase through movement, combat, and consolidation after the mission is over. All of the combat arms and support services have their individual roles to fill in the sequence of engagement, and these differ from one type of unit to the next.

Synchronization is the commander's ability to blend all of these diverse elements into a cohesive whole, such that they support the battle plan in the proper time and sequence to achieve a decisive affect. Perhaps the best analogy is to think of the battlefield commander as an orchestra leader, building woodwinds, brass, string, and percussion sections to a rousing crescendo that the audience cannot resist. All of these individual assets are used to maximum effect when synchronization is achieved, and therefore, friendly casualties are minimized and economy of force is achieved.

The following brief excerpt about Major General Griffith's 1st Armored Division, a quote from Brig. Gen. Robert H. Scales, Jr., taken from Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War, illustrates the principle of synchronization, as well as that of depth, extremely well.

'The fight around Al-Busayyah was little more than a skirmish, but it was first blood for the Division. First, the fight confirmed, if only on a small scale, the superiority of Griffith's tactic of simultaneous attack in depth. To his front, Griffith created a carpet of combat power that stretched twentyfour hours and nearly a hundred kilometers ahead of his lead maneuver elements. At the greatest distance, Apache aircraft struck with Company sized attacks as far as fifty to sixty kilometers forward of the advancing tanks. At thirty kilometers, MLRS's began to inundate targets uncovered but as yet undestroyed by air attack. Once within direct observation of scout helicopters and forward observers, cannon artillery joined in the crescendo of firepower. Only after these four successive waves washed over the Iraqi defenses did Griffith carefully maneuver to achieve overwhelming tactical superiority and finish the fight with direct fire.'

General Otis

General Starry may have developed the original ALBD concept, but it had undergone additional revisions before being implemented in the preceding example from the Gulf War. General Otis, Starry's successor at TRADOC, was the guiding force behind a 1982 revision that developed the concept of 'Operational Level Warfare.' Traditionally, military thought resided in one of two camps, strategic or tactical. The former can be further divided into 'Grand Strategic,' which involves the movement of entire armies in support of political policy, and 'Strategic,' which focuses on the movement and employment of corps and divisions within those armies. Tactical thought lies at the other end of the spectrum, dealing with company, platoon, and squad fire and movement plans in response to specific battlefield situations. In other words, grand strategy conceived the Normandy invasion during World War II, strategy was used to assign beaches and landing zones to the various units which participated in that operation, and tactics were employed by those units to overcome the obstacles they encountered once they arrived onshore.

General Otis recognized that this traditional division left a very broad area of military operations undefined, specifically the planning and coordination of regimental and battalion staffs, which is the natural interface between strategy and tactics. Some of the functions these staffs performed fell neatly into strategy, others cleanly into tactics, but far more of them involved blending both schools of thought. As such, Otis rightfully believed that a new level of military philosophy needed to be defined and studied. Under his guidance, the 1982 revision of FM 100-5 established the concept of Operational Level Warfare. Unlike Depuy's original approach of 'Active Defense,' the Operational Level Warfare concept was immediately embraced as doctrine by subordinate units, because, in essence, it simply canonized what they were already doing. The battle was far from over, however, and one of the most sacred cows of the military bureaucracy still had to be slain before ALBD would mature to its current stage of development.

The Importance of Being Purple

For Operational Level Warfare to succeed, virtually all of the well constructed, carefully nurtured barriers that existed between the various components of the armed forces (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) had to be torn down brick by brick. This was not an insignificant task. Anyone who thinks that inter-service rivalries are embodied only in sporting events like the Army-Navy football game has been living under a rock. In peacetime, the various services duke it out for the limited funding that each considers essential to equip, train, and maintain their ability to accomplish their mission in peace and war. In wartime, the stakes go even higher, and when things go wrong, fingers tend to get pointed across service boundaries far too frequently. That was the norm in the early 1980s, and it was built on at least 40 years of institutional momentum.

Nevertheless, proper implementation of the revised ALBD meant that the Army had to count on the Air Force to conduct deep interdiction, for example, and both had to be able to coordinate their efforts at the operational level to achieve the aforementioned concept of synchronization. In other words, generals and admirals would no longer have the sole privilege of carving up battlefield responsibilities (after which each service would handle their share of the load relatively autonomously). The Joint Operations concept begins with just such a meeting, but it doesn't end there. Once the concept of an operation has been approved at the higher level, operational level commanders and their staffs, many of which now contain representatives from the other branches of service, must coordinate the execution of that plan at all levels as if inter-service boundaries do not exist. 'Purple Ops' became the slang for Joint Operations between the various armed forces, after some wiseacre determined that blending all of the various uniform colors together would produce the color purple. Initial resistance to Joint Operations was squashed after the failed Iranian hostage rescue attempt illustrated that interoperability issues between the services needed to be resolved. Decades of independent research and development programs, service-specific doctrine statements, segregated support functions that wasted funding, and provincial attitudes had created a balanced force of four elements, each of which was fairly good at performing its assigned mission, but-with the possible exception of the Navy-Marine Corps team-was lousy at supporting the missions of the others. Communications frequencies and protocol varied from one service to the next, logistical planning and support functions weren't standardized, intelligence gathering assets weren't shared, and the list goes on and on. Many of these issues are still being refined, but the important thing to understand is that had this renaissance in military thought not begun between 1982 and 1986, the conduct of the Gulf War would have been entirely different. Granted, the outcome would have probably been the same, but both the duration and the cost of that conflict would likely have been much higher.

Today’s Air-Land Battle Doctrine

The current iteration of the ALBD relies on Joint Operations as an integral component and has incorporated a number of other lessons learned from recent operations. For example, when friendly casualties must be kept to a minimum, as is almost always the political reality of modern warfare, operations must be conducted swiftly and with overwhelming force. Night operations, though difficult to coordinate and execute, also contribute to this secondary goal. When collateral damage and civilian casualties are potential pitfalls to the conceived operations, precision-guided munitions can simplify the commander's task. Each of these lessons refine our ability to conduct ALBD, but their impact is more evolutionary than revolutionary. The heart of the concept remains the same.

ALBD stresses becoming 'proactive,' rather than reactive, as soon as the opportunity permits. Do not allow the enemy to dictate the tempo of operations. Use the concepts of depth, agility, initiative, and synchronization to break up the first wave of any enemy attack, then move from a defensive to an offensive posture. Use air strikes, artillery, special operations units, cruise missiles, and other non-combat force multipliers to confuse, delay, and even break succeeding waves of enemy troops moving into the theater of operations. While this state of disorganization exists, exploit it with the synchronized application of joint firepower assets. These include rotary and fixed-wing attack aircraft, MLRS, naval gunfire and artillery (indirect fire), and optimal employment of fast, mechanized forces to achieve decisive effect on the ground to seize and hold territory which supports the objective of the operation.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Well, the term "graduate school" is a bit broad. Knowing the course title and specific assignment might be helpful in making suggestions to you:)

Here's is the best link to resources on military topics I know of:

http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/CARL/

Dig around in the archives and you will find everything from papers on COIN to whether Arabian horses or thoroughbred horses are best for cavalry use.

I used to teach at Leavenworth and it is all on a post-graduate level. Hardest courses I ever took. Or taught. The prep time was enormous.

AirLand Battle is much too large a topic for a 10-page paper. I would narrow it considerably. Or avoid it entirely.

I would stay away from the hardware (Bradleys and F-16s) unless you really want to get into the politics behind those decisions. Did you know that at least one component of the B1 bomber is built in every Congressional district in the United States? What Congressman would vote to de-fund it? Those realities have nothing to do with military doctrine.

Perhaps something along the lines of what Gary Owen suggests on the evolution of doctrine since 1945 (no, I don't believe the focus on Europe was intended to heal the wounds of Vietnam. In any case it didn't. That finally happened with Desert Storm).

You could tie it together with the evolution of the Army Division from Pentomic Division to ROAD to today's post-Cold War swing in emphasis away from the division and toward emphasizing the brigade. All of this is evidence of doctrinal change. That gives you something a bit more concrete for an anchor to tie everything else down.

In any case, find a way to keep a focus on the topic; don't let it balloon out of control. Ten pages ain't much.

The biggest problem with discussing AirLand Battle is -- no matter how many members of this community love to fixate on it because it was so armor-centric ("The Good Ole Days") -- is that we'll never know whether any of it would work because it was a war that never was fought. So it's all theory without any proof.

Frankly, I would avoid AirLand Battle all together.The consensus of those of us actually involved in writing the Cold War doctrine texts was that all that "active defense" stuff never would work. It was mostly eyewash. "Fight Outnumbered and Win" made a great bumper sticker but was a slogan, not a viable doctrine.

One idea is to focus your paper on the impact of an individual. Depuy is good, Starry was more influential but the guy I would pick is COL Harry Summers.

In the post-Vietnam Era he was considered the JFC Fuller of his time. Everyone read his book "On Strategy" and quoted him as though he were Moses leading us out of the wilderness of Vietnam. Today, his theories are pretty much considered a dead-end trail and a weak rationalization for our failure in Vietnam which was a deeply flawed conflict from Day One. But he was for many years "The Man."

http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/SummersObitText.htm

One thing I did learn in grad school was to emphasize primary sources. Stay away from Tom Clancy (I can't believe anyone suggested him; he pays other people to write the stuff he then puts his name on) and steer toward the Joint Chiefs and the SecDefs and the Congressional committee chairs and what, as the decision-makers, they had to say about your topics.

Again, I don't know what type of class this is for so it's hard to be specific.

If I were you and looking for ideas, I would root around that link at Leavenworth for ideas. At a minimum, you'll see the topics of the Command and General Staff College papers are VERY narrow.

Well, now that we've all written your paper for you...

Good luck!

HT

Link to comment
Share on other sites

All,

Thanks for the great suggestions and the research links...extremely helpful. I'm trying to think through the topic to determine if I can do it justice in 10 pages and I think these sources will be helpful on that front.

HotTom -- I'm at the National War College and this paper is for the Domestic Context core course. We're specifically looking at the domestic political and policy decision making process and how the particular decision was made. My initial thought on AirLand was to see how changes in doctrine to address a specific threat affected the different domestic power centers. Like you said, I'm a bit concerned it might be too much for a 10 page paper. I've written several papers here about non-military subjects and wanted to sink my teeth into something a little more military specific. One topic I've thought about quite a bit today after speaking with some classmates is the Stryker Brigade Combat Team. I don't necessarily want to look at the procurement fight, but rather the implications of a new military doctrine on how policy makers can use the military instrument of power.

Please keep the thoughts coming...I have until Friday to turn in my topic! :)

Take care,

Brian

Link to comment
Share on other sites

HotTom,

Just to followup on my previous post, narrowing the topic down on all the papers I've written at NWC has been significantly more difficult than actually writing them. I also agree with your point on primary sources and prefer them myself. Ideally, I'd like to be able to interview people involved in whatever decision I select as a topic.

As far as topics go, I'm starting to lean toward the Stryker Brigade. I still have to sit down and think through it a bit, but here's the basic areas I think would need to be covered:

1. A quick overview of the Brigade Combat Team concept and why it was introduced

2. Discussion of the Stryker Brigade, how it fits into the overall BCT concept, and why it's such an important component within the BCT concept

3. Discussion on the Stryker vehicle itself and why it was selected

4. Discussion of opposition to the SBCT and the Stryker itself -- I understand there was some difficulty with Congress on this issue along with opposition from others in the defense community, but I really have to research this area.

While the above will basically cover my paper requirements to explore the decision making process and the players involved, I would personally like to explore how changing doctrine within the Army impacts policymakers. As I understand it, the Army was looking at this as a means to increase its mobility and response time to provide a more expeditionary option from the Army rather than always requiring a lengthy buildup. This increases the options available to the President. Of course, there was the parochial Army side of the issue as well. Again, in the limited research I've done so far, the Army saw this as a way to make sure they remained relevant following the Cold War. More mobility and more rapid deployment was viewed as the way to go.

I'd appreciate any thoughts you might have on any of this.

Thanks again for your time,

Brian

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Wow! Fort McNair! You are indeed one of the fortunate few. And it's a beautiful old post. Been to many meetings there (but never as a student).

Well, I retired 13 years ago and I'm a little out of date. The infantrymen do still carry pike poles, don't they? :)

But I do keep up with the papers from the CALL (Center for Army Lessons Learned), where I was attached when they were in high gear right after Desert Storm (I was just a humble reserve officer but all these assigments at Fort Leavenworth got me loads of active duty time and annoyed the hell out of my civilian employer) so I feel I have a bit of a personal investment in CALL :)

This very detailed IRR (Initial Impressions Report) by a CALL team attached to a 2nd ID Stryker brigade in Mosul during OIF was fascinating to read:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/iir-mosul-ops_stryker-bde_21dec2004.pdf

I'm sure some of this stuff has been addressed but not all of it. And you may already have a copy of it.

And many others here may find it worth reading, too. The Executive Summary alone is worth browsing.

At least it's a "primary source" :)

I'd also dig around through back issues of Military Review as well.

Hope that helps you with some areas to focus on and best of luck to you (getting it down to 10 pages)!

HT

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I am very fortunate to be at NWC, it's an unbelievable program. Of course, I'm part of the interagency affirmative action program, so it's a bit different for me. :)

Thanks again to everyone for the thoughts, links, and comments. I appreciate it.

Brian

Best wishes Brian, and do well.:) And come back here some day to teach us a little of what you've learned.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.

×
×
  • Create New...