OOB and doctrine in the 80's and today.

[Scrapper_511]

If the Cold War had continued to this day, would OOBs and doctrine (of NATO and WP in the European theatre) be much different from what they were in the 80's? Rumors of C2's arrival makes me wonder.

[AKM]

The Soviet ORBATs and doctrines would certainly have evolved considerably. They've always had a very flexible formation and good upper tier commanders, beginning in 1942-1943, and according to Glantz at least (primarily Soviet Military Operational Art) and Simpkin (Deep Battle) these evolutions would not have stopped. The next big step from the Soviet push from the "nuclear scared" single-echelon operational/strategic formations, and the emphasis on tailored-to-task combined arms forces right on down to battalion level, would most likely have been the greater incorporation of precision weapons of all types. What this would have done to Soviet doctrine and orders of battle is most likely increase their reliance on "manouevre by fire" and further separate units and subunits from one another in terms of geographical distance.

Also possible we'd see greater emphasis, on the Soviet side, of use of the "air echelon" to generate effects in conjunction with / independently of the operational or tactical manouevre group.

I don't know what NATO would have done. Continued with AirLand Battle until they realized that the Soviets had largely abandoned the echelonment concepts in the 1960s and 1970s as part of their fear of providing lucrative targets to nuclear weapons, then possibly evolved into a more 'first echelon'-centric ALB derivative to match the Soviet emphasis on the first echelon having to be able to achieve tasks fully on its own.

What we'd see with ORBATs here I suspect is greater modernization of equipment, perhaps higher concentrations of artillery and other combat support at lower levels of command to match the Soviets doing the same thing. For NATO, we probably wouldn't have seen the obsession with "Light" troop formations and strategic deployability we saw after the USSR fell.

[Scrapper_511]

Very interesting and well read. Thanks for replying, AKM.

The books sound interesting as well. Googling Glantz and Simpkin now...

[AKM]

My university library sent me a letter warning me that if I don't return Glantz's book in short order, they'll bill me for it. I looked it up and it's 300+ dollars.

That may be a bit of a hit on the wallet. Try and find it in a local university library first.

[GaryOwen]

It's available in paperback for considerably less than $300.

http://www.amazon.com/Soviet-Military-Operational-Art-Practice/dp/0714640778/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1306631674&sr=8-1

Simpkin, however, is a rare find.

[Scrapper_511]

Thanks Gary Owen. Nothing like a good read to take me away from daily routine.

[AKM]

Good find Owen; when I went looking on Amazon.ca earlier I could only find the 1991/92-edition hardcover. Thanks!

I don't know if Simpkin has published more recently than 1985, and I don't think he'd have been reprinted all that much: good work, but the market for military theoretical works is somewhat limited.

[GaryOwen]

Race to the Swift should be easy enough to find, if you must read Simpkin. That seems to have sold relatively well when published.

[AKM]

He references it extensively in Deep Battle. Available on Amazon for those interested; looks like a used copy kind of thing unless you happen to have a C-note lying around collecting dust.

Gary Owen; perhaps you have perspective on what NATO would most likely have done under circumstances stated by the original post? It's not my strong area at present, I've been facefirst into the Soviets for a few months now.

[Ssnake]

There are many unknown factors in the equation. On the one hand the Soviets, on paper, were really good. The operational concepts were sound (if ruthless), the combat vehicles were tailored without compromise to the intended purpose. On the other hand, there are the problems that plagued them - the vehicles were notoriously unreliable, the subordinate commanders didn't have the leeway to make their own decisions which as a whole created a serious leadership problem if things didn't go according to plan. So NATO knew it had to throw as many wrenches into the gears of the Soviet war machinery as possible in order to create tactical superiority in so many situations that, so it was hoped, would eventually also bring victory on the operational level.

What NATO never really took into account was the refugee problem, or the fact that the Soviets would probably have used nukes in large numbers from day one. Both had the potential to shred the beautiful defense plans to pieces.

[GaryOwen]

[T]he Soviets would probably have used nukes in large numbers from day one.

Spend any amount of time reading on Soviet operational art and you'll see that one of the greatest lessons that they took from the Great Patriotic War was that the opening move is really important. Which is understandable given the initial clobbering they took during Barbarossa. Since Krushchev, they had intended, if things were to get hot, that they would take the initiative and use their most lethal means to rip huge holes in the West's defenses, driving operational manuever groups through those holes as ruthlessly as possible. The infantry fighting vehicle (BMP) was designed specifically for this purpose. It was designed to allow infantry to fight from within a space that would protect them from radiological contamination. The Soviet force pointed at western Europe was organized from the ground up to fight on a nuclear battlefield.

The US maintained nuclear capable artillery in theater throughout the Cold War. During the 1960's we even fielded a nuclear device that was launched from a recoiless rifle tripod. One of the reasons it was eventually retired was that the warhead's radius of effect was greater than the rocket's range. Additionally think about the message that the change from the Active Defense to the AirLand doctrine was intended to be sent to the Soviets. That message: "We are now acknowledging that we if we strike, we intend to strike deep and hard. We will call it defensive, but we will attack your homeland." Implicit is the threat to use high explosives.

Of course, neither party wanted to see any of this actually happen. Andrew Bacevich, once the Blackhorse regimental commander - now a poli-sci professor/thinker, suggested in his The New American Militarism* that the military's conduct during the '70's-'90's with respect to the Cold War in Europe was a deliberate effort at regaining a degree of professional competence and self-respect after Vietnam by training to win a war that everyone knew would never have to be fought.

So in answer to AKM's question: Gary Owen; perhaps you have perspective on what NATO would most likely have done under circumstances stated by the original post?, my guess would be the same as it had been doing up until that point, just adding more expensive weapons systems as time went by -- or, the same, just more of it.

*http://www.amazon.com/New-American-Militarism-Americans-Seduced/dp/0195173384

[AKM]

So I guess in answer to the original question, both would just have kept on their original paths and incorporated fancier equipment as time and resources allowed.

Ssnake: It seems to me, through interactions with Russian military and ex-military personnel, some of whom have experience of the Soviet system, that the real "falling down" of Soviet leadership was at the battalion level. Regimental commanders could be good, divisional commanders were usually pretty good, and anybody higher than that was well schooled and at least theoretically good, though they did not get to 'stretch their legs for real' as the lower level commanders did in various 'interventions' and in Afghanistan.

While their doctrine is good, it is not interpreted at the minor tactical level as a "framework for thought." Commanders often interpreted it literally. The abysmal performance in Afghanistan reflects a doctrine that at both the highest level (popular resistance to a socialist gov't; totally inconceivable and the cynic would say not to the leadership, but what they wanted the proletariat to think so they wouldn't get any ideas of their own) and the lowest level (there is no framework for dismounted Infantry operations in complex terrain against a non-conventional opponent not defending ground or not the focus of a destruction mission).

Owen: They largely moved away from first use of nuclear weapons in the mid-1970s. With the adoption of the "nuclear scared" posture, after the 1950s-1970s fixation on exploiting nuclear strikes, comes the adoption of no-first-use, probably designed to keep the war conventional. In my opinion they correctly identified that NATO could not win a purely conventional war (emphasis on forward defence, limited operational depth, poor to nonexistent grasp of operational art) but would certainly cause everybody to lose a nuclear war.

Functionally that doesn't really change anything, just the means by which the initial "blow" (udar) is made.

Related topic to first use of nuclear weapons: How likely is it that SACEUR would have resorted to battlefield nuclear weapon use in the face of a successful Soviet offensive? I would think inevitable, thus leading to strategic exchange and global death. Looks like the Soviets thought roughly the same thing, thus them never starting the ball rolling: even if they win they lose.

To diverge a bit onto another related topic:

Building on the Soviet emphasis on surprise (at all levels) and their fixation on never being caught off guard again after the 1941 experience, and relating to a long-ago thread on TankNet, there was some discussion regarding the Group of Soviet Forces Germany and how the BRIMIS groups and their US counterparts 'touring' the Soviet zone were permitted/not permitted to see things. The NATO members there were adamant that the Soviets were always planning a first strike, and that if the Soviets had more armour, artillery, or other assets there than we had thought they did, that would be a warning for an imminent first strike.

After reading a lot about Soviet operational art and strategic thinking, I don't think that's accurate. Any concealed Soviet stockpiling/forward positioning of equipment is simply establishing the means to react very quickly to NATO aggression (particularly after Stalin's death) or, in the event of starting a war, to achieve operational/strategic - if not also tactical - surprise. It's not indicative of an immediate desire to go to war any more than us preparing defensive plans was indicative of that; it was simply their version of military prudence. Different culture, different ethos, different ideals, ergo different actions.

[GaryOwen]

With respect to the BRIMIs, here's a great link:

http://www.history.hqusareur.army.mil/uslmannual.htm

Along the other lines you're talking about, I recall reading somewhere about unsuccessful Soviet attempts to call up reserves in the early '80s in response to events in Poland. I can't remember if that was in Cockburn's The Threat or whether I've read about that elsewhere.

[AKM]

That's a good link, thanks.

See if you can find where you read that, because it would throw a wrench into the whole "the Soviets conducted limited mobilizations under the cover of large scale exercises to prepare for interventions in Hungary, Poland, and Afghanistan." With something so basic as calling up reserves (actually fairly complex, yes, but central to their thinking) you'd think they'd have that on "lock", as it were.

[GaryOwen]

See if you can find where you read that.

I looked through Odom's book, The Collapse of the Soviet Military and couldn't find mention of it. That work focuses on the post-Brehznev era; so perhaps that's why it's not mentioned.

Cockburn mentions the incident twice in The Threat. He claims that there was a faction within the land forces that wanted to invade Poland prior to the Polish declaration of martial law. Brehznev wasn't really on board with that (It probably would have required too much work for him that would have distracted energy from his more immediate pursuits). The faction, nevertheless, had enough juice to order a call-up. The call-up was totally fubar'd -- beaucoup invalid addresses, missing equipment, cluelessness on the part of those who couldn't figure a way out of reporting. The situation was particularly bad in the Carpathian district. There may have been an issue with ethnic Poles in the call-up. It was so bad that rather prolonging a career ending spectacle, or, heaven forfend, fixing the problem, the call-up was cancelled.

I don't know how much weight to give Cockburn, but there it is.

[AKM]

Even if what Cockburn reports (kinda like that Suvorov guy...) is entirely accurate then it's entirely possible that because the call up was not ordered 'at all levels' from the top down it messed itself up. The Soviets were notorious for checks and balances and the Russians still display some of the same behaviour.

[scowlmovement]

Spend any amount of time reading on Soviet operational art and you'll see that one of the greatest lessons that they took from the Great Patriotic War was that the opening move is really important. Which is understandable given the initial clobbering they took during Barbarossa. Since Krushchev, they had intended, if things were to get hot, that they would take the initiative and use their most lethal means to rip huge holes in the West's defenses, driving operational manuever groups through those holes as ruthlessly as possible. The infantry fighting vehicle (BMP) was designed specifically for this purpose. It was designed to allow infantry to fight from within a space that would protect them from radiological contamination. The Soviet force pointed at western Europe was organized from the ground up to fight on a nuclear battlefield.

The US maintained nuclear capable artillery in theater throughout the Cold War. During the 1960's we even fielded a nuclear device that was launched from a recoiless rifle tripod. One of the reasons it was eventually retired was that the warhead's radius of effect was greater than the rocket's range. Additionally think about the message that the change from the Active Defense to the AirLand doctrine was intended to be sent to the Soviets. That message: "We are now acknowledging that we if we strike, we intend to strike deep and hard. We will call it defensive, but we will attack your homeland." Implicit is the threat to use high explosives.

Of course, neither party wanted to see any of this actually happen. Andrew Bacevich, once the Blackhorse regimental commander - now a poli-sci professor/thinker, suggested in his The New American Militarism* that the military's conduct during the '70's-'90's with respect to the Cold War in Europe was a deliberate effort at regaining a degree of professional competence and self-respect after Vietnam by training to win a war that everyone knew would never have to be fought.

So in answer to AKM's question: Gary Owen; perhaps you have perspective on what NATO would most likely have done under circumstances stated by the original post?, my guess would be the same as it had been doing up until that point, just adding more expensive weapons systems as time went by -- or, the same, just more of it.

*http://www.amazon.com/New-American-Militarism-Americans-Seduced/dp/0195173384

Side-bar: Bacevich wrote an excellent article in Military Review back in the 80s. It detailed the use of the armored cavalry regiment to gain the initiative in the covering force battle, in the event of a Soviet attack.

[Tac Error]

It seems to me, through interactions with Russian military and ex-military personnel, some of whom have experience of the Soviet system, that the real "falling down" of Soviet leadership was at the battalion level. Regimental commanders could be good, divisional commanders were usually pretty good, and anybody higher than that was well schooled and at least theoretically good, though they did not get to 'stretch their legs for real' as the lower level commanders did in various 'interventions' and in Afghanistan.

While their doctrine is good, it is not interpreted at the minor tactical level as a "framework for thought." Commanders often interpreted it literally.

Even though Soviet tactical art had the regiment as the basic combined arms unit, I think that the stereotype/template that "everybody under regimental level is incompetent" may not be necessarily true.

I found these quotes from an Allen E. Curtis on another forum, the same guy who was editor of Red Thrust Star which sheds some light in Soviet tactical flexibility.

At the lower level, we missed the fact that for their best units at least, a flexible and creative tactical doctrine existed that could have taken us quite by surprise.

Just as in the Great Patriotic War, there were the majority of formations capable of carrying out ordinary missions, but a few which by virtue of talented commanders and experienced troops could be relied on repeatedly to carry out non-standard missions, the trend probably carried over into the post-war period.

The doctrine was there for all to follow. But some commanders, and some formations, were probably better able to conduct more complicated missions than others. These were not necessarily the highest category divisions stationed closest to the IGB, either.

One I would single out would be the 24th ("Iron") Motorized Rifle Division, an MRD assigned at the district level in the Carpathian Military District. The 24th was in many ways a "test bed" division, fielding and trying out new equipment, and training with advanced tactical concepts.

I shudder to report that "Suvorov" was assigned at one time to that division. I shall have to go and have a lie-down after this to process that thought. But more importantly, in the late '80s, we had access to a former regimental commander and divisional chief of staff of the Iron Division, who freely shared his knowledge of current tactical doctrine with us for several years.

This gentleman--and I say that unreservedly, as unlike the self-serving military intelligence and KGB defectors who advanced our understanding not one jot, he was a professional infantryman whom *our* colonels and generals immediately perceived as a kindred soul--was a proficient, creative, and extremely intelligent officer. If a shootin' war had come about, he might have been a Soviet Creighton Abrams. I have no doubt that his serving two tours in that division were not the luck of the draw; he was assigned their because of his ability.

I don't doubt that there were others as good or perhaps better, but as you know by now, there were many who were not. Those could be relied upon to carry out "standard" tactics with a motorized rifle or tank regiment. Those commanding a unit tasked to serve as, say, a divisional forward detachment, or operating as part of an operational maneuver group, needed to be of a higher caliber.

[scowlmovement]

Fascinating. It would make sense to save these formations for the more difficult missions. Leave the scrub commanders to be frittered away, and maybe create opportunities for the more capable commands to hit harder with a greater impact. Was this encouraged at sub-unit (battalion and below) commands? Would a battalion commander cultivate a culture of creativity and initiative in his captains?

[GaryOwen]

Side-bar: Bacevich wrote an excellent article in Military Review back in the 80s. It detailed the use of the armored cavalry regiment to gain the initiative in the covering force battle, in the event of a Soviet attack.

Thanks, found it, I'll read it through thoroughly over the weekend.

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p124201coll1/id/263/rec/226

Tac Error,

Welcome to the conversation. FYI, sb.com has a library: http://www.steelbeasts.com/Downloads/p13_sectionid/19

Please feel free to contribute.

[Tac Error]

Fascinating. It would make sense to save these formations for the more difficult missions. Leave the scrub commanders to be frittered away, and maybe create opportunities for the more capable commands to hit harder with a greater impact. Was this encouraged at sub-unit (battalion and below) commands? Would a battalion commander cultivate a culture of creativity and initiative in his captains?

Well the general answer would be, "it depends". In divisional and army-level forward detachments, and operational maneuver groups, the battalion may very well be a "unit" in practice due to their need for more independence.

Also, in the 1980s there were experimental "new army corps" consisting of brigades made up of combined arms battalions. These corps were tailored for the role as front operational maneuver groups and certainly would've required the same experienced commanders Allen was talking about.

To top it all off, here's the paper "The Soviet Combined Arms Battalion - Reorganization for Tactical Flexibility" from the Soviet Army Studies Office.

http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA216368

But it's also worth noting that the Soviet definition of "initiative" is not our Western one. There was a good, non-stereotypical article written by Richard N. Armstrong in Military Review, I gotta find it again...

[scowlmovement]

True, initiative can be defined in so many ways. I would choose to define it in the sense of battle command. How would small units operate in the absence of orders from higher up? It's starting to look as though the Soviet system was a bit more sophisticated, and misunderstood, than I originally thought. This is all very interesting, though. All of the insight is going a long way to develop a better understanding of how the Soviets intended to fight.

[Tac Error]

Commanders of forward detachments and operational maneuver groups, plus their subordinates were fully expected to function with dubious contact with higher command echelons. Even then, OMGs and foward detachments had missions outlined by higher commanders in a broad directive rather than detailed orders.

The Soviet definition of initiative is "intelligent anticipation, or at least correct interpretation, of the higher intent, and effective implementation of it without detailed guidance; it is also the ability, and the farsighted, flexible organization of the combined arms grouping, to reat speedily, without waiting for direction, to meet unexpected changes in the operational/tactical situation."

Here are some more reading sources if you're interested:

"Emerging Soviet Doctrine: Implications for the U.S. Task Force Defense"

http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA208043

"The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan"

http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA316729

"Initiative Soviet Style" by Major Richard N. Armstrong (page 20 in the PDF)

http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p124201coll1/id/277/rec/7

And to see where the Soviets were heading in the 21st century, look here:

Soviet Non-Linear Combat: The Challenge of the 90s:

http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA231789

Edited June 18, 2011 by Tac Error

[TankHunter]

As regards poor Soviet performance in the Afghan war, to what extent was that due to manpower problems? I seem to recall reading that it was not uncommon for Soviet formations to suffer heavy attrition due to disease as a result of poor camp hygiene.

Hence the development of the bronegruppa.

[Tac Error]

The search for ways to provide battalion and company commanders on the future, non-linear battlefield with more maneuver was one of the primary reasons why the bronegruppa concept was developed, not manpower problems.

Though manpower in itself is something that the 40th Army needed to address in counterinsurgency. The Bear Went over the Mountain says that units had to be filled in excess of 100% to operate in Afghanistan.