The Possibility of additional air power.

[SeanPatrick]

Play through "Excalibur.sce" by Eisenchwein a few times on medium or hard difficulty, then tell me that the current Hinds aren't enough of a threat. The scenario can be found in the default missions under "Scenarios>Contest>Contest 1>."

[Companion]

Play through "Excalibur.sce" by Eisenchwein a few times on medium or hard difficulty, then tell me that the current Hinds aren't enough of a threat. The scenario can be found in the default missions under "Scenarios>Contest>Contest 1>."

I don't mean to offend you but I didn't find hinds zooming at low altitudes, maybe popping up behind some treeline only to remain stationary, to be that much of a threat (in that particular scen, they can be taken out in pretty quick order before they encircle you)

The situation when I find hinds to be dangerous and so painful is when they fly at mid-high altitude, especially at short ranges where you can barely elevate your gun to engage, waltz like crazy, and take pot ATGM shots here and there or strafe rockets when they feel like doing so. (...now that I wrote it, it sounds oddly similar to Soviet rotary wing tactic hmm..)

Not only it's more harder to hit them at higher altitudes, frontal aspect of your tank is suddenly vulnerable to otherwise ineffective AT-6s diving onto your roof armor.

Rockets are even more dangerous since it does not compel the hind to stay still long enough to present a viable stationary target while at the same time punches hard enough to F-kill, or even K-kill, anything you've got on the ground.

Although those hinds eventually drop to earth given time, the ammo wastage and the damage incurred could be quite staggering at times.

[SeanPatrick]

Don't worry, I'm almost un-offendable.

Maybe I just suck. Seriously, I was just playing that sce. and got wasted by a near 4000m shot from a Hind I didn't see b/c I was engaging a tank.

[RecceDG]

Reword that a bit: "After 5 minutes against the Frogfoots, I had no tanks."

I don't think that is a fair assessment at ALL.

The big difference between the CAS situation in WW2 and modern times is the invention of the surface to air missile. WW2 the standard ack-ack weapon was a flex mounted 50 cal, which was more wishful thinking than actually effective. But SAMs - they work. Compare the North Vietnamese experience against the Americans, or the Mujaheddin experience against the HINDs.

Granted, the prevalence of MANPADs for hasty air defence and dedicated ADA units like ADATS or Patriot isn't an immediate and total defence against rotary wing or CAS. There will be successes and the core of that success will be careful use of CAS assets.

But any CAS guy who thinks that he is going to have it all his own way is due for a rude awakening. My experiences of HIND vs M2/M3 at Knox went very poorly for the HINDs.

DG

[12Alfa]

The Mi -24 in the sim is as stated many times was to provide a target for us tankers, and to make one think of the air threat.

If the Hind had the fidelity of a Leo 2E we would not do so well I would think in the sim. :eek2:

All this talk about the Hind in the Afghan conflict is one side I think. History has told us that the Hinds they used were doing a good job with effective tactics at the time, so much so the Freedom fighters asked for help for uncle sam (no pun intended). Some of you suggest that they were a poor wepond platforms, then there would be no need for the Stingers:confused:.

The fact of the matter is shown that they indeed were very effective, so much so they have been reported as the most effective wpn in that conflict to the point the fighters were willing to ask for outside help. Most of you know that in that country, as in that part of the world they don't ask for the west help that often, it shows the bad shape they thought they were in when dealing with the MI-24's.

I know that the CIA had a role to play as well as the ISI, but that came after the request for help.

A MI-24 in the hands of a good crew is as effective a s a good tank crew on the ground, unlike our sim or the Simnet.

Lets cut the SB's Hinds some slack until they are further developed to the point of the MBT's.:remybussi::smilelove-1:

[Ssnake]

Still, your arguments - and most of the points of the helo "proponents", shall we call them - fundamentally root in an asymmetrical operational environment. The HIND was successful in Afghanistan while there was no effective air defense. It was still a threat, but a somewhat manageable one, after the import of Stingers in the theater. The question remains, what kind of a loss rate would gunship helicopters suffer in a symmetrical conflict of two industrialized nations, maybe 2nd or 3rd tier, where there are SOME air defense assets and many mechanized forces with ubiquitous, medium and large caliber computerized weapon systems that have laser range finders.

Could well be that the helicopter threat is largely negated if they are forced to operate only at substantial standoff distance, and without the ability to perform deep incursions into enemy airspace without very serious risks. At that point the helicopter might be relegated to some sort of a "fire brigade" in the rear that is sent wherever the enemy might threaten to break through since they would not need to worry about their safety from the immediate environment.

[RecceDG]

The HIND was successful in Afghanistan while there was no effective air defense. It was still a threat, but a somewhat manageable one, after the import of Stingers in the theater.

When you look at the loss rate numbers, it is far more than that - Stinger neutralized HIND. Prior to the arrival of Stinger, the HINDs operated with complete impunity (and were accordingly highly effective). Post Stinger, so many HINDs were shot down - and so quickly - that they stopped using them for anything except administrative roles.

I wish I could find that paper that talked about this so I could cite it.... Bottom line is that the Stinger in the hands of the Muj pulled the teeth of the most effective weapon (at that time) in the Soviet arsenal.

The question remains, what kind of a loss rate would gunship helicopters suffer in a symmetrical conflict of two industrialized nations, maybe 2nd or 3rd tier, where there are SOME air defense assets and many mechanized forces with ubiquitous, medium and large caliber computerized weapon systems that have laser range finders.

That is an excellent question and one that, I don't think, has ever been fully answered. Cold War era, air defence hinged on the umbrella provided by higher echelon AD assets and the location and destruction of these assets was a high priority for formation level recce elements. Taking out an AD battery might well open up a flank for exploitation by rotary wing or CAS. Modern day, when any trooper can (in theory) pull a Stinger out of the back of the LAV and knock down an attack helo or CAS element... it is very much an open question.

And for full up nation-on-nation warfare where both sides have attack helos, CAS, AND MANPADs? Wow, what a mess.

I don't think it is safe to assume that MANPADs totally negate the CAS/attack helo threat, but neither do I assume that the presence of CAS reduces the life expectancy of tanks to mere minutes.

And the complexity of the problem is such that I'm happy with the current state of CAS in SB. There's enough of it to offer some flavour, and in some cases, a real threat that needs countering, but it's not SO prevalent that you need a TAC-P to play in every game.

DG

[Ssnake]

...an excellent question and one that, I don't think, has ever been fully answered.

So, what do you think about document describing the 1982 Beka'a valley incident that I linked in a previous post?

[Marko]

Could well be that the helicopter threat is largely negated if they are forced to operate only at substantial standoff distance, and without the ability to perform deep incursions into enemy airspace without very serious risks. At that point the helicopter might be relegated to some sort of a "fire brigade" in the rear that is sent wherever the enemy might threaten to break through since they would not need to worry about their safety from the immediate environment.

I would have to agree with you helicopters are very vunerable behind enemy lines.but part of the Arrowhead upgrade on the Apache.gives it the ability to control a UAV.it operates in conjunction with JSTARS.i wont pretend to know exactly how it works.i recently watched a episode of future weapons and the Apache crew were controlling a remotely controlled Kiowa so that may increase its survivability. at the same time i don't believe all the hype that i see On TV and the Apache is not with out its faults.i remember reading that it very Rarely deploys its full compliment of Hellfire's.for technical reasons.also the image of the downed Apache near Baghdad and the local guy claiming he downed it with a old 303 Rifle.i do not believe that happened but stranger things have happened on the battlefield.also i cant be sure on this but i think i read somewhere that Apaches had to be withdrawn from operating in Kosovo due to the high threat level.

[Ssnake]

also the image of the downed Apache near Baghdad and the local guy claiming he downed it with a old 303 Rifle.i do not believe that happened but stranger things have happened on the battlefield.

Well, I find it credible.

Uh, that the Apache was downed, probably due to massive rifle fire from 360°.

And that the farmer watched it go down while he guarded his turnips with a Lee Enfield rifle. He probably even shot at it as it went down. Heck, maybe he even hit it.

All that isn't unlikely.

Or, he was incredibly lucky, or it was just that, a propaganda stunt.

[Marko]

There just one more Question. in the first Gulf war.the Iraqi army had a lot of air defence.most of it was knocked out by fixed wing assets.but i was just wondering were any air assets fixed wing or rotary were knocked out by man pads.i read that a A10 was shoot down by a ZSU.and quite a few were damaged. i am just trying to establish how effective the Russian manpads Are.

[stormrider_sp]

Still, your arguments - and most of the points of the helo "proponents", shall we call them - fundamentally root in an asymmetrical operational environment. The HIND was successful in Afghanistan while there was no effective air defense. It was still a threat, but a somewhat manageable one, after the import of Stingers in the theater. The question remains, what kind of a loss rate would gunship helicopters suffer in a symmetrical conflict of two industrialized nations, maybe 2nd or 3rd tier, where there are SOME air defense assets and many mechanized forces with ubiquitous, medium and large caliber computerized weapon systems that have laser range finders.

Could well be that the helicopter threat is largely negated if they are forced to operate only at substantial standoff distance, and without the ability to perform deep incursions into enemy airspace without very serious risks. At that point the helicopter might be relegated to some sort of a "fire brigade" in the rear that is sent wherever the enemy might threaten to break through since they would not need to worry about their safety from the immediate environment.

In other words, governments wasted money on attack helicopters cause they are useless?

[Gibsonm]

No.

[LtGeorge]

So, what do you think about document describing the 1982 Beka'a valley incident that I linked in a previous post?

Interesting, especially since everybody's version of events was different. They say the Syrian troop armor hunting teams were very effective, but also that only 10-15% of them survived, so it seems to go both ways. Seems the Gazelles were effective and didn't take too many losses, but also got yanked back when it seemed the Israelis were figuring them out. I would hate to be in the Gazelle that finds a Vulcan-M113 that has learned the importance of his job.

Your earlier point is most valid - no one weapon system is perfect, and combined arms is the only way to go. Even the Apache may be highly vulnerable against a modern army, but when you combine it with A-10s, artillery, AD, and regular armored formations, then you have something, and a guy with a MANPAD who knows that shooting off a SA-14 will earn him artillery, or an A-10 strafe, or a 120mm HE round, or all 3 at the same time, may not be so effective after all.

[Panzer_Leader]

So, what do you think about document describing the 1982 Beka'a valley incident that I linked in a previous post?

My reading of the article was that Syrian Gazelles enjoyed a number of particular advantages that may have led to their tactical success in 1982, namely: the Israeli’s did not enjoy their customary local air superiority; the terrain favoured concealed approaches by helicopters; the terrain and road network conspired to ‘canalize’ Israeli armour into vulnerable kill zones.

For me it’s not definitive and even with these advantages the Gazelles were relatively easily countered once the Israelis brought air defence assets forward. Of course, the Gazelle is not a dedicated attack helicopter but, by the same token, air defence is also now more ubiquitous (MANPADS) and lethal.

[RecceDG]

So, what do you think about document describing the 1982 Beka'a valley incident that I linked in a previous post?

I think it is typical of what I would expect from a Cold-War era AD plan, where you have higher formation AD assets providing an umbrella for lower formations: if the assets are in place and working, it is very dangerous to be in the air and the effects are quickly neutralized. If the assets are out of place (or the ground units have moved out of coverage; same difference) or have been themselves targeted and destroyed, the air units have a much freer hand.

But while the attack helos were effective, they weren't dominant - neither were the CAS elements. They seem to have had about as much effect as the more modern tanks. Lesser tanks and M113s took a beating.

It is worth noting that the MANPADs in place were very early models and nowhere near as effective or numerous as modern stuff. In a world where (in theory) every LAV has a Stinger in it, you aren't dependent on the higher-formation umbrella and so aren't as vulnerable to having the umbrella go away.

It is also worth noting that small calibre autocannon are now far more prevalent. You aren't looking at the biggest integral infantry weapon being the 50 cal. Instead it is the 25mm chain gun on the Bradley or LAV, or the 30-40mm Bofors on CV40 and the like. Even without the Stinger "magic bullet" it is far more dangerous to approach an infantry column than it was when everything had a 50 on it.

So while this scenario does provide a glimpse into what the early attack helo experience was like, I don't think it is necessarily representative of a state-on-state clash where both sides have attack helos, pervasive MANPADs, and autocannon-equipped AFVs. In this, it is similar to the early clashes between tanks and ATGMs. Tanks initially fared very poorly, and there was talk of the day of the MBT being over. But new tank designs and changes in doctrine largely countered the ATGM threat to the point that while ATGMs are unquestionably still dangerous, neither have they swept the tank from the battlefield.

DG

[Companion]

RE: Hinds and stingers.

Stingers just reduced the effectiveness of Hinds, not negated it altogether. (in that Hinds couldn't loiter around with impunity like they are some flying tanks)

And the actual kill count by stingers isn't so astounding. Hit rate may be higher than contemporary systems though.

a link and an article of possible interest attached:

http://www.skywar.ru/afghanistanen.html

The Stinger Missile and U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan - Alan J. Kuperman.zip

[Ssnake]

So in conclusion, while the vulnerability of helicopters may be a tad too high in SB Pro, it's not totally out of place in the mechanized environment that our simulation represents even though we do not have a model of the large, operational air defense umbrella nor jet fighters, or ubiquitous MANPADs.

[SeanPatrick]

Don't worry, I'm almost un-offendable.

By the way, I tend to talk out of my a$$ sometimes (and inadvertently hijack threads.) Sorry. Anyone: feel free to tell me to STFU if you deem it necessary.

[stormrider_sp]

So in conclusion, while the vulnerability of helicopters may be a tad too high in SB Pro, it's not totally out of place in the mechanized environment that our simulation represents even though we do not have a model of the large, operational air defense umbrella nor jet fighters, or ubiquitous MANPADs.

No.

Since Steel Beasts is focused on the ground battle, and we don´t have any air units to dispute air superiority, we take that that phase was already accomplished. Whoever won the 1st phase (Air Superiority) is the one who control the Close Air Support. Still helos operate in Steel Beasts with such reckless manner that its impossible to make any use of them other than targets.

My question is: Today, in the modern battlefield, I´m not talking about Afghanistan conflict which is 100% assymetric, until where is it valid to disconnect the ground struggle with the air capabilities (Close Air Support).

I´m not including the listed scenario because neither helicopters nor attack planes operate as they were designed to. More than that, even brazilian prop attack planes (Super Tucanos) would do equal as modern F-18s in such role and environment with the difference of being a lot cheaper!

[Tacbat]

Still helos operate in Steel Beasts with such reckless manner that its impossible to make any use of them other than targets.

Depends on your ability with the mission editor.

[Gibsonm]

Still helos operate in Steel Beasts with such reckless manner that its impossible to make any use of them other than targets.

Depends on your ability with the mission editor.

Indeed as per my post #2, what four pages ago now.

However if all you are after is to bang a drum to make SB pro into a helo Sim, then keep on asking the same question over and over and over again.

[rump]

Book tip:

'Antitank, an air mechanized response to armored threats in the 90s' by Richard E Simpkin

- Rump

[Scrapper_511]

So in conclusion, while the vulnerability of helicopters may be a tad too high in SB Pro, it's not totally out of place in the mechanized environment that our simulation represents even though we do not have a model of the large, operational air defense umbrella nor jet fighters, or ubiquitous MANPADs.

I agree. I'm extremely glad to have rotorwings at least make an appearance in SB. Great immersion factor.

[Captain_Colossus]

There is partly a matter of scenario design. I think it's often the case that scenario designers assign too much artillery to platoon or company level Red units like M1 Tank Platoon did. This might be either done to make Red side a challenge or to promote the idea that Red usually has an advantage in artillery. Even where this is the case, it tends to be more at say a regiment level or above where that really comes in, OPFOR units tended to be more pure, more lean, more spare without as much expected support at such a low level. Similarly, Soviet independent helicopter regiments wouldn't necessarily be employed as air support for platoons but would throw a lot of helicopters at you once, used like mobile artillery, swarms of HINDS would be used to saturate an area with rockets. They are easy in most scenarios to pick off with aimed direct fire, because there's usually only one or two and they're kind of trying to engage individual units from a static position.

Could Steel Beasts model a helicopter strike like offboard artillery? The mission designer might for example plot a point for eight helicopters to fly in from a random location and strafe an area- this is much different than the computer behavior of hovering, popping off rockets and missiles while generally being vulnerable. The effect will be much different.

I haven't really experimented with the mission design tools to see whether they can replicate that, maybe given with a assault orders, take away the ATGMs so the HINDs don't deviate or get distracted by trying to shoot at individual targets. One problem though is the HINDs may not shoot rockets unless they identify a specific unit, so they'll just fly in and out again without firing. Maybe suppression fire orders would stop that behvior and just let them suppress a marked area. The alternative, which I think would be better- have an explicit type of artillery support called Helicopter Strike where once the player calls it like it's done now with an airstrike or artillery, except the helicopters physically materialze- once that happens, they are not under player control, they pass in and out of the area without player instructions.