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The Possibility of additional air power.


Marko

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There is partly a matter of scenario design. I think it's often the case that scenario designers assign too much artillery to platoon or company level Red units like M1 Tank Platoon did. This might be either done to make Red side a challenge or to promote the idea that Red usually has an advantage in artillery. Even where this is the case, it tends to be more at say a regiment level or above where that really comes in, OPFOR units tended to be more pure, more lean, more spare without as much expected support at such a low level. Similarly, Soviet independent helicopter regiments wouldn't necessarily be employed as air support for platoons but would throw a lot of helicopters at you once, used like mobile artillery, swarms of HINDS would be used to saturate an area with rockets. They are easy in most scenarios to pick off with aimed direct fire, because there's usually only one or two and they're kind of trying to engage individual units from a static position.

Could Steel Beasts model a helicopter strike like offboard artillery? The mission designer might for example plot a point for eight helicopters to fly in from a random location and strafe an area- this is much different than the computer behavior of hovering, popping off rockets and missiles while generally being vulnerable. The effect will be much different.

I haven't really experimented with the mission design tools to see whether they can replicate that, maybe given with a assault orders, take away the ATGMs so the HINDs don't deviate or get distracted by trying to shoot at individual targets. One problem though is the HINDs may not shoot rockets unless they identify a specific unit, so they'll just fly in and out again without firing. Maybe suppression fire orders would stop that behvior and just let them suppress a marked area. The alternative, which I think would be better- have an explicit type of artillery support called Helicopter Strike where once the player calls it like it's done now with an airstrike or artillery, except the helicopters physically materialze- once that happens, they are not under player control, they pass in and out of the area without player instructions.

From my experiments, choopers only engage from 3km or less! :eek2:

That's in my opinion, against a MBT is reckless behavior. People say that helos are useless because they're vulnerable to air defense. Its like saying that submarines are useless because they're vulnerable when on the surface.

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Could Steel Beasts model a helicopter strike like offboard artillery?

I can't think of any rotary wing commander in any army who would employ them this way. It would be akin to suicide if the target is capable of any degree of effective air defence.

Helos are best thought of as very fast moving, highly fragile AFVs. They require the same sort of tactics as ground-based AFVs - use of cover, surprise, fire and movement, etc - but their terrain limitations are different and they can't hold ground.

In order to get the most out of a helicopter, it has to be used as a helicopter, with all the associated skills, tactics, and whatnot of any other vehicle platform. It takes skillful use to mitigate the weaknesses and accentuate the strengths of the platform. A wave of helicopters converging on a single point and flying off is pretty much the exact opposite of that.

DG

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I just got through saying the Soviet organization had independent helicopter regiments used in this way. Do you deny this? Explain why. Explain how a platoon or company leader would have direct control of helicopters as it is represented now. They could be used by front commanders to open up holes in the lines or seal off enemy penetrations as opposed to low level cas. The Hind is an assault helicopter with transport capability. They were conceived a little differently than Western attack helicopters.

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Cite an instance where they were used this way.

The issue is not that helicopters were or were not placed OPCON/OPCOM to a platoon commander, but that waves of helicopters would converge on a single point.

The Soviets liked to think big, and they liked mass, but even massed helicopters still function as a unit and are subject to unit tactics designed to minimize risks and maximize strengths.

They aren't something that materializes over the battlefield, blows the crap out of a target, then disperse; they have to assemble, manoeuvre, strike, and retire just like any other vehicle and at every point during that sequence they are vulnerable to the appropriate weapon system used appropriately.

You might as well wish for a tank division that beams in from space, strikes, and beams away.

The only weapon system that strikes with impunity is long-range artillery, and even that is debatable when you start talking counter-battery radar and counter-fires (another degree of complexity not currently modeled and far outside the scope of SB)

Ditto the CAS airstrike - and ditto that CAS is nominally subject to risk from MANPADs and longer-range AD assets.

The only way to ensure 100% total accuracy and fidelity is to model everything and not only would that greatly increase the complexity of the sim, it would increase the complexity and breadth of skillset to play it. You'd need a battle group HQ with all the specialists to get it right, or you'd need the AI to be able to reflect that kind of expertise - and the AI right now, as good as it is in some respects, isn't the equal of a good crew commander, never mind a G staff.

Frankly, I'm very much OK with the current abstractions. Artillery is modeled in such a way that the call for fire and adjustment procedures are very good (with a couple of minor niggles like beaten zones in RL are not square) from the tactical level. Sure, battery/tube management is largely abstracted away, but a platoon commander doesn't need to worry about where his fire is coming from so long as the volume, type, and target are correct - there is no need to model the Regimental HQ or the FSCC managing fires. If the volume is too high, that's a scenario design problem, not a sim problem.

Airstrikes too are just where they need to be - a tactical airstrike is possible, and it represents an aircraft getting local superiority and/or a hole in the SAM coverage just long enough to get a strike in, without needing to model the entire air war, the AD plan, and/or the ACC. Too many airstrikes is again a scenario design problem, not a sim accuracy problem.

And I think it is clear that the helos are pretty much where they need to be too. They can be used as troop carriers very realistically. They can be used as recce or overwatch reasonably realistically (I know some hotrod Kiowa pilots form the Germany days who might object that they were far better than the sim pilots, and that's probably true) The attack helos are not really all that useful, but I'm 100% OK with that, because useful attack helos require useful AD assets to counter them, and that starts us down the spiral towards a helicopter sim and an AD sim and now I need to call my buddies in the AD artillery to help plan a friggin combat team attack.

No thanks.

DG

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I'm with Captain_Colossus on this one. Soviet Rotary wing attack can absolutely be used in this manner, massed attacks on a known position (Assembly area, Crossing point etc.). The Hind is in most cases employed much like a fixed wing aircraft in its profiles due to A) its avionics B) Weapon systems and C) Flight performance which is not stellar at the hover. Yes, these are coldwar tactics, but I'm pretty sure the M60 and the Cent are cold war vehicles.. should we remove them because we don't do historical battles?

I think the offmap hinds are a workable idea. They still can be engaged by AFV/AD while on the map, and helps alleviate the need to path them around the place. What really needs a look at is thier attack profiles, ie a point can be designated and the hind will pop up and AGTM/rocket anything around said point during it's attack run and then egress out of AD range as soon as possible rather than hovering in place blasting off precision pairs of rockets at things. Workable? I don't know, but it would make situation a bit more realistic.

Currently the RBS70 in SB clobbers most helos pretty damn quick (Go RBS70, go!). Is there any chance of seeing it paired with a bushmaster Ssnake? Might help you ship a few more units..

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Cite an instance where they were used this way.

The issue is not that helicopters were or were not placed OPCON/OPCOM to a platoon commander, but that waves of helicopters would converge on a single point.

The Soviets liked to think big, and they liked mass, but even massed helicopters still function as a unit and are subject to unit tactics designed to minimize risks and maximize strengths.

They aren't something that materializes over the battlefield, blows the crap out of a target, then disperse; they have to assemble, manoeuvre, strike, and retire just like any other vehicle and at every point during that sequence they are vulnerable to the appropriate weapon system used appropriately.

You might as well wish for a tank division that beams in from space, strikes, and beams away.

The only weapon system that strikes with impunity is long-range artillery, and even that is debatable when you start talking counter-battery radar and counter-fires (another degree of complexity not currently modeled and far outside the scope of SB)

Ditto the CAS airstrike - and ditto that CAS is nominally subject to risk from MANPADs and longer-range AD assets.

The only way to ensure 100% total accuracy and fidelity is to model everything and not only would that greatly increase the complexity of the sim, it would increase the complexity and breadth of skillset to play it. You'd need a battle group HQ with all the specialists to get it right, or you'd need the AI to be able to reflect that kind of expertise - and the AI right now, as good as it is in some respects, isn't the equal of a good crew commander, never mind a G staff.

Frankly, I'm very much OK with the current abstractions. Artillery is modeled in such a way that the call for fire and adjustment procedures are very good (with a couple of minor niggles like beaten zones in RL are not square) from the tactical level. Sure, battery/tube management is largely abstracted away, but a platoon commander doesn't need to worry about where his fire is coming from so long as the volume, type, and target are correct - there is no need to model the Regimental HQ or the FSCC managing fires. If the volume is too high, that's a scenario design problem, not a sim problem.

Airstrikes too are just where they need to be - a tactical airstrike is possible, and it represents an aircraft getting local superiority and/or a hole in the SAM coverage just long enough to get a strike in, without needing to model the entire air war, the AD plan, and/or the ACC. Too many airstrikes is again a scenario design problem, not a sim accuracy problem.

And I think it is clear that the helos are pretty much where they need to be too. They can be used as troop carriers very realistically. They can be used as recce or overwatch reasonably realistically (I know some hotrod Kiowa pilots form the Germany days who might object that they were far better than the sim pilots, and that's probably true) The attack helos are not really all that useful, but I'm 100% OK with that, because useful attack helos require useful AD assets to counter them, and that starts us down the spiral towards a helicopter sim and an AD sim and now I need to call my buddies in the AD artillery to help plan a friggin combat team attack.

No thanks.

DG

Look at page 17 of the the paper Scrapper posted- it reiterates what I've been saying, it's not exactly news that the helicopter forces were conceived this way, I thought. So you've never heard of it? Ok, what makes you think I'm just making it up if you haven't? This is what it states-

"Generally [the attack helicopters] augment artillery fires in defensive situations and may even replace artillery in fast paced offensive operations. CAS has traditionally been carried out by fixed wing aircraft; However, in the Soviet army, helicopters are preferred to fixed-wing aircraft."

Whether that makes sense to your conception of them really isn't relevant, the evidence is there that is how they regarded them. That's kind of the idea of this paper, that NATO wasn't possibly prepared for this.

It's kind of implied that an organization such as an independent helicopter regiment would open up these possibilities- for strikes available to higher echelon commanders, to assault rear objectives, to punch holes in the lines or to respond to enemy penetrations.

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I think however that the concept would have gone right out of the window after the first attempt - or, wait, this is the army: After the first dozen attempts. I think it was developed at a time when the majority of forces were not equipped with laser range finders and computerized lead calculation. If all that the ground units have are cal .50 and 7.62mm MGs plus 20 and 25mm HE without LRFs and lead assistance, you can substitute stealth with velocity. Once that you must expect a missile threat along the entire flight path (for a deep incursion) and a SAM and AAA threat for a substantial part of the front line you can HOPE to suppress much of it with massive artillery strikes immediately prior - and after - your helicopter strafing runs (but a deep incursion is no longer possible).

Whether you can actually achieve such good coordination so that the artillery doesn't endanger your own helicopters, but doesn't leave too big of a time gap for the ground forces to recover, is an open question.

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To be sure, anything and everything could have went out the window, the whole thing had a high chance of going nuclear anyway, throwing conventional plans out the window. Either the Soviets would open up with tactical nukes, or they would resort to them if progress wasn't so good and NATO were fencing them off. If they were getting too sucessful before NATO could bring in reinforcements, NATO might have had to use nuclear weapons. Nothing is for sure, but that's not my point. All theories about war are rendered moot if that's the case. Look at this way- I would probably not use them if they were getting shot down like they can be in Steel Beasts. That tends to be because of just the way they are not being massed, the way they hover dangerously around trying to engage individual targets- they often just get picked off piecemeal when they do that.

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We don't have to look at the worst possible development at the strategic level. I'm just looking at the concept or massed helicopter attacks in lieu of jet based close air support as stipulated in the Soviet doctrine that you cited.

I'm just saying, the concept wasn't outright stupid at the time when it was developed, under the conditions of the time when it was developed (ca. 1975). Fifteen years later the concept was already questionable, and another ten years later it would be suicidal. The game changer are the computerization of IFVs, equipping them with laser range finders, and with bigger gun calibers. Especially with programmable air burst munitions the threat level is further elevated.

Likewise, tanks with laser range finders and lead assistance have reasonable chances to hit targets with about two or three rounds, especially in head-on or hover engagements.

Even if you take away all that, the concept hinges on the ability to coordinate the air attack so closely with the artillery strikes (before and after) that it requires a high degree of sophistication and training level. It is doubtful that these conditions would always have been a given in, say, 1980 or 1985.

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My thoughts on air power in SB is that it should be a reminder of the various dangers on the battlefield or a possible value in the equation. It's not the focus but it should be there and be fiddled with, improved and expanded from time to time.

In short: As long as there are ADA in various forms in the sim there should be an air power threat.

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There certainly are fine helicopter simulations on the market. I just wonder if they aren't suffering from the same necessity to simplify things in order to keep both the simulation effort manageable and to not overwhelm the player.

It may reflect my ignorance, but from what I've seen in YouTube videos I'm missing elements like all-arms air defense with small caliber/high volume of fire, and MANPADs may also be a bit underrepresented. Likewise I haven't seen the necessity for target discrimination - that is, a mix of combatants and noncombatants, or that ground forces utilize the terrain and camouflage to their maximum extent; you can't engage with missiles if trees are in the way, it seems that AAA units have always switched their radars on, etc.

There are good and valid reasons for each of these design decisions. Yet, in their combination, they suggest that helicopters are more potent than they may be in a more balanced, all-encompassing simulation. I'm the first to admit that modern helicopters have lots of gizmos that are true force multipliers and enable them to perform attackes under adverse conditions. But just as Steel Beasts focuses on the ground forces as its simulation subject, those helicopter simulations by necessity have a tilt that favors the entertainment value of virtual combat helicopter flight.

That is not to say that the damage models or weapon performance data aren't right. The question is whether in the scenarios presented the threat density is realistic, and the targets are showing proper survival instincts. It is here where I am a bit skeptical.

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We don't have to look at the worst possible development at the strategic level. I'm just looking at the concept or massed helicopter attacks in lieu of jet based close air support as stipulated in the Soviet doctrine that you cited.

I'm just saying, the concept wasn't outright stupid at the time when it was developed, under the conditions of the time when it was developed (ca. 1975). Fifteen years later the concept was already questionable, and another ten years later it would be suicidal. The game changer are the computerization of IFVs, equipping them with laser range finders, and with bigger gun calibers. Especially with programmable air burst munitions the threat level is further elevated.

Likewise, tanks with laser range finders and lead assistance have reasonable chances to hit targets with about two or three rounds, especially in head-on or hover engagements.

Even if you take away all that, the concept hinges on the ability to coordinate the air attack so closely with the artillery strikes (before and after) that it requires a high degree of sophistication and training level. It is doubtful that these conditions would always have been a given in, say, 1980 or 1985.

I don't necessaily disgree here- I can't really know when this no longer applies. I don't if CIS states have moved into a more Western mentality with modern attack helicopters or they if they follow a mix of the 'old way' and a 'new way.'

But the evidence up until the 1980s at least, that option was available to Soviet commanders. The reason I say all this now is 1) for historical value, and 2), potentially I think that this would close the gap a bit when other users state the helos, the Mi-24 in particular is very vulnerable. That's why- because instead of moving in fast and attacking in the same stroke, the automated behavior is usually that they stop, hover to shoot. That's what makes them get picked off or chased off. Again, the paper Scrapper posted advances the proposition: "Hover fire is not currently a normal delivery technique used by Soviet attack helicopters (pg.20)". I think this follows from what the strengths of the Soviet Hind was- its speed and its ability to deliver a huge amount of ordinance violently if not so much accurately. Furthermore, if you were a Soviet commander, and a NATO unit had broken out and started heading deep into a soft sector, would you say to yourself, "I have my helicopters, which I can use to savage this unit at least until I can stabilize the situation," or just say, "Nope, that's it, I have no answer to this." Also, an 'Helicopter Strike' as a type of artillery support mission would obviate this idea that a tank leader on the ground could directly coperate the helicopters during a mission as if by remote control.

Your military customers probably aren't interested, yeah, I can see that. The original purpose was to provide an air target.

Edited by Captain_Colossus
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from what I've seen in YouTube videos I'm missing elements like all-arms air defense with small caliber/high volume of fire, and MANPADs may also be a bit underrepresented. Likewise I haven't seen the necessity for target discrimination - that is, a mix of combatants and noncombatants, or that ground forces utilize the terrain and camouflage to their maximum extent; you can't engage with missiles if trees are in the way, it seems that AAA units have always switched their radars on, etc.

You're pretty much spot on when it comes to Black Shark. The helo's systems are modeled to a very high degree. But the environment/AI is seriously lacking.

you can't engage with missiles if trees are in the way

Add to that the fact that the trees aren't even "solid." That is to say, you can actually fly right through them unharmed. (?)

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There certainly are fine helicopter simulations on the market. I just wonder if they aren't suffering from the same necessity to simplify things in order to keep both the simulation effort manageable and to not overwhelm the player.

It may reflect my ignorance, but from what I've seen in YouTube videos I'm missing elements like all-arms air defense with small caliber/high volume of fire, and MANPADs may also be a bit underrepresented. Likewise I haven't seen the necessity for target discrimination - that is, a mix of combatants and noncombatants, or that ground forces utilize the terrain and camouflage to their maximum extent; you can't engage with missiles if trees are in the way, it seems that AAA units have always switched their radars on, etc.

There are good and valid reasons for each of these design decisions. Yet, in their combination, they suggest that helicopters are more potent than they may be in a more balanced, all-encompassing simulation. I'm the first to admit that modern helicopters have lots of gizmos that are true force multipliers and enable them to perform attackes under adverse conditions. But just as Steel Beasts focuses on the ground forces as its simulation subject, those helicopter simulations by necessity have a tilt that favors the entertainment value of virtual combat helicopter flight.

That is not to say that the damage models or weapon performance data aren't right. The question is whether in the scenarios presented the threat density is realistic, and the targets are showing proper survival instincts. It is here where I am a bit skeptical.

But how can you separate tanks from helicopters? Imagine a helo sim without tanks when even a sim without proper modelled tanks is absolutely out of reason. What rational nation nowadays would send tanks into battle without proper air support?

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