Tac Error

I'm not an expert, but if you have access to the "Journal of Slavic Military Studies" (formerly the "Journal of Soviet Military Studies"), there is an article by Fritz Stoeckli (one of the West's best specialists in Soviet correlation of forces and means calculations in the late 1980s) titled "The Correlation of Forces and Success in Overcoming Anti-Tank Defenses" which analyses Kardashevskii's data and calculations.

The original source is an article published in the Soviet tactical journal "Voyenniy Vestnik/Military Herald" by Yu. Kardashevskiy in July 1979.

By the end of the Cold War, the main military threat to the Soviet Union was from Western microchips, not Western tanks or jets. The USSR's conventional military forces were all well and good for fighting the sort of mechanized industrial wars that would have happened if the Cold War went hot in Europe, '45-'89, but as figures like Ogarkov foretold in the mid-'80s, the Soviet military and economic-technical base was ill-prepared to compete in the next round of the military arms race. That next round was a shift from large-scale mechanized forces to automated command & control systems and what Soviet theorists termed "reconnaissance-strike complexes". (Something like a closed-loop link between a dedicated reconnaissance asset and a firing unit, or example JSTARS) On that new technology though, I do recall the posts of a retired officer over at Armchair General forums, who said that the numbers and depth of those new technologies was too thin even in 1991.

Tour of the Chieftain in 1991: gWY2eLzVrU8

Generally, Soviet artillery operates differently, (For example, the commanders of artillery units are forward in mobile command observation posts *directing* the fires instead of "calls for fire" from FOs) but I don't know if SB can model such a system.

A total rewrite. It's not widely available being a draft, but you might be able to find it in various U.S. Army schools, training centers or university libraries. (Such as Stanford or the Fort Leavenworth Combined Arms Research Library)

Adding another reference to AKM's suggestions, I can suggest James Holcomb's study on Soviet artillery if you are like me and have trouble finding a copy of Bellamy's book not being sold at ludicrous prices. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a216371.pdf

An issue of Red Thrust Star had an article on meeting engagements you guys might find interesting, linked below: http://nara-wayback-001.us.archive.org/peth04/20041020015617/http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/red-star/issues/JUL94/JUL94.HTML#Military%20sciences I would note, reading the article that references to precision-guided weapons and "future/modern battle" was part of Ogarkov's legacy to the Soviet Army when they tried to deal with the theater war in the information age, and so that stuff might not apply for 1980s scenarios. The 1984 edition of FM 100-2-1 has been widely referred to, but one author of the 1990 revision on another forum called it a "stereotyped, misleading, and woefully incomplete view of the subject", so I wouldn't rely on it that much.

Here in the West at least, there's a lot of uncertainty on exactly what is "operational art". Is it grand tactics, minor strategy, or perhaps something else? The 1986 edition of FM 100-5 calls operational art as "the employment of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations". Soviet specialist Charles Dick put it as "the business of successfully combining the combat activities of a large number of forces over a significant area of space and time in order to accomplish all or part of a strategic goal." It's interesting to see how operational art is interpreted in the West, but IMO it can get a little convoluted.

What to a NATO officer is just a dirt path through a forest is to a Soviet, almost as much of a "road" is as a highway, and therefore just as much as a candidate for a regimental strike sector. If a NATO officer in planning his defense believes that a Soviet unit will be channeled along open valleys because the flanking wooded hills constitute an obstacle "on account of their lack of roads", then he might be in for an unpleasant surprise... :wink:

"Tactics is the theoretical and practical aspects of preparation for the conduct of combat by the subunits, units, and formations of the various services of the Armed Forces, the combat arms, and the combat service support troops." From the U.S. Air Force translation of the 1984 edition of Taktika. "The theory and practice of the preparation and combat employment of subunits, units, and formations." From the Dictionary of Military Terms via James Sterrett's Report on Soviet Tactics.

Take a look at the "Non-Linear Combat" study I posted earlier. It provides some tactical examples of bronegruppa employment at the battalion level. Very true. The "good" commanders would be assigned to command battalion-size divisional forward detachments, combined arms battalions of Unified Army Corps and battalions as part of operational maneuver groups. The "who were not as good" majority were probably familiar with the tactics and techniques, but would not carry them out due to a lack in ability and only operate as part of a regiment.

The search for ways to provide battalion and company commanders on the future, non-linear battlefield with more maneuver was one of the primary reasons why the bronegruppa concept was developed, not manpower problems. Though manpower in itself is something that the 40th Army needed to address in counterinsurgency. The Bear Went over the Mountain says that units had to be filled in excess of 100% to operate in Afghanistan.

Commanders of forward detachments and operational maneuver groups, plus their subordinates were fully expected to function with dubious contact with higher command echelons. Even then, OMGs and foward detachments had missions outlined by higher commanders in a broad directive rather than detailed orders. The Soviet definition of initiative is "intelligent anticipation, or at least correct interpretation, of the higher intent, and effective implementation of it without detailed guidance; it is also the ability, and the farsighted, flexible organization of the combined arms grouping, to reat speedily, without waiting for direction, to meet unexpected changes in the operational/tactical situation." Here are some more reading sources if you're interested: "Emerging Soviet Doctrine: Implications for the U.S. Task Force Defense" http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA208043 "The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan" http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA316729 "Initiative Soviet Style" by Major Richard N. Armstrong (page 20 in the PDF) http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p124201coll1/id/277/rec/7 And to see where the Soviets were heading in the 21st century, look here: Soviet Non-Linear Combat: The Challenge of the 90s: http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA231789

Well the general answer would be, "it depends". In divisional and army-level forward detachments, and operational maneuver groups, the battalion may very well be a "unit" in practice due to their need for more independence. Also, in the 1980s there were experimental "new army corps" consisting of brigades made up of combined arms battalions. These corps were tailored for the role as front operational maneuver groups and certainly would've required the same experienced commanders Allen was talking about. To top it all off, here's the paper "The Soviet Combined Arms Battalion - Reorganization for Tactical Flexibility" from the Soviet Army Studies Office. http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA216368 But it's also worth noting that the Soviet definition of "initiative" is not our Western one. There was a good, non-stereotypical article written by Richard N. Armstrong in Military Review, I gotta find it again...