Iarmor

Merkava 1 saw combat in Lebanon in 1982 and later, until they were taken out of active service around 1985. One example is the battle of Jezzine, where Israeli armor school Merkava 1s, Centurions and M60A1s fought Syrian T-62s.

At the initial phase of the 1973 war, the Syrian forces broke through the IDF southern sector defenses and managed to reach as near as 6-7 kms from the Kinneret lake, near Kanaf. They also reached El-Al, Katzabiya and Nafakh. Before their were destroyed by the arriving Israeli reserves, the Syrian force of the 47th armored brigade excitingly radioed their HQ that they can see Tiberias on the western bank of the lake. By the end of the war, in addition to all the territory it lost, the IDF also took the territory between the Hermon mountain top, Mizraat Beit Jann, Tell Shams, Tell Maree, Tell Antar, Tell Al-Mal, Tell Maskhara and Umm-Bootna. "Tell" means a volcanic hill. The original Israeli goal was to reach Kanakir, in order to put the outskirts of Damascus in the range of the M50 howitzers (French-made 155mm howitzers on Sherman chassis), but the arrival of the Iraqi armor to the Israeli southern flank made Israel settle on shelling Damascus Al-Maza airbase and other nearby bases with M107s from Mizraat Beit Jann (the control tower took a direct hit). The book "Inside Israel's Northern Command: The Yom Kippur War on the Syrian border" by Dani Asher is recommended for anyone interested. Israeli and Syrian forces kept exchanging fire until June 1974, when a disengagement agreement was signed and a UN-manned buffer zone was created. Israeli forces leaving Tell Shams on June 18th, 1974:

Some other reserve Centurion-equipped armored brigade was re-equipped with Merkava back in 1996. A movie was produced celebrating the transition and 25 years of the brigade's existence. In the following part of the movie, the old Centurions and the new Merkavas can be seen between 1:55-9:50:

Last deployment was in 2002, the official retirement ceremony in 2003 AFAIK. 1959-2003, a long service indeed. The M60 saw a similarly long service with the IDF, 1970-2014.

Farewell to the Centurion: last Israeli reserve Centurion unit being re-equipped with Merkava, after one last operational deployment in Ghaza, late 2002.

A Syrian T-55AMV launches a Bastion missile on a target, from a position on Tell Alaqiya (Tell is a volcanic hill): These Syrian T-55AMVs are interesting beasts BTW, Tell Alaqiya (the NW hill) and the nearby Tell Antar (the SE hill) were the sites of major armor battles between Israeli and Iraqi forces during the 1973 war.

They keep the pin in its place. Don't know how are they called in English.

The main effort of the trials in Israel was to improve the Chieftain's mechanical reliability and performance. Air filters, engine, brakes, etc. But also firing, NBC protection and other stuff. Indeed the British were also very interested in the Soviet-made vehicles Israel captured in 1967 (not just the knocked-out ones).

The rocky terrain's effect on the rubber track pads was the reason for the replacement of the M60's original tracks with the Merkava tracks. During the 60s-70s, the Israeli M48/60s saw action mostly on the yellow sand dunes of Sinai, where the T97 tracks did well, while Centurions were deployed to the basaltic Golan height. The need to replace the rubber tracks first arose in the early 80s, when a M60A1 brigade spent large amounts of T142 track pads while training in the Golan for operation in Lebanon. Starting in the mid-80s, the Merkava tracks were initially fitted to M60s and then also to some of the M60A1s.

I think it is worth to add the engagement range to the engagement description in the AAR's playback control panel. It would help to explain the damage caused by KE rounds. Additionally, I wonder whether it would be possible to count the rounds fired at a certain target (including misses) and include the round counting in the engagement description as well.

The Israeli 14th armored brigade plan map for the October 15th-16th night assault near the Chinese Farm, taken from the 87th armored reconnaissance battalion's website: The large pink egg, where the Egyptian 16th and 21st divisions symbols are, is "Missouri". The small pink circle to the south of "Missouri" is "Amir", the Chinese Farm buildings area. The small pink circle to the east of "Missouri" is "Televizia" stronghold. The small pink egg, east to the Israeli 600th armored brigade symbol, is "Hamadia". Forces and missions, by order of movement (in short, of course): 1. 87th armored reconnaissance battalion (reserve, 22 M60A1s, originally subordinate to the 143rd armored division): navigate and lead the brigade, take "Matzmed" strongholds and the eastern bank. 2. 79th armored battalion (active, 22 M48s, originally from the 401st armored brigade): head north, take the eastern bank west of "Lexicon" road. 3. 184th armored battalion (active, 21 M48s, 14th armored brigade's only original battalion): head north, take the area east of "Lexicon" road up to southern "Missouri". 4. 407th armored battalion (reserve, 22 M60A1s, originally from the 600th armored brigade): open "Akavish" and "Tirtur" roads from SW to NE. 5. 424th reconnaissance battalion (active, originally subordinate to the southern command) + 5 M60A1s of the 407th: clear the east bank after the 87th. 6. "Shmulik" Force (two companies from the 35th paratroopers brigade) + 4 M60A1s of the 407th: clear "Tirtur" road after the 407th, clear "Amir" after the 184th. 7. 582nd reconnaissance brigade (reserve, originally from the 317th paratroopers brigade): reach "Lakekan" stronghold, on the Bitter Lake's shore, as the brigade's reserve. The 14th armored brigade's CO (1 M48) followed the 87th and spent much time on the front with the 79th and 184th. The 600th armored brigade (reserve, M60A1s) assaulted "Televizia" in order to cover the 14th armored brigade's assault.

Operation Raviv was a somewhat similar operation, that took place (unlike the 1973 planning) on September 9th 1969. The single paint scheme was still OK back then. Major differences between the two operations were the theater and the crossing platform: the 1973 planning called for crossing the 180-meters-wide Suez canal on Egyptian bridges, while during operation Raviv the AFVs were transported across the Suez Gulf of the Red Sea by Qishon-class landing ships. The ships took them from Ras Sudr to a location 25 kms north of Ras Abu Daraj and then after some 10 hours took them back to Sinai (to Abu Zneima) from a location north of Ras Zaafrana. The main targets were the marine radar at Ras Abu Daraj and the air defence radar at Ras Zaafrana. During the 1973 war, there were some more un-executed plannings for the Suez Gulf theater as well. T-54s, PT-76s and BTR-50s were supposed to be used.

This thread reminds me an interesting story from the 1973 war: Around October 10-11th, the IDF southern command considered sending a special force, including a T-54 (1967 war booty, already with 105 mm guns) company repainted back in Egyptian colors, to cross the canal on an Egyptian bridge, destroy some targets and then cross back to Sinai on another Egyptian bridge near the pier stronghold (Maoz hamezach, "Masrek"), in order to assist the extraction of the besieged Israeli troops there. The operation was aborted as it was too risky. When the T-54s were repainted back in IDF colors, someone noticed a dangerous mistake - during the preparations for the operation, the T-54s were painted in the 1967 sand yellow, while the up-to-date Egyptian scheme was the new 3-tone camouflage. Luckily the Egyptians didn't get the chance to ID the wrong paint scheme (or the 105 mm guns). BTW, the operation CO was supposed to be Ehud Barak, who served mostly with the SF up to 1973, but also experienced commanding a M48 company in Sinai around 1970-1971. Barak rushed back to Israel from his studies in the US when the war broke out and established a M48 battalion. He was pulled out of his battalion for this operation and came back to it when the operation was canceled. Later on the battalion fought on the Chinese farm and Suez city battles.

For 1973, the common Egyptian tank camouflage was a 3-tone scheme (sand yellow, brown and black) like in this file. Also in the following video, from 1:12 to the end: For 1967 it was just sand yellow.

When enemy infantry are so close, driving forward and running over them can be better than driving backwards.

Reporters were present almost from the beginning on both fronts. For example:

BTW, the footage from 0:08 to 0:22 is from the Golan, not from Sinai. The graffiti on the M113's front says "express to Damascus".

A chapter from the book "Fire" by Yuval Neria, describing the battle against the crossing Egyptian forces near Qantara during the opening of the 1973 war. See the video thread:

Were there any ATGM hits on Leopards in Afghanistan? I don't remember ever reading about ATGM use in Afghanistan against NATO nor against the Soviets. I wonder why the locals didn't get a significant supply of TOWs in addition to the Stingers during the 80's.

Tanks numbered 109### by the IDF are war booty captured during the 1967 war and accepted into service. Early on the 1973 war, tank no. 109121, that served with the 9th armor battalion at the northern sector of the Suez canal (near Qantara), took a RPG hit to its engine and remained in Egyptian-held territory. Somehow it reached the US. The tank is presented with APFSDS rounds which didn't exist at the time: As for Yuval Neria: when the war broke out he served as the K company XO in the 9th armor battalion. It is not mentioned explicitly whether 109121 was his own original tank. Neria kept fighting while replacing tanks multiple times. For a while he crewed a tank manned solely by officers, which were all killed (and posthumously decorated) at "Makhshir" (Katib el-Kheil) on October 8th, shortly after Neria left that tank in order to command another (which was also hit during the same battle). On October 9th Neria established a tank company which notably participated one of the major October 14th armor battles, near "Hamadia" versus the Egyptian 21st armored division. Eventually he was badly injured north of the Chinese farm on October 18th. During the 1982 war, Neria commanded a reserve M48 battalion which saw little fighting south of Sultan Yacoub.

Footage from the Golan height taken during the 1973 war: Halftracks, Centurions, M-50 Shermans and T-62s (from Syria's 1st armored division) are seen between 0:25-1:15 and from 2:40 on. Looks like the central sector (Hushniya area) around October 10th.

Sometimes absorption of war booty can be very quick, but in most cases tanks captured in one mission are not used immediately on the next mission at the same area by the same force who captured them, unless that force already has the knowledge to operate that specific tank model (for example: Syrian rebels who operate a captured tank which they know from their former military service). When absorbing unfamiliar enemy tanks into service, it should take some time to organize the formation: recover (after your own damaged vehicles), fix (with no manual), repaint and mass (from several battlefields) enough usable tanks (at least a company), train crews (again no manual), recover and mass enough ammunition, etc. On the other hand, the absorption of captured soft-skins (and maybe APCs) may be much faster. During the 1973 war, the first T-62s were pressed into Israeli service on October 9th, 3 days after the war had started. A picture gallery taken in a 1973 war booty lot can be seen here. I think that use of enemy vehicles should remain as an option for the mission designer, regardless whether the mission is a part of a campaign or whether any vehicles were captured during the previous mission.

Being able to capture intact enemy vehicles is a great idea IMO. I think the user should get extra points for capturing non-destroyed, deserted vehicles (and POWs). There should be several options for vehicle crew behavior when things go bad: fight to the death, surrender, orderly retreat (with or without the vehicle) or flee. However, capturing an enemy vehicle and using it in the same battle is very rare. I think that use of enemy vehicles should remain as an option for the mission design phase, as those vehicles should represent war booty from an earlier battle.