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Breakthrough7

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About Breakthrough7

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  1. That's a hilarious metaphor for an FOs existence. In the same vein there's a narrow 'passage' inside the Bradley located behind the driver and between the turret and left side armor called the 'hell hole.' Spent a lot of time when I was younger stuffed into the hell hole as an afterthought.
  2. - Immediate Suppression functionality (mixed fuse/fast CFF to splash/lower percentage of effective rounds on target/grey out options to prevent player from modifying target dimensions, ROF and tube numbers etc). - Fire Missions generated by friendly AI (and other party members) during execution phase to be displayed in the Fire Mission Drop Down List and be cancelable. - Fire Missions initiated by units that have been designated as having Priority status by the scenario designer to be processed and executed with the same or similar speed as Fire Missions called on Priority Target Reference points. -M795 HE side note; noticed yesterday while browsing the manual that eSim *might be working on Illumination, which was excellent to see.
  3. Adding to the above; Infantry killed by On-Map Mortars, Howitzers, and MLRS, are not credited to the Firing Unit/Vehicle/Mortar team in the report file.
  4. I like the large maps in DCS, I love being able to theoretically integrate naval surface fire support, and air, with CA ground operations, but that's about it for my part. I don't like the editor. The damage model is iffy. The terrain isn't great for ground troops. I don't like the spotting/fog of war options, the map view and UI for executing control over large numbers bugs me, the optics and fire control systems bugs me; and things that are simple in most wargames are not so simple in DCS, dismounting/mounting troops from vehicles for example.
  5. These are the readily available references I would recommend reading to all interested in the effects of ICM (DP&AP); 3rd Infantry Division AAR (OIF1) https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2003/3id-aar-jul03.pdf ICM: Bridging the Capability Gap: https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1038759.pdf Operation Iraqi Freedom: Decisive War, Elusive Peace: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1214/RAND_RR1214.pdf US Marines in Iraq 2003: Anthology and Annotated Bibliography: https://www.usmcu.edu/Portals/218/Anthology and Bib.pdf Between those 4 reports, there are numerous battle damage assessments and AARs like these: ------------------------------------------------------------ There's no shortage of reasons to decline the use of ICM, and really there needs to be widespread implementation of purpose built anti-armor rounds, picking up where the incredibly effective SADARM left off. However, in OIF 1, DPICM target engagement criteria was heavily restricted, and as a result clever FDCs chose to take advantage of improvements in FISTs ability to provide accurate grids, and successfully engaged armor with HE, converged sheaf over traditional sheafs that would have compensated for poor TLE by spreading the love, but potentially reduce the exposure or probability of direct hits on hard material targets like tanks (hence why DPICM would normally have been preferred). It was in my opinion totally unreasonable for the author of the NYTimes DPICM piece to cite as evidence of DPICMs ineffectiveness, the decision to not use DPICM in the Balkans during the 90s, while ignoring the numerous successful uses in Iraq 2003.
  6. @stormrider_sp That excerpt is from page 271 of 'CERTAIN VICTORY: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War' By General Robert Scales. You can find a downloadable PDF here: https://web.archive.org/web/20170215223727/http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/csipubs/certainvictory.pdf There's a lot in the book that's relevant to the questions you brought up in the fire support thread.
  7. I know for a fact that the author of the NYTimes piece spent a lot of time researching for the article, and I've noticed he's engaged with some artillery circles. That said; he devotes an awful lot of time and words to debunking myth (specifically that Iraqis surrendered en masse because of DPICM thus bestowing the title steel rain rather than the myriad of reasons that preceded the ground war) that no serious artilleryman considers fact, or even considers at all beyond tongue in cheek instances of expressing espirit de corps. Secondly he unilaterally declares DPICM ineffective, stating "In many cases, they failed to work as advertised. They were supposed to be able to destroy Soviet armored vehicles, with small armor-piercing warheads. But the attack on the First Armored Unit shows that the DPICMs not only failed to destroy Bradley Fighting Vehicles; they also failed to destroy the troop’s unarmored Chevrolet S.U.V.s — even those that took more than one direct hit." Referring to this incident mentioned earlier in the article: "That document also misattributed a mass-fratricide bomblet attack on a unit of the First Armored Division to enemy fire. It correctly states that one American cavalry troop suffered at least 23 wounded when howitzers fired cluster shells at them; however, in a 2017 interview with The Times, the squadron operations officer at the time, Mark Hertling, now a retired lieutenant general, says he believes it was friendly fire that wounded his soldiers. Hertling himself was awarded a Purple Heart for shrapnel wounds he suffered in that incident." This is how the incident was described at the time: Now assuming General Hertling's recently re-imagined version, where the enemy fire that earned him his purple heart was actually *friendly fire* and his recollection at the time of 100 bomblets is correct-- that would mean maybe 2 rounds of 155mm DPICM yet sustained 23 casualties, five destroyed trucks, a damaged Bradley, and two damaged command vehicles. This is the only incident the author was willing to cite, in support of his DPICM is ineffective thesis, and it remains unknown whether the incident was indeed friendly fire. His second piece of evidence is to cite a theoretical dud rate, which is rather meaningless as a function of ineffectiveness. Massive amounts of additional risk, yes, critical effect on plans, yes. Last two points-- the article is remarkably devoid of any serious technical detail. There are no discussions about the relationship between armor, probabilities of hits, purpose in achieving hits, critical surface area, weight of fire, desire to overcome and spread the traditional overkill of HE. No explanation of the technical reasons to favor DPICM over another munition. Was incredibly let down by the article, which should have been an opportunity to educate the public on the weapons its military chooses to use and why.
  8. It's imperfect for sure, though in testing with Bradley's as stand-ins for Marders w/Milans, detaching the vehicle from the platoon mitigates problems associated with blanket-platoon-logic settings. It's not a 100% or even 90% solution, and it could be gamed by dismounting Milan teams, and keeping a fire team inside the vic (effectively doubling your milans), but it is a surprisingly ok solution.
  9. One ok solution for simulating the dismounting of milans from Marders if they were present would be to set the vehicle's missile launcher to --damage if (missile launcher)--unit this--is not carrying troops. And --repair if (missile launcher)--unit this--is carrying troops.
  10. Yep-- if 'allow ai to call for fire' is enabled by the scenario designer the AI can request fire from off-map artillery as well as on-map tube artillery (at the moment various self-propelled howitzers), but not rocket artillery or mortars.
  11. SEXY! Make sure to take the time to synch ya'lls movements with smokescreens! Prep known enemy positions hard, keep the artillery rate of fire low, and constant, keeping the enemy engaged at depth for the complete duration. And use the responsiveness of those mortars to hit every ATGM or infantry group that you see.
  12. @IrishHussar Your complaining has got me interested and digging into the 1st Armoured Division (UK) order of battle for The Gulf War and I'm curious if you know exactly which units are missing from the Orbat?
  13. @IrishHussar "However an incorrect post like yours" Okay killer, If it'd make life easier on you, I can edit my original post to specify in bold block letters, that this Desert Storm Wikipedia OOB shouldn't be taken as gospel but rather considered a visual aid and ancillary to the actual topic.
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