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  1. ORDERS IN PDF: BG5 TF-32 OP ANVIL HAMMER.pdf KANIUM SUNDAY 29th OF APRIL 1800 UTC “The Bears Gambit 5 - Operation Anvil Hammer” BY Nike-Ajax, Swordsman and SnS Where: Kanium TS : teamspeak3.i3d.net:10077 World Clock 1800 UTC IMPORTANT POINT: If you havent played with us before, or if it is a while ago, then please contact either @Major duck or @Swordsmandk to help you set up your Teamspeak before the day of the session - thank you. As always open to all Background: 1.Situation. a.Time: 141045ZDEC2018 b.Terrain: Wooded and patchy boggy terrain channel and delay Armd manoeuver and provide concealed AT ambush sites. Only major water obstacles designated as lake north. Heavily forested areas provide effective concealment, but will reduce overall rate of march, and can reduce observation and fields of fire to approximately 500 meters. Areas lacking heavy forestation can provide observation and fields of fire from 2-3 KM, and risk of ambush.. c.Weather: 15 degrees centigrade, wind direction SW but neglible. No Rain likely. Visibility 3000km, no affecting Aviation support. No impact on sensor capabilities. d.Vital Ground. All positions with good field of fire along the four AO´s must be cleared, so as not to leave a ENEMY unit behind that can either attack TF-32 in the rear or deflect the Attack of TF-48. It is estimated that obstacles and mines in the south along with Stay-behind units and SOF will stop and deflect the ENEMY north. e.Key Terrain. Operational area 3 and 4 provides sufficient concealment & cover to enable Russian forces to establish a SBF base to defend against our attack northeast, as well as getting flanks shots on our axis of advance. General Situation. In spite of the successes and the efforts of the TFs of JEF and other units, then the Russians have committed reserves and have slowly fought their way north and has taken Lithuania. Their do not have full control of the conquered areas as Forest Brothers/Sisters across Lithuania are fighting, supported now by US Special Forces amongst others. The Russians and their allies are paying dearly, but have for now soaked up the losses. The Russian forces have been stopped in Latvia, with a line that goes broadly from Riga in the west towards Madona, where it goes north towards Balvi. Allied units are doing a fighting, planned and orderly withdrawal to consolidate defences at Estonia. In the west then Russian and Byelorussian for a number of reasons, have chosen not to attack Poland yet. Intel including Satellite imagery and HUMINT, lead to the conclusion that the Russians will instead attempt to open a new attack vector and front by striking west towards Narva, in an effort to threaten Tallinn and thus the whole Baltic front. f.Situation Enemy Forces: 1.CoA: Six(6) days ago, Russian forces began mobilising for the expected attack on Narva, with the attack starting the day after. The fight for Narva was fierce and is in fact not over. Estonian infantry armed with AT weapons amongst other, have been mauling the Russian forces pushing through, while the Russians are using brute strength including artillery to subdue the defenders. But it seems at least a brigade of Russian troops have pushed through and are now pushing towards the secondary defence lines near Sillemäe. 2.There have been reports of Russian forces moving through Narva with heavy losses. However, seems at least a Brigade (-) have gotten through, (Vicinity Sillamäe), 12 km to our east, an area where OWN SoF have set up covert OP´s. Russian covert RECON ops have already likely to have taken place and ENY attack is likely to be rapid and part of a pre-determined plan. 3.Disposition: Composition: Russian force composition in the OA 1 - 4 SE of Sillamäe, are reported to consist of a Battalion sized element of a BTG from the 138th Guards Separate Motor Rifle Brigade; a combination of Infantry (including Snipers and ATGM teams), and armoured Recon, IFV and MBT´s. This includes BRDM-2, BTR-80, BMP-2/3 and T-72x and some T-90s as well. Russian air activity has significantly decreased in the last 12 hours, probably due to air parity and attrition. Russian AD batteries however are on high alert. h. Situation Friendly Forces. 1.JEF, host nation and other NATO forces have been activated and deployed along the border. Article V has been declared per the NATO Charter, and all forces in this AO presently operate under overall JEF command. 2.Currently, elements of the Estonian 1st Infantry Brigade are providing a Screen in Area ANVIL; reinforced with belts of mines and obstacles. Elements from JEF TF-32 and TF-48 have been detached to support the defence in the north and south. South have also been made very difficult to pass with mines and obstacles. i. Rules of Engagement. NOTHING IN THESE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT LIMITS YOUR RIGHT TO TAKE APPROPIATE ACTION TO DEFEND YOURSELF AND YOUR UNIT. A. You have the right to use force to proactively engage any and all ENY targets of opportunity. B. You are cleared to fire first on all hostile targets or targets with deemed hostile intent, including armed civilians. C. The force should be used under the circumstances and proportional to the threat. D. We are at war. Destruction of civilian property has been cleared if CO deems that there is a military value and goal in said destruction. E. All Laws of War are to be observed. j. TF-48 TASKORG; 1.TF HQ a)HQ Sect (1xLEO 2a5a2-DK, 1xCV9040-B) b)1 FOO Sect (1 x FOV90) c)1x Sustainment PLT (medic, fuel, Ammo and Recovery/Mechanic) 2.A Coy Combat Team (CT): (-) a)1 x Armoured Infantry (AI) PLT (4 x CV9035DK) b)2 x Tank PLT(4xLEO 2a5a2-DK) 3.B Coy Combat Team (CT): (-) a)2 x Armoured Infantry (AI) PLT (4 x CV9040-B) b)1 x Tank PLT(4xSTRV 122) 4.Reserve a)1 x Armoured Infantry (AI) PLT (4 x CV9035-DK) b)1 x Tank PLT(4xSTRV 122) k. T-48 Attachments and Detachments: 1.1 x Battery M109A3 ( 2x3 Tubes), with supply truck 2.1 x TUAV 3.1x Battery M1064A3 (2x3 tubes) with supply truck TF-32 MISSION 1.TF-32 is to BLOCK iot prevent further ENY advance west, and then to Rapidly Advance and counterattack through OA2 and OA 3, to Strike and Destroy ENY in place in OA 3 and OA 4. 2.BPT: - DEFEAT any Russian attack in North. - Support TF-48 Counterattack in North. 3. EXECUTION a.Extended Purpose. Counterattack and Destroy Russian attack to enable JEF and NATO forces to withdraw N and E, to facilitate possible evacuation from Estonia. b.Key Tasks 1.BLOCK ENY Adv in Area HAMMER 2.COUNTERATTACK in OA2 and OA3, within boundaries 3.DESTROY ENY in OA 3 and OA 4, within boundaries. 4.CONTROL area Vicinity PL Dagon, within boundaries 5.BPT DEFEAT ENY attack in North. 6.BPT SUPPORT TF-48 COUNTERATTACK in the North. c. End State 1.Terrain. TF-32 Control of area vicinity PL DAGON, but NO further than Limit of Exploitation. 2.Friendly: TF-32 have a minimum of 75% Operational capability. 3.Enemy: If required, Russian force DESTROYED in OA 1 through OA 4. 4.Civilian: (Secondary) Minimal collateral damage and disruption to the civilian way of life. d. Constraints 1.Laws of War – Otherwise NIL A.COM JEF Intent: Quickly establish defence vicinity PL Abel. ID Russian dispositions via mixture of TUAV & ground C/S. When ready, go on the offence in Counterattack to NE. B.CONOPS: A.SoM: Four (4) Phase operation: I.Phase 1. TF-32 deploy to assigned defensive areas (Vicinity PL Abel) and establish temp Defensive POSs. Block ENY Advance. II.Phase 2. Conduct COUNTERATTACK through OA2 and OA3 III.Phase 3. DESTROY ENY in place in OA3 and OA 4. BPT to SUPPORT TF-48 counterattack East of OBJ Anvil. IV.Phase 4. Proceed to an achieve Control of area vicinity PL Dagon. BPT DELAY any Russian Incursion Force from north. 2.SoFires: FIRES & CAS to be secondary means of engaging Russian Forces within AO & providing concealment for counterattack East. 3.Shaping Operations: ID Russian strongpoints and destroy them along OA 2 – OA 4. C.Decisive Operations: Strike and DESTROY ENY in all OAs within boundaries. D.Deception Operation: By CO TF-32´s command E.Tactical Risk: Terrain can channel OWN forces into hastily constructed ENY ambushes and Strongpoints. OWN forces can be spilt up by terrain and lack of cohesion and communication. Tasks to Subordinate Units: 1)TF-48: 1)Rapidly DEPLOY SW of Area ANVIL 2)Establish temp DEFENCE direction SOUTH, behind boundaries 3)Support TF-32 and prevent ENY advance North. 4)Counterattack around south of defensive positions in AREA ANVIL, and then advance to the NORTH and NE 5)Advance to and control area West of Sillamäe 6)BPT EMPLOY FIRES to DISRUPT Russian lead elements. 2)TF-32: 1)Rapidly DEPLOY to Area PL ABEL 2)Establish temp DEFENCE and Block ENY Advance. 3)Conduct COUNTERATTACK through OA2 and OA3 4)DESTROY ENY in place in OA3 and OA 4. BPT to SUPPORT TF-48 counterattack East of OBJ Anvil. 5)Proceed to an achieve Control of area vicinity PL Dagon. BPT DELAY any Russian Incursion Force from north. 6)BPT EMPLOY FIRES to DISRUPT Russian lead elements 3)CSS 1)Establish ASP fwd of MDA; 2)BPT resupply, recover & re-equip all TFs on order b. Coordinating Instructions: a.C2 No Change b.High Value Targets: MT-55, MT-LB/FO, BAT-2, T72x, T-90, PRP-1/3, SA-19/ZSU 23/4 c.FIRES; 5x BTY155mm Direct Spt to TFs. d.ISR; 1 Sqn 45th ISR Coy (4 x UAV) e.Sustainment: CSS to provide sustainment fwd. f.Command and Signal: a.Command: i.Succession of Command: OA, OB, A66 (TF-32), B66 (TF-32) ii.Location of Key Leaders: OA and OB with TF 32. b. Signal: i.TF HQ : 26000 ii.A Coy Combat Team (CT): (-): 46000 iii.B Coy Combat Team (CT): (-):31000
  2. Hello Everyone First and foremost, then let me start by making an excuse: I am sorry that both Intermission and next Scenario in this Campaign have been delayed. The fault is mine. The next and final Scenario will be held on Sunday the 29´th of April at the usual time of 2000 GMT+1, so 1900 GMT. Again thanks to everybody who made this work, including the people who were a part of the Session. As usually then I recommend reading the PDF This is the Game list: https://www.kanium.org/forum/viewtopic.php?p=11630#p11630 And the PDF BG Intermission 4.pdf The AAR became so huge that its impossible to post here... The Bears Gambit “I know not with what weapons World War III will be fought, but World War IV will be fought with sticks and stones.” Albert Einstein Intermission 4 By Nike-Ajax, All Rights reserved World War 3 – for generations Europeans have dreaded the words and the ideas it conjured up. Nobody really wanted it happen, but in the end, then nobody really was willing or able to stop it either. No matter what, then it is no longer just an academic concept or paper exercise. But rather it is a reality that the world in general and Europeans in particular will have to deal with, politics have failed and a military solution at least in the short perspective seems the only alternative. On the 8th of November 2018, the NATO countries invoked Article V of the NATO charter. This followed the events of the huge battle that took place east of Klaipeda and left over 100 Russian vehicles destroyed and at least 1000 Russian soldiers dead and wounded. The JEF comparatively paid a comparatively light price having lost less than 20 vehicles and 100 dead and wounded. The 1:5 ratio and huge victory, however did not quiet the few but very vocal voices calling for a full withdrawal and unilateral ceasefire. However consequently, and regardless of the tiny anti-war grouping in the west, a state of war now exists between Byelorussia and Russia on one side and NATO on the other. Or rather most of NATO, as France has declared that they have pulled themselves from the NATO command structure and refuse to be involved in what they have termed “A war of fools”. Turkey at the same time not only pulled themselves completely out of NATO, but in a move that astounded most has chosen to sign a non-aggression pact and a friendship and cooperation agreement with Russia. Turkey has stated that this is a case of “Chickens coming home to roost”, and that this is also a consequence of decades of being slighted by both NATO and EU. Regarding the latter, then it is somewhat unclear if president Erdogan was talking about Turkey or Russia. The TF´s of JEF have done well, as have all the other NATO units in the Baltic regions and other places. They have struck and they have struck hard. In the air then they – just barely - have air parity, but still have to contend with powerful Russian SAM systems including S-300, S-400 and S-500, which hampers the ability to do strike missions and CAS. They have however used this relative parity if not superiority effectively, perhaps mostly on sea. The picture that is emerging, is that Russia had been planning an all-out war, and a simultaneous attack on all the Baltic Nations, but that the actions in southern Lithuania particularly the heavy defence as well as the precipitous action that the Russians got dragged into with TF-48 and later TF-32 near Vilkaviškis, forced them to postpone the other offensives to reinforce and concentrate on their southern attack vector. In other words it seems that the war started before their preparations were complete. This is only partly good news as the same certainly can be said of the other side. Russia achieved total Strategic if not tactical surprise through the use of Maskirovka supported by applied politics in the Hybrid Battle Field. The Russian Baltic fleet based in Kaliningrad and Saint Petersburg, which had been surging and deploying in the mid- and southern Baltic Sea, was baited by the New Allies which Media have termed the Western coalition, which includes Sweden among others. Information was deliberately leaked that a massive convoy action would fight their way to Estonia to resupply and reinforce units in the Baltics. This in fact was partially true. What was not said is that this was preceded by the stealthy deployment of almost all the Diesel-electric submarines of the northern NATO countries, as well as some American Nuclear Attack Submarines, into the Area of Operations. They passed the Danish straits of the Great belt and Oresund submerged, unobserved and unopposed. At the same time the New Allies quietly concentrated SEAD, anti-sub, attack and fighter planes at airbases across the area. Concurrently with this, then USA supported by UK deployed a combined and reinforced Carrier Air Group supported by several SSNs, Norwegian fighter planes, numerous ASW planes and all of the Norwegian SSKs to the north of Norway to engage and destroy any Russian vessels or submarines trying to pass into the Atlantic or operating in the area. At the same time then the SOSUS network have come under full military control again, despite loud complaints. In a twist of irony, then the Norwegian SSKs are now operating out of the reactivated Olavsvern naval base, which used to be leased by the Norwegians to the Russians. It has been strengthened, refitted and cleared of Russian surprises including listening devices and IEDs, and is now defended by a strong Norwegian force including SAM batteries. This is a move that has been mirrored across Europe as many former military installations have been taken over or reactivated by the military again, including the Swedish naval base at Muskö. This has proven to not be without problems as many of them have been neglected for years, and many former military areas have been turned over to civilian authorities, in a post-cold war effort to exploit the so-called, but in reality fictional, “Peace dividend”. The political eagerness to shut down military installations is a move that in hindsight has now proven foolish, ill-advised and short-sighted, not to mention very expensive. The European nations are thus finding out that reactivating units and installations is not just difficult, but also a costly effort. On the 1st of December 2018 the first hammer stroke fell in the Baltics, following the Russian reaction to the very deliberately leaked information. In a very complex and well-coordinated attack, the New Allies struck with everything they had in the Air, Ground, Sea and Below sea against all Russian Vessels in the Baltics: both at sea and in Port. While the Russians expected the attack, they certainly did not expect the ferocity and scale of it. This attack was preceded by massive and simultaneous attacks on the military and civilian IT infrastructure as well as infrastructural targets by the New Allies against Russia and their allies. In this they thus mirrored, what Russia, China and others had done to the west, and did it with a ferocity the enemy seemed to not have expected at all. Informally and unbidden, then parallel to these attacks, Russia, China and Iran were the targets of a multitude of coordinated internet attacks by numerous hacker groups including Anonymous, that targeted everything from newspapers to traffic lights and Governmental IT infrastructure. And thus the Dance of death started. The – very secretly – stated objective was simple but ambitious: wipe away most if not all Russian naval capability in the Baltics, while degrading Russian air defence and air power locally in that theater in the process. It makes little sense to say where it started, as this battle was waged across thousands of square kilometres and from a height of kilometres to a depth of hundreds of meters below the sea. Allied diesel-electric submarines that had been stealthily shadowing Russian submarines either torpedoed them or radioed instructions to Hunter-killer air ASW groups that destroyed most of the remaining. Most but not all the Russian submarines was destroyed like this, and although the allied losses in this Phase were comparatively light, then that is hardly a consolation to the crews of the two allied submarines or 3 ASW airplanes that was lost in counter fire or by Russians just shooting first. And this did not account for all Russian submarines. A Russian submarine managed to sneak up on one of the Surface Action Groups and sink one warship, while severely damaging a second. Another Russian sub managed to sneak up on the huge convoy and sink three of the transport ships and set a fourth ablaze. Both submarines were engaged and at least one is confirmed sunk. As for the Russian surface assets them some were destroyed in ports, which were struck by a combination of SEAD, Air-to-Ground attack and huge number of cruise missile attacks. Again this did not come without cost. Even though Allied SOF forces, including Swedish SOG, Norwegian MJK and FSK, Danish Jæger- and Frømandskorps, Polish GROM and English SBS and SAS had struck at Russian Air defence and Air control sites as well as military command centres in advance, then the Russian Air defence is very sophisticated and comprehensive. And the Russians are no fools. In the ensuing battle 27 allied fighter planes were shot down as well as one AWACS aircraft that fell to a sustained attack. Even though after action reports that almost all targets were successfully engaged and destroyed, then this is a severe blow to the alliance. Although the attack took a toll of almost twice that number in Russian planes, then this is a bitter if not Pyrrhic victory. Regardless of which, then it was a victory that the New Allies can hardly afford to repeat too many times. On the sea the New Allies fared better: in successive waves then Russian surface assets were mercilessly engaged and reengaged by air, sea and subsurface attacks by missiles, bombs and torpedoes. Even though this took a toll of another 9 combat aircraft, another submarine and two Allied surface assets, then the Russians lost many airplanes as well and the Russian Baltic fleet is basically no longer is a fighting force. But the operation also hammered home another problem: due to years of budget cutbacks, then there simply isn’t a large enough stockpile of smart weapons and missiles to keep this rate of operation up. In some instances then the New Allies are already starting to look at using less sophisticated ordnance. However there also exists a limited supply of these. There also exists a limited amount of Combat Aircraft, as the European nations who bought the F-35 fighter, has yet to receive let alone fly one of them. This in turn has forced them to re-evaluate their situation, which means interim orders of amongst others the Gripen fighter has been placed and production is ramping up to full 24/7 wartime production. But things take time. The Russians have struck back though, and done so with a well-aimed blow. Russian submarines that slipped through the not very tight NATO screen to the north, a screen that simply no longer have the strength it did during the cold war; have attacked and destroyed most of the undersea communication cables linking Europe and North America. This is an unmitigated disaster as these cables not only carried a lot of civilian information traffic, but also much of the Military communication. NATO is still reeling from this blow. The New Allies have accelerated the process of calling up whatever reserves not already activated, and pulling every conceivable piece of military equipment from storage or even museums and refurbishing them as necessary to get them into at least a reasonable ready combat state. There are both successes and failures in this. The Danes for instance have managed to get 12 M109s ready with new parts including new barrels, engines, torsion bars and suspension rushed from USA along with mechanics. Also they have pulled 12 Leopard 1a5DKs from museums and have done whatever updates and refurbishments they could and are now fielding them as heavy recon. Sadly the Swedes have discovered that most of their old JA/AJS-37 Viggens are no longer flyable, as someone apparently chose not to pay for the heating and dehumidifiers leading to corrosion and degradation of equipment and avionics. On a positive note, then the Swedes have managed to get some more Coastal missile batteries into action by stripping museums and spare parts from wherever they can. Similar positive and negative surprises are being experienced across Europe as the wheels of war are grinding into full war-production. USA has declared a national emergency and has stated that they again will become the Arsenal of Democracy – and are reactivating every ordnance, ship, airplane and weapons factory as fast as they can. They have also started recalling every reservist and person still covered by a contingency contract with the armed forces, as well as recruiting. And there are a surprising number of willing recruits not only in USA. This is in part also due to the escalating international situation where it seems that every dictator is testing the boundaries and flexing his or her muscles at a time where the west and USA seems fully occupied with other issues. Mixed ad-hoc battalions some of them equipped with weapons that include British surplus SLR and Bren guns have been fielded, and some deployed to the Baltics, along with whatever MANPADS, ATGM, Mortars and assorted support equipment that were in storage. Many of these are manned by National guard/Territorial army/Home guards units. Although good, then this in turn challenges the Allies Logistics because of the many different calibres and ordnance needs. Most NATO countries are nationalizing formerly closed barracks and military training areas, where this is possible – with predictable negative backlash from those it concerns. On the other side Russia and Byelorussia are also waking up militarily and have started reactivating their vast stores of equipment and ammunition, and recalling reservist and volunteers. The equipment might be old as are many of their reservists and not all reservist or vehicles are useable, but there are a lot of both. And ammunition, though a lot of it not modern at all, is plentiful. And a week ago somebody opened Pandoras Box. Even though no one knows for certain, then the initial clues point towards Russia, Iran, North Korea and China. In a massive leak that was simultaneous sent to press agencies, newspapers and Anti-corruption NGOs across the globe, and in a scope that easily dwarfs WikiLeaks, Panama papers and the Appleby Leak combined, then thousands upon thousands of files on decades of mistakes, corruption, crimes and cover-ups in all the industrialized nations, were distributed. Many hundreds of politicians, Political parties, business people and in a new move especially Civil servants, have found that the carpet has been lifted to reveal too many dirty secrets, lies and mistakes to be counted or countered. This has shook the nations at a time where they need to stand together, which indeed was in all likelihood probably the purpose. Surprisingly then this cache of information also includes every single traitor that has worked for the Soviet Union, DDR, China, North Korea and former Warsaw Pact countries until 1990. Many of these traitors have through the years won liable lawsuits against people who declared them out as traitors. In at least some cases across Europe, then seven of these named traitors have been murdered by what is expected to be vigilantes operating outside the law. The chaos is not lessened by the discovery of other traitors. The leak of information was a well thought –out ruse and trap: Many different versions and with specific different wording was put out to what was considered suspect persons. And then every resource was used in tracking them. In this way many national NATO and JEF countries was able to arrest people, most of whom was very shocked to be discovered delivering information to Russia and other sources. This includes national as well as EU officials. Some of these traitors claim that they acted in the interest of peace. But whatever their motivation, then they about to discover that giving the Enemy restricted information in a time of war carries a very heavy sentence. At the same time IT infrastructure in the EU and NATO countries are continually under attack and pressure, which is made more serious as it comes on top of the severing of the Trans-Atlantic communication cables. The same goes for Russia, however as there is less automation in Russia, then they are to a certain degree somewhat less vulnerable. The war is here and given the price that has already been payed, then it looks like this will not be solved with words.
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