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Hello all A very good Christmas to you all, may the season bring you nothing but happiness and good experiences. I will be doing some ad-hoc COOP sessions over the holiday seasons. They are open for ANYONE who wants to have some SB fun. I am aiming for smaller games and in all likelihood will do these fairly spontaneous. SO ... for those who are not on our Discord but might want to have some fun with us, then post below and I will send you a PM if and when we mount a game. There are NO obligations and its quite OK if you cant or have other obligations when its time. But if you post below, then you will at least get the offer as soon as we know we will be playing.

BG1 TF-32 OPERATION RED ROUTE 1.pdf KANIUM SUNDAY 21st OF JAN 1900 UTC “The Bears Gambit 1 - Operation Red Route 1 ” BY Nike-Ajax and SnS Where: Kanium TS : teamspeak3.i3d.net:10077 World Clock 1900 UTC IMPORTANT POINT: If you havent played with us before, or if it is a while ago, then please contact either @Major duck or @Swordsmandk to help you set up your Teamspeak before the day of the session - thank you. As always open to all Prologue: Background: 1.Situation. a.Time: 171100ZSEP2018, Local time: 1300 b.Terrain: Wooded and patchy boggy terrain channel Armd manoeuver and provide concealed AT ambush sites. Major water obstacles pre-dominate the area. Heavily forested areas provide effective concealment. A number of small villages are scattered throughout; the populations are most sympathetic to the Government, however, where the population is ethnic Russian, sympathies lie with that Government. Major LOC limited to single routes north-south and east-west – see map. Main City Šalčininkai, centre of Lithuanian Governance and security force base. c.Weather: Sunny with little chance of rain , 15 degrees Celsius. Visibility good out to 4km. No impact on sensor capabilities. Sunrise/Sunset: 06:54/19:30 local time. d.Vital Ground. Route BLUE – coordination points between R13-R15 & R14-R16 & Area FOX2. Control of these areas provide good opportunity to mount ambush attacks against the convoy.. e.Key Terrain. Villages at R19 & R22 must be SECURED to enable Convoy use of Route BLUE. f.Situation Enemy Forces. 1.Russian backed insurgents, supported by Russian Special Operations Forces (SoF) are operating in up to Company size formations within TF-32 AO, particularly between Marijampolis south to Šalčininkai (see Ops Trace); strength undetermined. They have succeeded in creating a chaotic environment and the rule of Law is disintegrating fast, overburdening the challenged Lithuanian security forces. Fox 1 & 2 are villages known to be sympathetic towards the Insurgents aims. The Insurgents appear to be well stocked with light infantry weapons including RPG´s and have also used IED´s to attack convoys and government patrols. It is likely they also possess ATGM of Russian manufacture, type and number unknown. Insurgent spotters likely to be used as identification of TF-32 Route of Advance and progress. g.Situation Friendly Forces. 1.Lithuania has requested support through its bilateral arrangements with Denmark, Finland, Sweden and Norway. TF-32, part of the UK Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) has been deployed early under the bilateral arrangements. Russian Influence and support is suspected behind the deteriorating security situation and should actionable evidence be found of Russian overt involvement, it is likely Article V could be called by Lithuania and agreed by the NAC. Should this occur, TF-32 will fall under command of COM JEF. Lithuanian authorities have tried to clear Route BLUE, and declared this is the route they want the Convoy to take. 2.Rules of Engagement. 1.NOTHING IN ROE LIMITS YOUR RIGHT TO DEFEND YOURSELF AND YOUR UNIT. 2.You have the right to use force to defend yourself against attacks or clear threats of attack. 3.Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to stop a hostile act. 4.If OWN forces or those under their protection are attacked, then minimum force should be used under the circumstances and proportional to the threat. 5.We are not at war and in an allied nation, uncalled for destruction of civilian property will not be accepted. 2. TF-32 TASKORG; 1.TF HQ a) (1xM113G3-DK, 1xCV9040, 1xFOV90) b) HQ QRF (4xM113G3/ENG, 4xCV9040 Recon PLT) c) Logistic/Transport Element (3.5t TRUCK-G/SUPPLY, 2 x 5 trucks) 2. A Coy Combat Team (CT): (-) a) 1 x STRV122 Tank SEC (2 tanks) b) 1 x CV9040 Mech. Inf PLT (2xCV9040) c) 1 x R2 (CV9040) Recon SEC (2xCV9040) d) 1x Sustainment PLT (medic, fuel, Ammo and mechanic) 3. B Coy Combat Team (CT): (-) a) 1 x STRV122 Tank SEC (2 tanks) b) 1 x CV9040 Mech. Inf PLT (2xCV9040) c) 1 x R2 (CV9040) Recon SEC (2xCV9040) d) 1x Sustainment PLT (medic, fuel, Ammo and mechanic) g.T-32 Attachments and Detachments: 1.Logistic/Transport Element (3.5t TRUCK-G/SUPPLY, 2 x 5 trucks) 3. EXECUTION 1.TF-32 MISSION TF-32 is to PROTECT Lithuanian Convoy 67 move from FOB ATHENA, Marijampolis south to Government Stores in Šalčininkai in order to ensure re-supply of Lithuanian security forces in Šalčininkai. a.Extended Purpose. Facilitate Lithuanian counter insurgency operations in Šalčininkai. b.Key Tasks 1.PROTECT Convoy 67; 2.CLEAR Route BLUE of IED; 3.If possible DETAIN Insurgent Leaders; 4.IDENTIFY Russian Support to the Insurgents. c. End State 1.Convoy 67 supplies SECURE in Government Stores; 2.TF-32 fit for future operations; 3.Minimal collateral damage and disruption to the civilian way of life. A.COM JEF Intent: I will use TF-32 RECON and Engr assets to CLEAR Route BLUE forward of the Convoy & IDENTIFY Insurgent ambush points. I will DEFEAT any Insurgent Attack using proportional force, limiting collateral damage to Lithuanian territory and population. If possible, I will seek to arrest Insurgent Commanders. B.CONOPS: 1.SoM: SoM. Four (4) Phase (P) Operation. i.Phase 1. RECON & ENGR move from FOB ATHENA to CLEAR along Route BLUE ii.Phase 2. Convoy 67 move from FOB ATHENA along Route BLUE, Team BRAVO front, Team ALPHA South. iii.Phase 3. RECON & ENGR arrive at Government Stores in Šalčininkai, conduct static DEFENCE. iv.Phase 4. Convoy 67 arrive at Government Stores in Šalčininkai, TF-32 re-organize for future operations. 2.SoFires: FIRES & CAS to be primary means of engaging Russian Forces within Lithuanian territory & providing concealment for withdrawal East. C.Critical to the Operation. ID of likely Ambush & IED attack points; D.Shaping Operations: RECON of Route BLUE; E.Sustaining Operations; Establish fuel & ASP at Government Stores in Šalčininkai. F.Decisive Operations: DEFEAT of Insurgent attacks on Convoy 67. G.Deception Operation: Move along Route BROWN to simulate Convoy move. H.Tactical Risk: Limited force against Insurgent Forces and lack of pursuit. Tasks to Subordinate Units: 1)TF-18: 1)Conduct Counter Terrorist operations in support of Lithuanian Security Forces in Area FALCON 2)BPT to support TF-32 operations. 2)TF-48: 1)Support Lithuanian Counter Terrorist operations in Area GEESE 3)TF-32: 1)RECON Route BLUE ITO IDENTIFY likely Insurgent ambush & IED Attack points. 2)PROTECT Convoy 67 move from FOB ATHENA to Government Stores in Šalčininkai. 4)TF-66 1)Conduct training of Lithuanian Security Forces. 5) CSS 1) Resupply, recover & re-equip all TFs on order 4. COORD & C2 - OPERATION RED ROUTE 1 a.Movement Timings. H Hour no change b.C2 No Change c.High Value Targets: Russian backed Insurgent leaders, Russian SoF. d.FIRES; All call for FIRES through A66 and only by authorization of Lithuanian Authorities. Likelihood of authorization is LOW. e.ISR; nil f.Sustainment: CSS to provide sustainment from FOB PRICE; g.Medical Evacuation. All casualties will be evacuated to the main Lithuanian hospital in Šalčininkai. h.Detainees. All detained Insurgents or Russian POW are to be taken to the Lithuanian Police Detention Centre in Šalčininkai and handed over to Lithuanian security forces. i.ROE (also see above). 1. All EN targets must be positively identified before firing. 2. ROE Card 65 in force. 3. FIRES will NOT be authorised in Urban areas unless there is significant risk to Friendly Force (FF) Life. 4. All calls for FIRES through A66, but authorization in such circumstances remains with Lithuanian JTF, and likelihood of authorization is LOW. 5.We are not at war and in an allied nation, uncalled for destruction of civilian property will not be accepted. j.Recovery. Damaged vehicles are to be towed. No damaged vehicle is to be left for potential use by insurgents. k.Command and Signal: a.Command: i.Succession of Command: 0A, OB, A66 (TF-48), B66 (TF-18) C 66 (TF-66). ii.Location of Key Leaders: OA with TF 48; OB with TF 66. b. Signal: i.TF HQ : 26000 ii.A Coy Combat Team (CT): (-): 46000 iii.B Coy Combat Team (CT): (-): 31000

Scenario 1 background.pdf The Bears Gambit 1 ”Si vis pacem, para bellum…” Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus Operation Red Route 1 By Nike-Ajax, All Rights reserved DTG 171100ZSEP18 Pacifists and dreamers hoped that the fall of the iron curtain and most of the worlds remaining communist dictatorships, would usher in a new age of understanding, peace and international harmony and prosperity. This however has been proven by reality to be in fact very much not the case. Nationalism or patriotism is not dead, nor is it in any way considered a bad thing by many hundreds of millions of people. Likewise then the idea that we all live in what amounts to common solidarity and a united market, has had very serious problems with the broad masses. Reality is that many if not most modern industrialized nations stand deeply divided politically and emotionally. And that these and other divisions also run deep and firm between many nation states as well. War Never Changes, but neither does Politics. Russia have expressed rising anger and anxiety with regards to what is perceived by Russia, as aggressive and escalating European and NATO expansion into Russian spheres of influence. With rising force and clarity, Russian under the consolidated and firm leadership of President V. V. Putin, have tied this in with what the Russians consider deliberate insults and failure to aid Russia both economically and politically in the past and present. And also a clear lack of aid and understanding politically and militarily in the Russian part of the war against Terror, including Chechnya. And finally what Russia sees as an effort to keep them away from their natural and proper place as a great nation, and a Superpower. The idea that Nationalism is somehow a bad thing, falls wholly on a great many deaf ears – not least Russian. Russia has become more destabilized due to economic recession. The collapse in the Ruble in 2014 has caused an ongoing economic crisis worsened by amongst other things a fall in oil prices, international economic sanctions and worn out infrastructure. Infrastructure has historically always been a challenge in the vastness of Russia, and has not become easier. Moreover then Russia, although a great nation by any standard, still has the problem which has dogged its development for centuries, namely that it infrastructurally and economically always seems to be one step behind its competitors and potential enemies. Part of this is also the economic imbalance that Russia still exports too many raw resources and in turn imports too many fabricated goods, instead of making them in Russia. This combined with a sharp rise in nationalism and a more firm leadership, creates a volatile situation. One of the stated goals of Russian foreign policy is to see Russia take their rightful place as a superpower on the international scene again, and to actively counter perceived threats not only to Russia, but to Russian interests in general. Russian foreign policy revolves around the idea of the near abroad and the far abroad, and the near abroad, what was once called buffer states, have been slowly eroded by internal unrest and the expansion of NATO. In line with this, then Russian leadership have increasingly and with support from large parts of their populace, expressed the view, that NATO might have won the Cold War, but that they sacrificed any legitimacy by treating Russia as a third world nation, ruled by a fool (the first President of the Russian Federation). Also the West including EU and NATO is seen to be hemming Russia militarily in, by expanding NATO literally to the doorstep of Russia, despite repeated firm Russian warnings, and in general refuse to understand the Russian position. This includes non-military actions that have worsened the economic situation in Russia. Many if not most Russians are fed up being told what to think and feel by the West, and being demonized by using the same tactics on Islamic terrorists on Russian soil as the West including USA are seen using abroad. The Russian plan for survival as a state has for centuries been to bleed any invader dry, and then drawing on its resources, annihilate them. This is based in part on the idea of buffer states, geographical areas that gives Russia the means and space to do a fighting withdrawal towards their centre of power around Moskva. And if the need arises, then have the option to fall back behind the Urals from where they would stage massive counterattacks. Russia has over the last 30 years seen many if not most of their buffer areas disappear, and what is worse that these despite Russian warnings have allied with real or perceived enemies. In line with this they have sought to counteract what they perceive as a veiled but direct attack on Russian sovereignty, first in Georgia then in Ukraine/Crimea and Syria. And now in the three Baltic states. Russia has thus sought a firmer and more belligerent line politically, both domestically and internationally. This includes covert support to parties and groups in line with Russia national interests, including pacifist groups, newspapers and parties in Europe. Russia has also given covert opposition to those who is perceived to be opposing Russia internationally and internally. And overtly they have politically underlined this with de facto alliances with Syria and thus Iran, as well as China. Russian military forces in the Kaliningrad Area alone are unofficially estimated to be in excess of 250.000 military personnel, with in excess of 250.000 in the areas surrounding the Baltic States on top of that. Actual battle-ready Russian military force in the region is estimated to be at least in excess of 160.000 in varying degrees of training and readiness. This is not counting the VDV or Russian Airborne Troops, Naval Infantry and Russian Special Operation Forces, which adds at least another 15.000 in this theatre alone. On top of this, then ever closer ties between Russia and Byelorussia de facto means that Byelorussian military personnel can and will be added to this number if needed. This means in excess of at least another 25.000 military personnel, just in the ground forces alone, that train with Russia, including in the Zapad yearly military exercises. Western military experts made the claim after 1992, that it would take Russia at least 10 years of rearmament to pose a threat to Western Europe. From its lowest point in 1998, then the military budget in Russia has risen, passing the budget level of 1992 in 2008, with inflation-adjusted funds. In 2008 Russia made sweeping military reforms, and have since spent vast sums to upgrade their forces. Thus the ten years for Russia are now spent … What western politicians and civil servants for years have chosen to ignore, in their eagerness to use up all of the so-called “Peace Dividend”, is that the same applies to the West. Many European countries, in an effort to cut military costs, have changed and reduced their armies into ever smaller COIN and Anti-insurgents units and structures, with a very limited capability to fight an actual conventional war. Capabilities such as Submarines, Anti-air defences, Logistics and Artillery takes at least 10 years to build up again when they have been scrapped, as they require not only the hardware, but also specialists, experts and training to function, as well as doctrine to integrate them into the battle. But it looks like the West and NATO might not have 10 years: Ethnic Russian people in the Baltic States have long claimed unfavourable and racist treatment in the three Baltic States, and the tensions have lately become violent. Many people in the Baltic States feel that they owe the Ethnic Russians absolutely nothing, as the Ethnic Russians are perceived by these people as being unwelcome remnants and infiltrators of an oppressive state who twice conquered and then militarily occupied the once free and democratic Baltic States for decades after WW2. The Baltic States have sought for affirmation of defence obligations from both EU and NATO. Europe internally and USA stand divided on the issue, and specifically the scope and means of affirming the military solidarity. Thus the Baltic States feel isolated and vulnerable, a fact not lost on Russia. A little over a month ago the situation escalated, as insurgents and terrorists have started fighting for what they claim is “A Free and Equal Lithuania”, while at the same time Lithuanian Internet infrastructure was attacked with different but coordinated attacks. This includes electronic attacks on key logistical and electrical nodes. Also more peripheral sites that have a military connection have been targeted by Chinese and Russian based hackers and infiltrators, including www.Steelbeasts.com and www.kanium.eu. The Russian SVR is suspected of being behind some if not most of these attacks, while the Russian GRU is suspected of training, funding and supporting the insurgents as well as deploying GRU Spetznas to support, augment and help the insurgents. The other two Baltic nations are also experiencing unrest, disturbances and acts of criminality; similar to what is happening in Lithuania, but on a much lower scale. It seems that the actions in Lithuania are coordinated, supported and for lack of better words, has a game plan. Initially then parts of the Nordic Battlegroup and UK Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) was put on alert and deployed to Lithuania. Terrorist acts are still being committed in Lithuania, with unclear perpetrators. But all signs still point to Russian support and involvement, directly and indirectly. The NATO and EU have discreetly and slowly been raising their military alert levels and readiness, but are hemmed in by a wish of not wanting to escalate the situation, as well as disagreements on a unified contingency plan as well as direction. Thus so far it has mostly been a matter of holding more military exercises, making political statements and seeking political solutions both overtly as well as covertly. The discreet talks with Russia have so far yielded little if any results. Consequently then the European nations in general, and the Baltic and Eastern European States in particular, as well as NATO are re-evaluating and assessing their military options and reserves. Unfortunately many of them are finding that discreet orders of ammunition and ordnance are hard pressed to be met – at least in full, as most national arms producers firstly cannot ramp up production significantly in the short run, and secondly that the producers are being pressured to supply the nations in which the few remaining manufacturing facilities are situated first. But the wheels are slowly beginning to turn faster. The Baltic States, Finland and the Eastern European nations are recalling and reactivating reservists. Lithuania in the meantime, struggling to survive as a State has used any and all means at their disposal to stop the insurgency and terrorism. Russia claiming that Lithuania have lost all legitimacy and control, and seeking to safeguard Ethnic Russian people, has late last week massed troops at the borders to Lithuania from Byelorussia, direction Vilnius. Lithuania is now in an undeclared and limited scale conflict with insurgents and what is by Lithuania claimed as Russian Special Operation Forces, Spetznas. NATO is at highest peacetime readiness, with weekly meetings between the defence ministers. The EU military structure has added little except more confusion and discord to the situation, and stands even less prepared – De facto being what amounts to a paper tiger, who primary function seems to be to stand in the way of NATO. TF-32, part of the JEF have been tasked with providing, escort and security for a Military Convoy moving from Marijampolé south to Šalčininkai, close to the Russian border. The convoy contains supplies and ammunition for Lithuanian Defence personnel and police that have fought for days trying to keep the area clear of insurgents. This is a distance of around 25 Km. SITUATION The military situation in the AO remains tense, with Insurgents making increasingly bold and well-planned attacks on both military and civilian targets. The majority of the insurgents seem to have at least some military training and are well-equipped with light weapons, and has proven to be well-coordinated. Recently there has been an influx of Russian made ATGMs and MANPADs, as well as what seems to be very well trained insurgents. There is widespread belief that many of these are in fact Russian SOF soldiers, and probably GRU Spetznas – what was called “Little Green Men” in Ukraine and Crimea. Also IED´s have been found and disarmed, but sadly some were only discovered when they detonated. So far no NATO (apart from the Baltic States), JEF or Nordic Battlegroup soldiers have been lost or injured. A fact that Command fears can change soon. A convoy is to depart from Marijampolé for Šalčininkai, with military supplies soon. The convoy is mission-critical to the forces holding and stabilizing the area around Šalčininkai and north towards Vilnius, which remains one of the few areas in southern Lithuania, not controlled or infested by insurgents. As neither NATO, the Baltic States nor the Scandinavian countries are at war at this time, then as little force as possible is to be used in executing the mission. The goal is to deliver the convoy safely from FOB ATHENA to Government Stores in Šalčininkai, via E85 in order to ensure re-supply of Lithuanian security forces in Šalčininkai. Civilians in Area of Operations are mostly staying indoors, or try to flee the city North. OWN forces are to displace showing all needed and prudent safety measures. Rules of Engagement NOTHING IN THESE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT LIMITS YOUR RIGHT TO TAKE APPROPIATE ACTION TO DEFEND YOURSELF AND YOUR UNIT. A. You have the right to use force to defend yourself against attacks or clear threats of attack. B. Hostile fire may be returned effectively and promptly to stop a hostile act. C. If OWN forces or those under their protection are attacked, then minimum force should be used under the circumstances and proportional to the threat. D. We are NOT at war AND in an allied nation, uncalled for destruction of civilian property will NOT be accepted.

We will, on Sunday 10th of July 1800 UTC, host a joint ops game with DOW and Kanium and anyone else who wants to join in. Kanium will host the first session, DOW the second and so on. If this turns out like we both hope, this could happen on a monthly basis. First mission will be a BTN size mission with 2 tank COYs and 1 MECH COYs. Game is open to everyone. The two VUs will run a tank COY each with free room for everyone that wants to give it a shot also. Included in mission is both recon, engineer and support units. It will be hosted in 4.0 unless issues should arise. If it does then I will update this thread and so on. When: Sunday July 10th 1800 UTC World Clock Where: Kanium TS for this one. Plz if you are planning to join make sure game has been tested and TS tried before getting there. What are we doing: BTN size attack COOP mission with OPFOR players. Play time is at least two hours but you can join for duration you can play. Manning list and more info will be posted during the weekend.

In a single player mission or Coop, can an OPFOR CGF UAV call for fires?