Bundeswehr Recce

[Ssnake]

Ssnake, regarding the long range recce and commo: would the team typically radio in on some regular reporting schedule? both to keep higher aware the element is intact and active as well as pass info? or would the elements continuously transmit their take?

The basic rules of emission control don't become invalid for recce elements (rather the contrary). You will report only if you have something to report and shortly before leaving your position. Constant blathering on the radio is certain death.

I imagine they would need a powerful transmitter to reach higher HQ

Not necessarily. Even in WW2 direct radio connections from the Caucasus to Berlin were possible with standard HF radios. Typically in modern armies other frequencies are favored today for a variety of reasons - radios are now near-ubiquitous equipment and you actually want to limit your range as a simple means against enemy signal intelligence. And other frequencies offer more bandwidth.

But if you transmit rarely and concentrated and displace quickly after each transmission and range is your primary concern, HF radio is your friend even if you have just a few Watts of effective transmission power.

Secondly, would they perform any "direct action" while behind lines, i.e. attack targets of opportunity. i'm thinking about Spetsnaz and how i've read that even if on a stealthy recce mission their doctrine dictated to attack specific types of high-priority targets such as nuclear-armed Lance missiles when encountered.

That's the beauty of Auftragstaktik. It's up to the local leader to make such a decision, based on the value of the target, whether it's a fleeting opportunity, and what the consequences will be for his own forces. Typically the biggest stick that a recce troop has is not the gun but eyes, ears, and a radio set. Why open fire and provoke a response from forces you are not equipped to deal with if all that you have to do is call for artillery, or an air strike?

[Hackworth]

The basic rules of emission control don't become invalid for recce elements (rather the contrary). You will report only if you have something to report and shortly before leaving your position. Constant blathering on the radio is certain death.....

That's the beauty of Auftragstaktik. It's up to the local leader to make such a decision, based on the value of the target, whether it's a fleeting opportunity, and what the consequences will be for his own forces. Typically the biggest stick that a recce troop has is not the gun but eyes, ears, and a radio set. Why open fire and provoke a response from forces you are not equipped to deal with if all that you have to do is call for artillery, or an air strike?

Sweet. Those poor buggers get schwacked and no one is the wiser just no report. Pure fun!

Regarding the targets of opportunity, I was thinking about the 150km range here and time being a factor such as tac nuke missiles preparing for launch or something like that. but your answer says it all

Thank you!

[TankHunter]

This is quite an interesting thread.

A question that I have is was Auftragstaktik something that bulk of the German army was using in the Cold War or was that simply used by the Luchs formations due to wanting to keep comms usage at an absolute minimum?

In other words were the officers in those formations specifically trained in the use of auftragstaktik?

[Hackworth]

This is quite an interesting thread.

A question that I have is was Auftragstaktik something that bulk of the German army was using in the Cold War or was that simply used by the Luchs formations due to wanting to keep comms usage at an absolute minimum?

In other words were the officers in those formations specifically trained in the use of auftragstaktik?

Look what I found:

The Birth of the Auftragstaktik and Its Meaning For the Modern Enterprise

empowering those with eyes and ears on location and at the point of decision with not only the authority, but the training and therefore ability to make decisions. at least that sounds like the idea to me. so, in answer to your query, i believe it was an entire culture culture shift and way of thinking. so the entire officer corps I would assume would be reared this way.

let's see what the experts say. wanna place bets TankH?

This is an awesome quote from von Moltke in the article regarding orders:

"An order shall contain everything that a commander cannot do by himself, but nothing else"

I LOVE that concept...

[TankHunter]

Look what I found:

The Birth of the Auftragstaktik and Its Meaning For the Modern Enterprise

empowering those with eyes and ears on location and at the point of decision with not only the authority, but the training and therefore ability to make decisions. at least that sounds like the idea to me. so, in answer to your query, i believe it was an entire culture culture shift and way of thinking. so the entire officer corps I would assume would be reared this way.

let's see what the experts say. wanna place bets TankH?

This is an awesome quote from von Moltke in the article regarding orders:

"An order shall contain everything that a commander cannot do by himself, but nothing else"

I LOVE that concept...

Pretty much. Auftragstaktik is a way to enable decentralized decision making so that an organization can react quickly in a changing and competitive environment. Basically you the subordinate is given an outcome based order. So instead of being told how to do your mission (example: "take hill 35 and cover highway 1 by fire"), you are told what the desired outcome is (example: "prevent enemy armor from evacuating from Joe's Town via highway 1" or something like that), your commander's intent and the intent of the commanders in the next few levels above him. That way if things change you can still do something that is useful for the larger formation without needing to wait for new orders.

Of course for this to work the officers need some sort of a common pool of knowledge, ideas, terminology, etc so that intent can be transmitted without much of an issue in terms of interpretation. Hence part of the importance of the general staff.

[Grenny]

Well, given the current situations faced by NATO militarys...esp. the US military was very quick to adopt the Auftragstaktik, as it suits the asymetric warfare very well. (at least from what i saw over there)

The Bundeswehr on the other hand was moving backward for a long time, for reasons of political half-assedness. The fear that a local commander would actually USE his assets and kill some INS+maybe some collats (and the resulting bad press in germany), lead to very strikt orders.(best call Potsdam first befor you decide to fire a round...)

[Ssnake]

Auftragstaktik is primarily a culture and mindset thing. You cannot successfully adopt it without accepting error at the subordinate level. Where subordinates are punished for making their own decisions with second-guessing decisions in hindsight, local initiative will quickly be stifled with a fallback to Befehlstaktik.

Weak leaders loathe Auftragstaktik because it quickly exposes lack of direction, double-talk, and obfuscated intent. You are responsible for errors of your subordinates (it can't work without accepting it) but you must not punish them for exercising their free will, as long as their decision was reasonable onder the circumstances. You need an atmosphere of trust in the chain of command.

Sadly, my own impression in the Bundeswehr throughout the 1990s were that only lip service was paid to the commitment of Auftragstaktik where it was lived and embraced well into the 1970s.

[Grenny]

...

Sadly, my own impression in the Bundeswehr throughout the 1990s were that only lip service was paid to the commitment of Auftragstaktik where it was lived and embraced well into the 1970s.

...

You get such and such. Fact is that this style of leadership quickly identifies weak leaders, that why some senior officers fear it.(and rightly so ;-) )

Many staff-officers now (raised in the 70's to 80's) where not realy soldiers, they where state employees who happend to wear a uniform and saw the army as a normal 7-5 job (esp. during the 90's). There subordinates with initiative and and own ideas/intents meant MORE WORK... so "nonsense" like this was highly discouraged.

A major once told me, that the only thing that could save the Bundeswehr from becomming a mockery was another war.

Well, we got that going :-(

[Grenny]

...

You need an atmosphere of trust in the chain of command.

...

In that light: thank god they did not convict Col. Klein...this would have realy brocken the last straw!

PS.: I cease now...appoligies for thread highjacking :-)

[Tacbat]

No worries, some good insight there.

[Hackworth]

No worries, some good insight there.

and it really is good insight...theory versus practice. i see this in the corporate wold work its way as well. in fact, my most serious complaint against my current employer is there is not enough authority at the middle and low-levels of management within my organization, especially for what three years ago were routine issues. sometimes, i feel like a baby asking permission to crap my diapers. "hey, it's what I do! why do I have to ask permission!?"

[enigma6584]

Bump for reference.

[Gibsonm]

On 10/2/2010 at 10:41 PM, Eisenschwein said:

.... over to Heeresstruktur 5 in 1990

 

 

 

Resurrecting for Rolling Thunder '19 planning.

 

As RT '19 is set in the 1991 time frame, I'm going to work with Heeresstruktur 5 being in place.

 

Can I confirm how the Kompanies were configured?

 

Is that:

 

3 Platoons, each of 3 x Leo 1s (Leopard 1A5)

2 Platoons, each of 5 x Luchs?

 

or

1 x Leo 1 Kompanie Commander

2 Platoons, each of 4 x Leo 1s (Leopard 1A5)

5 sections each of 2 x Luchs?

 

or

 

something else entirely?

 

 

Edited June 12, 2018 by Gibsonm

[Ssnake]

In 1990 HS4 was still in place, according to the German Wikipedia (which is never wrong...); so:

1. 2 heavy armored recce COYs of 4 x 3 MBT Leo 1A5 each
2. 1 mixed armored recce COY of 2 x 3 MBT, and 4 x 2 SpPz Luchs
3. 1 armored recce COY 3 x 3 +1 TPz Fuchs (with one Milan team per platoon)
4. 3 BDE recce platoons with 4 x 2 SpPz Luchs
5. 1 ground radar platoon w/ x9 M113 based "PARA" vehicles

 

From 1992, HS5:

1. 3 mixed armored recce COY of 3 x 3 MBT Leopard 2A4, and 5 x 2 SpPz Luchs (plus CO on M113A3)
2. 1 BDE recce COY with 6 x 2 SpPz Luchs and 3 PARA ground radar vehicles (plus CO on M113A3)
3. Additional forces at corps level (1 airborne recce platoon, 3 COY of 6 x 2 SpPz Luchs and 3 PARA ground radar vehicles)

 

Recommendation for network session:

Doctrinally, players of Luchs sections should be aware that most of their recce activity was done dismounted, with the vehicles in defilade. The difficulty in SB Pro is that infiltration as a tactic is practically impossible since computer-controlled forces immediately recognize enemy as such. A possible workaround would be to make the Luchs units "neutral" with the understanding that enemy player would still be permitted to shoot them, and under a Gentlemen's agreement that players would not abuse their neutrality by driving around in plain sight, or shoot Red vehicles without fear of retribution.

[Gibsonm]

Thanks Ssnake.

 

I suspect I might be putting an entry is the Wish List for a "detect if ..." condition for both the Luchs and the Ground Surveillance Radars along the lines of ...

 

Variable 1: If unit X has LOS.

 

Variable 2: If unit X is within Y metres.

[dpabrams]

RT 2019, I will schedule it!

 

[DemolitionMan]

Sorry I posted this in the video section already but until I saw this I had no real picture how a Luchs troop would be employed on the battlefield. It's pretty self-explaining even if you don't speak German.