Soviet Ammo type impacting Scenario outcome

[WarUlf]

I would like to discuss the huge impact of Soviet Ammo type/availability for the outcome of all central European scenarios.

Does anybody have information on when the GSFG (Group of Soviet Forces Germany) introduced the BM29 or the BM42?

And how common it really was in the war-load of Soviet tanks in the late eighties?

Why was the war-load of Soviet tanks in the late eighties composed of 50% HEAT and HE?

The information I have suggests that the GSFG only hade limited amounts of BM29 and no BM42 in 1989? Can this be right?

And

How common was ICM/bomblets in the GSFG artillery?

What systems could fire ICM?

/WarUlf

[Captain_Colossus]

Does anybody have information on when the GSFG (Group of Soviet Forces Germany) introduced the BM29 or the BM42?

The Soviet BM29 round entered service in 1985, BM42 in 1986- this however says nothing as to where or when these rounds were deployed in substantial numbers if at all. I know they had some limited potential to produce and test these rounds, but I've never heard of any widespread deployment- someone may have more information here.

Why was the war-load of Soviet tanks in the late eighties composed of 50% HEAT and HE?

Well, HEAT is versatile enough and Soviet HEAT rounds generally had better penetration against RHAe than Soviet KE penetrators- composite armor notwithstanding. But Soviet tank doctrine had always been weighted with additional consideration to HE shells- it fits the conception of Soviet breakthroughs into soft rear areas as the Soviets regarded the MBT concept a little differently than the supposedly Western specialist 'tank-killing' designs in contrast- it was presumed that in WW3, the West would fight as the defender in response to the Soviet attacker. In this context, HE (and to a lesser extent) HEAT are more valuable pulverizing enemy troop concentrations, fortifications, infrastructure and economic targets, whereas sabot would be useless.

The information I have suggests that the GSFG only hade limited amounts of BM29 and no BM42 in 1989? Can this be right?

Sure it can be right- BM42 tungsten core penetrator performed better than the BM32 dU alloy penetrator; it certainly would have been more prohibitive to maintain stockpiles of the more expensive ammunition to equip such a large tank force where there existed an overabundance of cheaper Maraging steel penetrators. And Soviet doctrine didn't necessarily emphasize tank vs tank combat per se at any rate.

[WarUlf]

Well, HEAT is versatile enough and Soviet HEAT rounds generally had better penetration against RHAe than Soviet KE penetrators- composite armor notwithstanding. But Soviet tank doctrine had always been weighted with additional consideration to HE shells- it fits the conception of Soviet breakthroughs into soft rear areas as the Soviets regarded the MBT concept a little differently than the supposedly Western specialist 'tank-killing' designs in contrast- it was presumed that in WW3, the West would fight as the defender in response to the Soviet attacker. In this context, HE (and to a lesser extent) HEAT are more valuable pulverizing enemy troop concentrations, fortifications, infrastructure and economic targets, whereas sabot would be useless.

Sure it can be right- BM42 tungsten core penetrator performed better than the BM32 dU alloy penetrator; it certainly would have been more prohibitive to maintain stockpiles of the more expensive ammunition to equip such a large tank force where there existed an overabundance of cheaper Maraging steel penetrators. And Soviet doctrine didn't necessarily emphasize tank vs tank combat per se at any rate.

When reading transcripts of the NVA/GSTD joint war-games, (One of the most freighting documents I have read), it suddenly all makes sense. To date NO-None Nuclear WP-OPLAN has been documented to the best of my knowledge. ALL WP-OPLAN:s after 1977 started whit an general WP NBC Tactical pre-emptive first strike against NATO Airfields and key targets. Contemporary to the general belief at least in the Bundeswehr during the eighties that if it would come to WWIII that it would start conventionally and that NATO would have to escalate over the nuclear-threshold.

Everything from the Soviet doctrine, the composition and order of battle of WP units, the general layout of the T-xx MBT:s, the emphasis on Div/army artillery, the HEAT/HE as the primary war-load ammo suddenly makes sense from a strategic point of view.

Why have a expensive 30% APFSDS war-load when your units anyway probably won’t encounter any NATO MBT:s, At least in theory?

The impact for the Central-European SBpro scenarios is that a war-load whit 32 rounds of BM42 probably isn’t realistic?

[Norfolk]

When reading transcripts of the NVA/GSTD joint war-games, (One of the most freighting documents I have read), it suddenly all makes sense. To date NO-None Nuclear WP-OPLAN has been documented to the best of my knowledge. ALL WP-OPLAN:s after 1977 started whit an general WP NBC Tactical pre-emptive first strike against NATO Airfields and key targets. Contemporary to the general belief at least in the Bundeswehr during the eighties that if it would come to WWIII that it would start conventionally and that NATO would have to escalate over the nuclear-threshold.

Everything from the Soviet doctrine, the composition and order of battle of WP units, the general layout of the T-xx MBT:s, the emphasis on Div/army artillery, the HEAT/HE as the primary war-load ammo suddenly makes sense from a strategic point of view.

Why have a expensive 30% APFSDS war-load when your units anyway probably won’t encounter any NATO MBT:s, At least in theory?

The impact for the Central-European SBpro scenarios is that a war-load whit 32 rounds of BM42 probably isn’t realistic?

I remember in the 90's when I first saw excerpts from the NVA OPLANS, along with another version of the plan held by the Czechs or Hungarians (the one that revealed the WP attack along the Donau Appraoch through Austria). It was shocking that the WP was going to go TAC NUC right from the start in order to guarantee break-throughs along major axes, and of course the Soviet/WP intention to pin German II Corps and U.S. 7th Army with the Danube advance through Austria.

But I think that what really got me most was that the Soviet were prepared to go to war on 15-30 minutes notice at practically all times. All those new, top-of-the-line T-80s and BMPs just sitting around in army parks and storage sheds that apparently were never used, and which led to jokes within NATO about how the Soviets considered them to be too good to be used, was the same stuff that the GSFG was going to swap out for the stuff they used in peacetime, all fully loaded and fueled, and with stocks of additional fuel, food, and ammo already loaded on trucks for up to 30 days of fighting.

That one study that NATO did back in the 80's, which figured that the Soviets could take advantage of regularly-scheduled exercises (a traditional Soviet deception) to disguise the forming-up for a 29 division attack into Germany was dismissed by most publicly. Seeing as how the Soviets used the same approach in 1968 to invade Czechoslovakia, I suspect such skepticism was unfounded. One senior German general back in the 80's said that he didn't worry about granting leave to the armed forces for the weekend because he already knew on a Thursday if there was going to be a war; I suspect that the first inkling that we were at war may have been when messengers and dispatch-riders (because the Soviets would have jammed most comms) from the UK Armd Recce Bde and US ACR's up front near the inner-German border arrived at Corps' HQ screaming that the Russian were coming and where's the reinforcements?

Soviet tanks were intended to be perform more of a sort of Assault Gun role than an Anti-Tank role as in NATO, to be sure. Direct-fire cannonry is three times as effective as Indirect-fire, and even the majority of Soviet SPGs were intended to spend most of their time in the direct rather than indirect role. Until we actually got our hands at the end of the Cold War on the various OPLANs distributed to the Soviet's WP allies, a lot of things about the Soviet war machine seemed anomalous, even anachronistic (although some old WWII German generals kept trying to tell us a few things, but apparently we didn't listen closely enough); now that we have a much better idea of the actual Strategic and Operational approaches that the Soviets held to, things make much more sense. And if had come to blows, the Soviets may have won in as little as five days (though they planned for a month or so).

[rump]

I remember in the 90's when I first saw excerpts from the NVA OPLANS, along with another version of the plan held by the Czechs or Hungarians (the one that revealed the WP attack along the Donau Appraoch through Austria).

I've read that one, I think it was Czech. Chilling.

Here's more: http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/coll_warplan/introduction_mastny.cfm

Regards,

-Rump

[Kepler]

All battle-winning master plans win...on paper. However, I would think that all bets are off once the nukes start flying. Would the French just sit on their hands (and nukes) during this onslaught? Would the Soviets ever have been able to pull off a surprise assault of that scale, without bringing the full weight of NATO strategic retribution upon themselves? I see too many questions and pitfalls in the whole scenario for me to trust the Soviet timeframe, or even the basic premise, that "this would work". Basically, noone could say for sure what would happen after the first nuke. Stratic nuke or tac nuke, doesn't really matter, IF the Soviets wanted to hit important airports and the like we're talking evaporation of several major population centres throughout Europe. From day one, that is! If that's the STARTING point of the conflict, why bother wading in with tanks and troops afterwards, one might ask.

Sure, WAPA tanks might have been able to reach the channel coast within a certain timeframe, but if all they would have had behind them was a nuclear hazard zone all the way back to Siberia, I think the whole win/loose discussion would be rather moot. Nobody wins in global thermo-nuclear war (I can recommend the game, though).

[WarUlf]

This very interesting document from the German MoD (in German) is analysing all the known transcripts of the NVA OPLAN:s

http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/03_jb97_14.pdf

I have printed out the English translation some years ago, but cant find the site on the Internet were I downloaded it from anymore.

Does anybody know the site?

[rump]

Plan of Actions of the Czechoslovak People’s Army for War Period, 1964

Available here: http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?id=16239&navinfo=15365

Regards,

-Rump

[Norfolk]

All battle-winning master plans win...on paper. However, I would think that all bets are off once the nukes start flying. Would the French just sit on their hands (and nukes) during this onslaught? Would the Soviets ever have been able to pull off a surprise assault of that scale, without bringing the full weight of NATO strategic retribution upon themselves? I see too many questions and pitfalls in the whole scenario for me to trust the Soviet timeframe, or even the basic premise, that "this would work". Basically, noone could say for sure what would happen after the first nuke. Stratic nuke or tac nuke, doesn't really matter, IF the Soviets wanted to hit important airports and the like we're talking evaporation of several major population centres throughout Europe. From day one, that is! If that's the STARTING point of the conflict, why bother wading in with tanks and troops afterwards, one might ask.

Sure, WAPA tanks might have been able to reach the channel coast within a certain timeframe, but if all they would have had behind them was a nuclear hazard zone all the way back to Siberia, I think the whole win/loose discussion would be rather moot. Nobody wins in global thermo-nuclear war (I can recommend the game, though).

What would likely have happened is that the German Government would just have folded, and NATO would have unravelled politically in the event of a Soviet invasion. There was one exercise in the late 80's where selected senior German Government officials and military officers were whisked off to a secure bunker under the exercise pretext that war had just broken out. After only a couple days, when whoever was playing the role of SACEUR sent a message to this Government group that NATO was requesting authorization to resort to TAC NUCs because the Soviets had broken through, still believing of course that this was the real thing, some of the German civilian officials freaked out, literally, and the whole exercise had to be stopped and the fact that is was just an exercise revealed.

For that matter, NATO found that in exercise after exercise, it typically could last no more than 4 days before it had to request TAC NUC use, and then that would have required all sorts of political approvals that would take a day or two - even if approval was given. Then the TAC NUCs would have been ready to go within 2 hours or so. But by then the Soviets would already probably be at the Rhine. Moral of the story - Nukes don't work, there is no substitute for having adequate and capable conventional forces. Forget nukes.

Great finds WarUlf and rump.

[ShoutingDog]

Would the Soviets ever have been able to pull off a surprise assault of that scale, without bringing the full weight of NATO strategic retribution upon themselves?

And there in lies the very reason that the NATO/Warsaw Pact war never happened.

My father was privy to war plans for various reasons. Around about '95 or so we had a talk about this when I claimed that NATO could not only have held but defeated the Soviets if they'd launched a mid 80's war. He told me that the NATO plan was never to go toe to toe with the Russians because all the studies said we'd get our asses kicked. If the Russians crossed the border they were gonna get nuked. We told 'em that thru various non-public channels and they not only believed it but knew it was true. The Germans didn't like it but what choice did they have?

[Captain_Colossus]

I don't understand victory- pyrrhic victory or botched and bloody stalemate once the preconditions are tripped and someone turns the heat on; once it escalates to atomic weapons on everyone's cities (which it would have), the whole thing looks pointless.

Still, the Soviets added the political component to its war plans in ways that NATO didn't come to regard them- the Soviets looked at what it perceived as the inherently weaker NATO cooperative structure as opposed to the control given to Soviet front commanders; knock out the weaker NATO partners, attack where their commands are co-mingled, make Germany think about its serious destruction, isolate the US mission and force it to consider that the nations in Western Europe are no longer interested in sacrificing themselves for WW3.

The Soviets probably didn't believe they needed to fight everywhere and everyone- only where it was necessary and expediently to force a resolution. The crack US V Corps would have been tough if they fought to the death.

[Kepler]

Thing is, France would probably have gone nuclear on their own before invading Soviets had crossed Germany - to keep the mushroom clouds on foreign soil (and not just any foreign soil...).

[WarUlf]

If we move on to more conventional force multipliers..

What about DPICM?

What WP systems could fire DPICM, and what system actually was fielded whit large stocks of DPICM during the eighties?

[Captain_Colossus]

Typically all 152mm systems could be equipped with them.

Self-propelled guns:

2S3 M1973 152mm howitzer

2S5 152mm howitzer

2S7 203mm howitzer

2S19 152mm howitzer

MLRS:

9P140 220mm rockets

Possibly the 9A52-2 Smerch- 300 mm rockets have some sort of capabilty to strike hard and soft targets. I'm not sure if these are mixed submunitions or basically each salvo is pre-programmed for a particular mission.

Tube:

D-20 152mm towed howitzer- the venerable old stable.

I have no idea what the usual ammo mix would consist of at the brigade/regiment/division level artillery- but you could probably infer that cluster munitions are going to figure in there. Front level probably consists of HE, nuclear, chemicals.

[Companion]

Sorry to dig up an old thread but I have a question:

How large was the DPICM and FASCAM stockpile of WP forces at 1989? (or 80s in general)

Was it large enough to have a significant impact if *cough* "the balloon went up?" *cough*

And where do you people find those warplans or wargame results? :confused:

- Comp

[WarUlf]

Sorry to dig up an old thread but I have a question:

How large was the DPICM and FASCAM stockpile of WP forces at 1989? (or 80s in general)

Was it large enough to have a significant impact if *cough* "the balloon went up?" *cough*

Nobody seems to have a definite answer. Not even the western intelligence community.

I have searched the internet for any information that could shed some light at the matter whit out success. To date

And where do you people find those warplans or wargame results? :confused:

- Comp

For wargame results for the central European theatre you will find some information from the “Newport papers” from the Naval War Collage:

Specific the Global War Game Second Series 1984-1988:

http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/newportpapers/documents/20.pdf

/WarUlf