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Counter insurgency operations


Tjay

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Ssnake has understandably shut down my 'Defeating ISIS/ISIL' thread because despite me emphasising that I was interested only in battlefield operational tactics, at least two of the responses were blatantly political.

So... Is it possible we could have a discussion STRICTLY about the best operational methods to employ against generic/non-specific irregular forces in the field, in which those with recent experience would share their opinions?

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Tjay,

I understand the interest but you need to appreciate that those of us with "recent experience” most likely have colleagues using the same Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) as we speak - so sharing them wont happen.

I’d also argue that the group you wish to discuss don’t really qualify as “Insurgents“ (by virtue of the territory they control, the type of combat they are involved in, etc.) so “Counter insurgency“ operations don’t really apply - they may have in the early stages.

A similar example was Vietnam with the early American phase being “Counter insurgency“ with primarily the Viet Cong but after the Americans withdrew it transitioned to more conventional combat as the North Vietnamese Army reinforced/replaced the Viet Cong in operations against the Republic of South Vietnam forces.

If you want to read about a reasonably recent “Counter insurgency“ activity with a UK/Commonwealth aspect, I’d suggest the Malaya Emergency.

Northern Ireland is also a good example (albeit perhaps a bit to close to home).

Stopping / Neutralising ISIS/ISIL is a complex issue and by definition it requires the inclusion of politics, either in the countries fighting them, or as a means within the affected areas to remove their support base.

Its not a simple issue of throwing munitions at them, or “boots on the ground”. Unless you have the political will to stay for a long time, commit lots of troops, expend a lot of money and take casualties (not ones or twos, but quite a number).

You need “Hearts and Minds”, you need to counter their propaganda, you need to fill the domestic power vacuum that allowed them to rise, you need to support a “local” solution that includes the broader Muslim community as well as the states neighbouring the troubles, you need to consider the domestic political impacts of tightening security measures and intelligence activities, etc.

You also need a long term view of the world, not just an event horizon of the next domestic election. Saddam Hussein was the West’s best friend when he was fighting Iran.

Sorry but if you want a simple answer all I can offer is “42”.

I suspect this is why the earlier thread was locked as you can’t discuss possible solutions without including politics.

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I concur with Gibsonm's points, the best we can do here is point you in the direction of "Further Reading".

The Malayan Emergency is the text book way of doing things,

Also the Australian contingent in Vietnam did sterling work.

(Some of whom were veterans of the Malayan Campaign.)

"War" is an extension of "politics".

The two go hand in hand.

It might be worth setting up an account at SimHQ and opening a discussion there in the PWEC forum.

Be advised PWEC is uh, spirited.

Racial slanders of current heads of state have been spoken.

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There's "Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife", and Galula's "Counterinsurgency Warfare" as further reading. To which extent they are actually relevant for ISIS is open for debate; I'd say no because one of the defining moments of ISIS is that they have set up state-like structures, a command hierarchy, and if at all, THEY are the occupants in the region, not the "insurgents".

Of course there would always be the problem to separate combatants from noncombatants on the modern battlefield, particularly if one party is in the habit of disguising as civilian, but even here international law has some answers. It's only a question whether leading politicians are willing to go as far as customary law permits when defining the rules of engagement -- but hello, there we are, discussing politics again.

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Thank you for your replies. But PLEASE note that the subject of this thread very deliberately makes NO MENTION of ISIS/ISIL as I fully understand that that has political overtones that are not acceptable in this forum. So why do the replies mention that organisation? Ssnake's statement that 'there we are, discussing politics again' is certainly not down to me.

I take Mark's point that some organisations currently involved in fighting in the Middle East are not classic insurgency movements. But the sort of fighting going on there is a mile away from the sort of conventional European combat operations that would have occurred if the Cold War had gone hot. I'm interested in the opinions of 'veterans' with recent combat experience as to how such operations might best be conducted and would have thought it was a legitimate subject of discussion on this forum. But I accept that I'm apparently in a minority of one here and therfore withdraw.

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It is true that you didn't make any statement; I simply inferred this background from the context of recent other threads, and I wanted to point out that the literature to which I pointed may actually not be applicable. It's still worth reading, though.

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Actually, perhaps even more helpful than books are a few wargames on the subject.

The COIN series from GMT Games is worth a look, it concentrates on counter insurgency and they have games in the series currently covering Columbia (late 90s, early 2000s), Cuba (the rise of Fidel Castro), Afghanistan (the current conflict) and Vietnam. In the pipeline is one about Algeria 1950-60s, American Revolution, and Caesars invasion of Gaul (of all things). It is a very good series and it can be played by 1 to 4 players (it has a solo/solitaire system).

Another good game to look into is "Labyrinth" by the same publisher, which is getting an expansion "Labyrinth II" which covers the rise of... you-know-who in Syria and allows you to try to figure out a way to defeat it. That game is more of a global conflict in the war on terror, rather than being extremely focused on one particular war (that would be the COIN series). Labyrinth is a game for 1 or 2 players.

Ok, I wouldn't say those wargames are better than books - but it allows you to put strategy and critical thinking to the task of figuring out how COIN ops works. Personally I like to play them alone for "fun". :eek2:

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It is true that you didn't make any statement; I simply inferred this background from the context of recent other threads, and I wanted to point out that the literature to which I pointed may actually not be applicable. It's still worth reading, though.

OK, but I really tried with the subject of this thread and the phrasing of my initial post to discourage people from making such inferences and begin afresh :(

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Another good game to look into is "Labyrinth" by the same publisher, which is getting an expansion "Labyrinth II" which covers the rise of... you-know-who in Syria and allows you to try to figure out a way to defeat it. That game is more of a global conflict in the war on terror, rather than being extremely focused on one particular war (that would be the COIN series). Labyrinth is a game for 1 or 2 players.

That sounds most promising; I'll take a look. People have made reference to the Malayan Emergency, Vietnam, and (unbelievably) Northern Ireland. IMHO none of them are really relevant (especially NI, and I was there) to the sort of combat ops currently going on in the Middle East.

I also understand MG's reservations about giving away trade secrets, but is it not the case that during the cold war, NATO battlefield tactics were not only discussed in detail on this forum but demonstrated via Pro PE scenarios that were available to anyone prepared to cough up the purchase price? That is a genuine question, btw, not an attempt to be contentious or argumentative.

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Stopping / Neutralising ISIS/ISIL is a complex issue and by definition it requires the inclusion of politics, either in the countries fighting them, or as a means within the affected areas to remove their support base.

Its not a simple issue of throwing munitions at them, or “boots on the ground”. Unless you have the political will to stay for a long time, commit lots of troops, expend a lot of money and take casualties (not ones or twos, but quite a number).

You need “Hearts and Minds”, you need to counter their propaganda, you need to fill the domestic power vacuum that allowed them to rise, you need to support a “local” solution that includes the broader Muslim community as well as the states neighbouring the troubles, you need to consider the domestic political impacts of tightening security measures and intelligence activities, etc.

You also need a long term view of the world, not just an event horizon of the next domestic election.

Mark - I would dearly like to comment on your remarks, but am unable to do so because this thread is STRICTLY non-political. :)

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Yes, I accept that Counter Insurgency probably isn't the right term to use for the type of warfare that is currently taking place in the Middle East but I don't know what is. It isn't exactly 'conventional' warfare is it? Northern Ireland started as largely urban Counter Insurgency and remained so throughout so is totally irrelevant to the subject of this thread which is possible BATTLEFIELD tactics.

I'm sorry if me changing my mind as to whether I stop posting or not following further contributions annoys you. Thank you so much for your unwanted and unneeded advice on what I need to do regarding that. In this case the term 'withdraw' meant that I withdrew the request to have a conversation about the subject - indicating an end to the discussion. But having said that, others made further useful contributions which it would have been rude to ignore, so I came back in.

Edited by Tjay
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That sounds most promising; I'll take a look. People have made reference to the Malayan Emergency, Vietnam, and (unbelievably) Northern Ireland. IMHO none of them are really relevant (especially NI, and I was there) to the sort of combat ops currently going on in the Middle East.

Sorry, But how are they not relevant?

"The Middle East" at the moment is what would happen when an "insurgent group" is left unopposed, well, more or less unopposed.

In this context on the ground.

When you start an air campaign or any serious "on the ground" effort they tend to scuttle away into the corners like vermin from a flame.

Like the "other team" did in the "troubles".

(I don't mean to political-lise this thread, I am merely using "Examples")

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You will excuse me if I see your comment as yet another example of the sort of cheap point scoring and 'put-down' remark to which you are addicted, and which so often tarnish your otherwise intelligent and useful contributions. And no, the two emoticons following do not alter that.

Well it was meant as a humorous reminder of your own post of a day or so ago in a different thread (complete with ”a hammer hitting yourself in the head" icon IIRC).

But I gather there is a difference between self deprecation and someone else saying it (even with smileys/emoticons).

Anyway, its gone.

Edited by Gibsonm
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Well it was meant as a humorous reminder of your own post of a day or so ago in a different thread (complete with ”a hammer hitting yourself in the head" icon IIRC).

But I gather there is a difference between self deprecation and someone else saying it (even with smileys/emoticons).

Anyway, its gone.

Thank you. I appreciate it. In a spirit of reciprocal goodwill (it being that season 'an all) I have deleted my original remark.

Edited by Tjay
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Sorry, But how are they not relevant?

"The Middle East" at the moment is what would happen when an "insurgent group" is left unopposed, well, more or less unopposed.

In this context on the ground.

When you start an air campaign or any serious "on the ground" effort they tend to scuttle away into the corners like vermin from a flame.

Like the "other team" did in the "troubles".

(I don't mean to political-lise this thread, I am merely using "Examples")

I accept that they ARE relevant in the ways you mention above, i.e at the strategic level.

Perhaps I have failed to ennuciate what I'm interested in learning about here. The fighting in Syria, as I understand it, is open battlefield-like warfare, Northern Ireland was nothing like that. Malaya isn't relevant, IMHO, because it was jungle, not desert/urban warfare. Same goes for Vietnam - with the exception of Bien Hoa and the final occupation of Saigon. Until the final invasion, neither the North Vietnamese nor the Viet Cong attempted to occupy and hold South Vietnamese territory in an open fashion with borders and front lines. Which, as I understand it, was what stymied Westmoreland's conventional warfare approach.

The 'other team' in Syria are certainly not scuttling away into the corners like vermin are they?

So i was after things such as: How much can be achieved by air attack alone, including drone strikes against individual military leaders? What type of ground forces are best suited to this type of warfare (Tanks? PCs? Artillery?). Stuff like that.

However, I fully accept Mark's point that such information might be regarded as sensitive and best not made available on a public forum available to 'the enemy'. So perhaps it is best to leave things at that?

Edited by Tjay
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Hmm, well don't you know this already?

(Not being trying to be daft or anything.)

Open warfare is open warfare, the differences are you adjust tactics to the opponent and the terrain.

That's what SB's intended professional role is.

To teach the lessons of combat in a virtual environment.

The very fine points such as Gibsonm's TTPs are as Gibsonm and 12Alpha rightly say, classified.

We might have a good idea but aforementioned persons can ahem, neither "confirm nor deny"

On the other hand we might be completely wrong.

:)

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Tjay,

What needs to be remembered with this particular problem is the wide ranging, complex and international character of the conflict. It is a wicked problem.

You cant talk tactics in this case. You are dealing with a non-state organisation that operates from within a number of sovereign states, some allied and some not. Wider international context will see have different countries aligned to different sides of the opposition.

Hedgehog’s Clauswitzian remark of War being an extension of politics by another means is bang on. Clausewitz bangs on about ends ways and means and it is as relevant todays conflict as it was in the 1800s.

What needs to be remembered is that states will act in the interest of a state. If those interests align exactly with another, then great. I would suggest that it is rare that they will entirely. This creates the friction in a coalition.

What is important is the effect you are trying to achieve. It is most likely that it will come down to a mix of Politics, communication, and as a last resort military action. It is also likely that all of these will be overlaid and used in conjunction. This is done by both sides leading to a battle of narrative .

In sum tactics are a minor part of the issues. The tactics are born out of principles that are hard earned and adjusted to the task in hand.

That is why the books written on Malaya, Vietnam, Aden, Doha, Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan are all relevant. We have learnt different things on all of those operations and they are all equally applicable. The clever bit is applying them to the current problem and the changes in technology to deliver them - an by that I predominantly mean the use of social media by both sides.

No SSnake I do not want a social media function for info ops in Steelbeasts!

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Tjay,

That is why the books written on Malaya, Vietnam, Aden, Doha, Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan are all relevant. We have learnt different things on all of those operations and they are all equally applicable. The clever bit is applying them to the current problem and the changes in technology to deliver them - an by that I predominantly mean the use of social media by both sides.

Thanks for your reply Charlie B. It remains my opinion that the books you mention - and the issues to which you refer - are relevant only at the wider, strategic level. I was really after the nitty gritty of the battle fighting aspects such as the use of tanks against an enemy that doesn't have much mechanised equipment of its own, whether the use of artillery is productive or counter productive. That sort of thing. But as you and others have pointed out we we shouldn't discuss those subjects - if only because we don't want to give away our current thinking. I accept that point and am more than happy with the thoughtful responses that have been posted in this thread. Thanks to all that contributed.

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We won't give away a big secret by telling that tanks offer a lot of firepower and protection and that they are generally loathed by fighters that have no tanks - if the crews of those tanks are somewhat competent. As far as the use of artillery is concerned, it depends.

I'm not sure what can be said about tanks and artillery in counterinsurgency warfare at the lower tactical level without discussing extremely specific scenarios. How they are being used - and how they shouldn't - can be studied from the avalanche of YouTube videos, lately from Jemen (lots of double-group facepalms), but also earlier from Iraq (tactically usually successful, not so much strategically), Afghanistan (similar), or Syria (that Kasach TV reporting team).

Beware of extreme snackbar sound levels and brain-melting à capella chants, though. Which may be the point of these videos, actually. You've been warned. But seriously, these videos are a main source of intelligence, for all sides. Of course they are so much more useful if you know the date and location when they were taken, so you can reconstruct a broader context. ANd of course they are all more or less carefully edited to show a specific message. But still there's a lot that can be learned from them, and we don't really have to speak out every detail here.

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Many thanks for the information and advice Ssnake. As you say, many YouTube videos appear to be edited in an attempt to produce propaganda material. It's encouraging to note that some of the 'opposition's, while obviously attempting to demonstrate their bravery and competence, do just the opposite. :)

Unfortunately, I don't have the experience to always judge whether what is being shown is good practice or bad. The big (can't be answered without breaching security) question in my mind is how effective air strikes and drone strikes in enemy-held territory are. I suppose the ideal is when the strikes are coordinated with friendly forces on the ground so they can go in and hold the area after the enemy has suffered casualties from the air. Assuming they have the numbers, the motivation and the necessary kit, of course. I wonder if that is actually happening in 'you know where'.

Anyway, thanks taking the time to contribute to the discussion.

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Yes, I accept that Counter Insurgency probably isn't the right term to use for the type of warfare that is currently taking place in the Middle East but I don't know what is. It isn't exactly 'conventional' warfare is it? Northern Ireland started as largely urban Counter Insurgency and remained so throughout so is totally irrelevant to the subject of this thread which is possible BATTLEFIELD tactics.

Well these guys are basing their operations on the theories of a relatively recent (past 15 years or so) concept of warfare by a guy who is/was one of AQ's main thinkers, Abu Bakr Naji. Perhaps I'm mixing him up with another, al-Suri. In any event as I recall his thinking was very influenced by Maoist concepts of insurgency and the current situation in the Levant reflects that.

The idea being that you create lawless areas through constant pressure and you then use the vacuum to enforce your own law. Instead of it being in neighborhoods as the IRA was doing in NI, it is in a region the size of a mid-sized state.

The actual tactics at this point are at that transitional phase in Maoist warfare, between insurgency and conventional fighting. I think RusFed wants to keep these people in the conventional phase for as long as possible so as to attrit them and their supplies. It helps explain the slow grinding fighting going on along a wide front.

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Well these guys are basing their operations on the theories of a relatively recent (past 15 years or so) concept of warfare by a guy who is/was one of AQ's main thinkers, Abu Bakr Naji. Perhaps I'm mixing him up with another, al-Suri. In any event as I recall his thinking was very influenced by Maoist concepts of insurgency and the current situation in the Levant reflects that.

The idea being that you create lawless areas through constant pressure and you then use the vacuum to enforce your own law. Instead of it being in neighborhoods as the IRA was doing in NI, it is in a region the size of a mid-sized state.

The actual tactics at this point are at that transitional phase in Maoist warfare, between insurgency and conventional fighting. I think RusFed wants to keep these people in the conventional phase for as long as possible so as to attrit them and their supplies. It helps explain the slow grinding fighting going on along a wide front.

Thanks for the input Tom. Again, tho, we are talking strategic more than tactical here. Let me put it this way. Many videos of Iraq after the main fighting had ended showed urban and suburban environments being patrolled by MIs. I understand why - because that was what was on hand after the 'big bangs' stage had finished. But to my COMPLETELY UNTRAINED EYE (and I mean that sincerely), they looked unwieldy and vulnerable against individuals toting RPGs. So if a Western force were intending to take and hold a town such as Aleppo, today, would they ideally use different vehicles and a different tactics? If so, what?

If any of the professionals consider that this is the sort of thing we shouldn't discuss here for security reasons, just say so.

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