Jump to content
Tjay

Counter insurgency operations

Recommended Posts

You would use tanks in high intensity street fighting.

Such as Hue and Fallujah as examples

Well supported by infantry they are effectively a piece of mobile cover that can shoot back.

Also it was for this type of terrain (and others) that the M1028 Canister round was developed.

Unsupported they die like the videos of (begins with S ends with A)

In this environment the tanks tend to do what they call a "Stand off" Breach I.E. Blow a big hole in the wall.

They can also clear streets and reduce "soft" obstacles (Car/tyre based roadblocks Sandbag walls etc) with the M1028 round.

Incidentally that's what the Dutch Leo 2s did in Afghan as part of their fire support remit.

Low intensity street fighting tends to be more like a riot with firearms involved

Again as an example: Northern Ireland

Tanks can fill many other roles aside from dedicated anti armour, that's is why they still have a place on the modern battle field, they can fill the role of a 120mm artillery piece, a double hard piece of mobile cover, a well protected radio system, a giant shotgun, self deploying mine/obstacle clearance asset and a mobile 7.62mm pillbox.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Thanks Hedge. You have added to my knowledge of how tanks are best employed in urban environments. :) Seems to me that almost as important as what they CAN do is what they CAN'T. I've just been swatting up on the MRAP programme. Presumably, these vehicles would play a big part in any modern conflict in which it was necessary to get troops into and around urband and suburban environments? What's the nearest thing to a MRAP in SB?

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
If any of the professionals consider that this is the sort of thing we shouldn't discuss here for security reasons, just say so.

That would imply it was close to the mark when it may or may not be.

Anyway I’ve had my head bitten off once here already.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
That would imply it was close to the mark when it may or may not be.

Anyway I’ve had my head bitten off once here already.

Well, I do not have the ability to judge if a certain subject is 'security sensitive' or not and am therefore happy to be guided by those that are. Better safe than sorry. If by having your 'head bitten off' you are referring to anything I have written in this thread, please be assured that I didn't mean to. Anyway, I'm glad to see that you've got it reattached in quick time with no permanent damage. :)

And many thanks for pointing out the vehicles most closely representing the MRAP.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

<snip>

Incidentally that's what the Dutch Leo 2s did in Afghan as part of their fire support remit.

<snip>

I'm sure you mean the Danish?

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Regarding sources of information, there are plenty of publicly available sources. In my prep and deployment in Afghanistan, I became very acquainted with them.

The best primer is "Counterinsurgency," by David Kilcullen. It contains a lot of theory and several recent case studies. In the back of the book is a primer if you are deploying as far as what to do and what to look for.

The US Army/Marines Counterinsurgency Field Manual is also public knowledge.

The book "The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa" is a good one about being a local commander in CI, and has a nice throw-back to the Boer War. From these sources you can deduce what low level tactics will be and maybe try to simulate them in SB.

These are great books but don't really help you in SB at all. CI is a lot of work - law enforcement, public relations, press relations, human intelligence, perception management, government relations, etc - and less on the shooting element. CI is far more than just military action, and it deeply frustrates those who just want military action.

CI is usually from the standpoint of the following script:

- A nation or region has a very ineffective government.

- A sub-national group advances its agenda and is unable to be stopped by the local government. Both compete for control of the area and its population.

- Violence occurs.

- The violence gets out of hand and draws in a large foreign power as an occupying power.

- The foreign power tries to prop up the local government so they can handle the problem in the long term, while simultaneously trying to get the violence under control.

- Elements of the local entities form an insurgency against the foreign occupier.

- The occupier now has an insurgency against them and is now engaged in counter-insurgency, while still trying to pursue security and getting a functional local government in place that can deal with the issues.

A key of CI is that you need to understand the local groups - their gripes, aspirations, economics, culture and societal norms, etc. Things get very complex very quickly and it baffles outsiders, who often just want a simple solution and get out. The local issues that were present in Bosnia, the Middle East, etc are far more complex than most outsiders are equipped to deal with. I think Americans are particularly frustrated by this, as our society is fairly monolithic and we don't encounter deep cultural divides in close proximity - we are therefore untrained in that kind of thinking.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

- The occupier now has an insurgency against them and is now engaged in counter-insurgency, while still trying to pursue security and getting a functional local government in place that can deal with the issues.

Seems to me that this is the essential lesson from Aghanistan that is forgotten over and over again. The Afghans may fight amongst themselves perpertually but once a foreign force enters their country they put their differences aside temporarily to fight the infidel invader. Once he is expelled (with his tail between his legs), it's back to business as usual. The Brits in particular should know this.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
Regarding sources of information, there are plenty of publicly available sources. In my prep and deployment in Afghanistan, I became very acquainted with them.

The best primer is "Counterinsurgency," by David Kilcullen. It contains a lot of theory and several recent case studies. In the back of the book is a primer if you are deploying as far as what to do and what to look for.

The US Army/Marines Counterinsurgency Field Manual is also public knowledge.

The book "The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa" is a good one about being a local commander in CI, and has a nice throw-back to the Boer War. From these sources you can deduce what low level tactics will be and maybe try to simulate them in SB.

These are great books but don't really help you in SB at all. CI is a lot of work - law enforcement, public relations, press relations, human intelligence, perception management, government relations, etc - and less on the shooting element. CI is far more than just military action, and it deeply frustrates those who just want military action.

CI is usually from the standpoint of the following script:

- A nation or region has a very ineffective government.

- A sub-national group advances its agenda and is unable to be stopped by the local government. Both compete for control of the area and its population.

- Violence occurs.

- The violence gets out of hand and draws in a large foreign power as an occupying power.

- The foreign power tries to prop up the local government so they can handle the problem in the long term, while simultaneously trying to get the violence under control.

- Elements of the local entities form an insurgency against the foreign occupier.

- The occupier now has an insurgency against them and is now engaged in counter-insurgency, while still trying to pursue security and getting a functional local government in place that can deal with the issues.

A key of CI is that you need to understand the local groups - their gripes, aspirations, economics, culture and societal norms, etc. Things get very complex very quickly and it baffles outsiders, who often just want a simple solution and get out. The local issues that were present in Bosnia, the Middle East, etc are far more complex than most outsiders are equipped to deal with. I think Americans are particularly frustrated by this, as our society is fairly monolithic and we don't encounter deep cultural divides in close proximity - we are therefore untrained in that kind of thinking.

Without a effective CI plan,nothing the war fighter will do will have their desired effect on the ground.

In NATO we call his IA or influence actives, CIMIC and CI fall into this as well as other enablers when I deployed , and was tasked at the tactical level in my small part of A'stan to implement a CI plan and enable us to fight the enemy on this level.

When I came home I was sent to the school to teach what I saw worked and most importantly, what did not to the younger generation, so I have some insight into the subject matter....or so I was told

One might say I was at the front of the ISAF COIN plan.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
Seems to me that this is the essential lesson from Aghanistan that is forgotten over and over again. The Afghans may fight amongst themselves perpertually but once a foreign force enters their country they put their differences aside temporarily to fight the infidel invader. Once he is expelled (with his tail between his legs), it's back to business as usual. The Brits in particular should know this.

A bit more complex.The Afgans will fight for who ever will pay them, it's a matter of putting bread on the table, it may be Nato, another tribe, the enemy, or family members. A son may join the opposing force (Tallies) for the basic reason to bring home money, if he dies he gets his 16 virgins, and the family will send more males. No different than sending a 10 year old to work in another province/district for child labor, to pay a debit off, seen all of this first hand. And there is no way to stop this basic need to feed your family.

The taliban would drive to a village and offer anyone a AK some ammo and 20 US dollars to shoot at us, chances he would not be killed, and he makes the $20.00 US, hard to stop this kind of behavior when they would make less than $20.00 US a month.Like I said,it's complex.:c:

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

You could tell the difference between hard-core "want to die" fighters and those who were trying to earn some pay (usually in the lull in farming between harvests). Those who wanted to live would take some poor shots and then split before they could be shot back at. Those who were suicide candidates were fewer and farther between and would go for special training. Generally, I didn't feel like most Afghans had much hostility toward us - it felt like the crazies in NW Pakistan were responsible for a lot of the problems. There was kind of a weariness in the Afghan side for having been at war for over 30 years. You see a lot of war damage there, old and new scars: damaged buildings, craters, amputees, etc.

When I was in Afghanistan in the summer of 2012, we felt that the area was going to continue in war and it would probably get worse when ISAF left, probably to a multi-way Afghan civil war with the Taliban from NW Pakistan. Kind of a repeat of the mid/late 1990s. That is why the ISAF draw-down is going so slowly.

Back to SB - there isn't much fun game play in SB for COIN ops. You could do procedural training, like proper response to an IED strike on your convoy. Maybe spawn a red troop in a crowd, have him fire a few rounds for a few seconds, then disappear him from the map. You can practice your 9-lines. Not much fun, if you ask me. However, there are current day ops that would make for a better time in SB - elements of Ukraine, Syria, etc, where you see larger ops and more hardware being used. Having a driveable T-72 becomes very relevant with these possibilities.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

The best primer is "Counterinsurgency," by David Kilcullen.

The book "The Defense of Jisr al-Doreaa" is a good one about being a local commander in CI, and has a nice throw-back to the Boer War.

Have ordered both of these. As for doing this sort of thing in SB, this thread was started accepting that such operations were difficult if not impossible in SB, and therefore asking for opinions relevant to RL. In fact 'Counter Insurgency Operations' wasn't the right title; I was primarily interested in how to dislodge enemy infantry - who may or may not qualify as insurgents - from the sort of small town (often severely damaged) commonly found in Iraq and Syria, with particular emphasis on the most suitable type of vehicle for deploying/supporting one's own soldiers. But contributions on the wider aspects/implacations of COIN ops have been most interesting. Again, thanks to all who have taken the trouble to contribute.

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
Have ordered both of these. As for doing this sort of thing in SB, this thread was started accepting that such operations were difficult if not impossible in SB, and therefore asking for opinions relevant to RL. In fact 'Counter Insurgency Operations' wasn't the right title; I was primarily interested in how to dislodge enemy infantry - who may or may not qualify as insurgents - from the sort of small town (often severely damaged) commonly found in Iraq and Syria, with particular emphasis on the most suitable type of vehicle for deploying/supporting one's own soldiers. But contributions on the wider aspects/implacations of COIN ops have been most interesting. Again, thanks to all who have taken the trouble to contribute.

Some set up a screen in 3 directions, the open direction is where your forces move in. Once in the area of said village two circles positions are setup, a outer and inner, then the clearing ops begin. Village is given sectors and individual units clear their sectors till done. Enemy that squirm out are caught by inner/outer circles. Forces trying to assist the enemy from afar are seen by the screen and dealt with.

Hope this helps:clin:

Any questions or details just PM me. Have done plenty of theses as a CIMIC:cool3: Operator, and a screen commander when in my Armoured role....ah the days....:luxhello:

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Join the conversation

You can post now and register later. If you have an account, sign in now to post with your account.

Guest
Reply to this topic...

×   Pasted as rich text.   Paste as plain text instead

  Only 75 emoji are allowed.

×   Your link has been automatically embedded.   Display as a link instead

×   Your previous content has been restored.   Clear editor

×   You cannot paste images directly. Upload or insert images from URL.


×
×
  • Create New...